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FRANCO-GERMAN DEFENSE STRATEGY DISCUSSED

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Nov 79 pp 24-27

[Article by Michel Schneider: "Franco-German Defense? Crux of the Debate"]

[Text] In its 20 August 1979 issue, the weekly LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR asked Georges Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti the "sacriligious question": Must our nuclear capability be shared with the Germans? Their answers opened the door to clarifications and aroused commentaries by various critics who seized this opportunity to rehash their stock article on "European defense" in a sort of "gift wrapping." Upon close analysis, George Buis' remarks proved to be perfectly reasonable and quite orthodox. But this was really the least one could expect from the former president of the Foundation for National Defense Studies. Alexandre Sanguinetti's comments, however, were more like striking political prophecy than sage strategic realism. They were the ideal spark to rekindle the controversy over a Franco-German defense of Western Europe.

The Issue

In his now well-known report on implementation and updating of the military programming law for 1977-1982, Arthur Paecht, the UDF [Union for French Democracy] deputy from Var, summarized the "proposition" advanced by Buis and Sanguinetti as follows: "Both propose that pro-Europeans consider a Franco-German agreement with a view to creating a nuclear European defense. They both recommend a 'grand plan' that would permit a mix of technical and political exchanges for a trial period of some 10 years. These exchanges would deal mainly with 'nuclear logistics' and the two countries would back development of military satellites, etc. France and Germany would 'marry but agree to each manage their separate properties,' the precondition being Germany's withdrawal from NATO. Sanguinetti and General Buis are offering this solution to pro-Europeans while they themselves continue to support the national deterrent." The question that then naturally comes to mind, and which Paecht did not answer, is: Why did these two partisans of French independence decide, in unison, to play the "sorcerer's apprentice" [person who unleashes forces he cannot control] by putting themselves in the position of pro-Europeans for the duration of a few interviews?

But above and beyond all this froth, we must stick to what is actually being said and done. The honorable member of Parliament's "summary" doubtlessly does quite accurately reflect Alexandre Sanguinetti's position, and to a lesser degree Georges Buis' position. In fact, what did the latter actually say? "A European defense can emerge solely from a partnership between the French nuclear force and German industry.... I believe much less in an automatic casus belli in the event Germany were to acquire a nuclear capability. This would be done in stages and on the European level. It would take 1 or 2 decades.... When I am asked how to build a united Europe, I repeat that there is only one way, namely risking the establishment of a common defense based on cooperation between France and Germany."(1) A little later, Buis further clarified his position: "I am in no way advocating extension of the French nuclear deterrent to Germany. What I do propose is a twofold process, political and logistical, that would enable France and Germany together to display a deterrence that would then be jointly theirs. As for the instrument per se, in other words the weapon systems produced by the complementarity and financing of the two major continental powers, its deterrent capability would have complete credibility.(2) Though at first glance, General Buis' position appears quite "advanced," it ultimately turns out to be a cautious approach.

In contrast, Alexandre Sanguinetti's comments are sharper and more political. Yet their originality probably does not lie where some journalists have perceived it. Their originality and paradox lie rather in his divergent opinion on the so-called theater weapons, a subject that is obviously very much in the news today. Sanguinetti actually said: "The validity of the deterrent strategy of medium-sized powers like France is being questioned. Can we possibly respond to a coercive weapon striking military targets, solely by employing a deterrent weapon aimed at population centers and economic targets? The hard fact is that we must launch out into the same technological race as the superpowers. Are we capable of doing this alone? I do not believe we are. Hence we must face the problem: we need a partner."(3) That partner is obviously Germany. In Sanguinetti's opinion, if the SALT II agreement is ratified, this will open the way for the SALT III agreement which will seal Europe's fate as a pure and simple protectorate of the United States. He continues to reject the notion of fighting a classical battle, while noting that we may be forced into one. In this connection, he recalls that the creation of our nuclear force was a conservatory act for an independent Europe. He now maintains: "If our nuclear weaponry does not evolve in this direction (acquire a battle capability) while still retaining its deterrent capability, we are taking a great risk."(4) General Buis retains the conventional view on this particular point. So he told Sanguinetti: "I do not agree with you. Our strategy of deterrence has nothing to do with the coercive counterforce strategy developed by the American and Soviets. Our strategy is in a way a kind of state terrorism that cannot allow itself to particularize.... And our nuclear capability is deterrent precisely because it cannot particularize."(5)

To this, Sanguinetti simply replied: "If they do not attack our cities, I doubt that we will retaliate against their cities." This is really the major issue that is leading us by slow degrees from abandonment of deterrence toward the strategy calling for "employment of nuclear firepower." One thing is clear, however. General Buis remains "an unshakable partisan of a national deterrent force," while Alexandre Sanguinetti does not.

Sanguinetti, like General De Gaulle, has taken the habit of saying everything and the opposite of everything. Ordinary people find this quite confusing. In a book published 2 years ago--"L'Armee Pourquoi Faire?" [What Is the Army For?], Editions Seghers--he wrote that the FRG's possession of nuclear weapons "is not in France's interest and would be considered a casus belli by the Soviet Union." Last year again, in his pamphlet--"J'ai Mal a Ma Peau de Gaulliste" [I Feel Uncomfortable as a Gaullist], Editions Grasset, p 133--he wrote: "We reproach the president of the Republic, fundamentally, for saying at every turn that we are a medium-sized power.... This is the inveterate argument of the rancid right that forms part of the centrist bloc." Yet today Sanguinetti himself now refers to "the strategy of a medium-size power like France" (see above). So who are we to believe? Even more recently he acknowledged: "France does not feel capable of standing up to Germany and equaling it, the primary condition of any partnership."(6)

French Reactions

In a 9 February 1978 televised interview, the chief of state asserted: "What I want to make perfectly clear is that the French deterrent is a French deterrent.... France is opposed to any direct or indirect plan for the nuclear arming of Germany." A view he confirmed on 17 September 1979: "I categorically rule out any proposal by France calling for the establishment of nuclear armament in the Federal Republic of Germany." As for "theater weapons," Defense Minister Yvon Bourges, in an appearance before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on 12 October in connection with the neutron bomb, told that body: "The neutron bomb is a theater of operations weapon and is consequently tied to acceptance of fighting a classical battle, a concept opposed to the concept of deterrence." And yet we do recall certain official statements [to the contrary] by Jacques Chirac in 1975, General Mery in 1976, and Raymond Barre in 1977, plus the "imprimatur" given to books by Guy Brosselet ("Essai sur la non-bataille"), Philippe Debas ("L'Armee de l'atome"), Guy Doly ("Strategie France-Europe," "La 6e Colonne," and "Euroshima"), and certain articles in the DEFENSE NATIONALE review. As early as 1969, General Fourquet, General Ailleret's successor [as armed forces chief of staff], stated--in a lecture at the IHEDN [Institute of Advanced National Defense Studies]-- that in the event of conflict, "graduated actions" could henceforth precede the "strategic nuclear strike."

He also explicitly admitted that in a crisis situation, French air and ground "battle" forces could, if necessary, operate "in close coordination with the forces of our allies." This statement made during General De Gaulle's presidency marked the end of the "all or nothing" strategy.

Reactions in political circles to the firebrand comments of Buis and Sanguinetti have, of course, been quite varied, but also not surprising. For instance, Jean Le Lagadec, writing in L'HUMANITE, said: "It is impossible to reconcile the views expressed by General Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti with concern for national independence and sovereignty. But what is certain is that persons like Lecanuet and others who advocate surrender of our national independence, out-and-out Atlanticists, will rejoice at such comments."(7) Such was not the case with Francois de Rose, despite his close relations with Atlantic circles: "The first essential observation is that in a world that remains militarily bipolar, Western Europe lacks two of the assets necessary to superpowers: space, the geographical dimension, and resources of raw materials and energy.... The second consideration has to do with the magnitude of the effort required to acquire a degree of power capable of withstanding comparison to the power of the Soviet Union."(8) Georges Sarre, one of the leaders of the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research, and Education], considered that "a Franco-German alliance in the field of nuclear deterrence would be a poor subterfuge designed to place French deterrent forces under an integrated command, at NATO's disposal."(9) Paul Granet, former assistant secretary general for national defense, criticized the "lack of realism" displayed by partisans of "Franco-German nuclear collaboration" who "persist in ignoring the fact that nuclearization of the German armed forces would probably be viewed as a casus belli by East European countries and would constitute the model case in which French public opinion would massively push for adoption of a position of neutrality."(10)

During the RPR [Rally for the Republic] parliamentary seminar on 27 September 1979, Maurice Couve de Murville said: "France alone harbors the ambition to remain itself. And if it has its own nuclear capability, the reason is that it knows this capability would be the last resort the day its national existence is directly threatened, everything else having collapsed. As for considering atomic cooperation with Germany, that would be treating two basic concepts with scorn. First, by its very nature, the atomic capability can only be national because the attendant responsibility for the decision to employ nuclear weapons is such that it cannot be shared. Secondly, is it France's place to suggest to the Federal Republic of Germany that it denounce the solemn obligations it has wisely assumed relative to atomic matters?" Michel Debre, in his confrontation with Buis and Sanguinetti, also very clearly recalled that "the partnership of France and Germany means Europeanization, and nothing else. It being clearly understood that, in General De Gaulle's mind, French views on independence take precedence over German views on dependence. But such a Europe is productive only with a France that is on an equal demographic, industrial, technological, and monetary footing with its neighbor." (11)

As for Michel Jobert and Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, they have both raised the major issue, namely the Atlantic Alliance. According to Jobert, "the Atlantic Alliance, which once represented both the American tutelage and assured protection in exchange, has become a semi-empty reality: the protection no longer exists but the tutelage remains." And Jobert added: "The

only element of freedom which Europe has today is France's freedom and independence in nuclear matters."[12] Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti seems to find himself in agreement, for once, with his "adversary brother." He wrote: "There can be no French or European independence until we have raised the issue of the Atlantic Alliance and chosen to break with the policy of blocs."[13]

Thus, if the NATO forces, who adopted, in spite of our recommendations, the flexible response strategy, now find themselves in a fix, this must be no concern of France whose security and independence are based on strategic nuclear weapons, guarantees of the "sanctuarization" of its territory. Current developments only serve to confirm the value of deterrence of the strong by the weak through the threat of attacks on population centers in case of aggression against our vital interests. Alexandre Sanguinetti's proposal is highly attractive from the historical perspective of a potentially "imperial" Europe, but it faces two obstacles that are insurmountable at the present time. First, there can be no viable and honorable partnership between two partners who have been unequal since 1974. Secondly, there can be no partnership between two partners when there is a clear and total absence of agreement by one of the partners. Unlike the ambiguous French position, the German position is, in fact, perfectly clear. Across the Rhine, the question does not arise: "semper pax Americana."

German Position

In 1954, under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty, Germany expressly renounced becoming a nuclear power.[14] Germany has also ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1 July 1968. Nevertheless, a procedure based on the NATO Nuclear Planning Group[15] could be established. This procedure would grant Germany right of control over the use of nuclear weapons without that country itself therby becoming custodian of such weapons. Thus the main obstacle to a Franco-German partnership in this field is not legal but political. Chancellor Schmidt's words at the 1974 Washington Energy Conference continue to re-echo: "Between the United States and Europe, my choice is already made" (implication: in favor of the United States, naturally). On 6 September, the German chancellor stated in Budapest: "The Federal Republic harbors absolutely no ambition to participate in a nuclear strategy." Karsten Voigt, a Social Democratic Party member of parliament, has reiterated that his party does not want Germany to become a nuclear power "whether it be with the help of France or the help of another country." On 4 September, West German Defense Minister Hans Apel asserted: "Europeans need U.S. protection against intimidation. This protection cannot be replaced. Even if Western Europe were to create a political union, the role of the United States in nuclear protection would remain indispensable." Nevertheless, in an interview given L'EXPRESS, former FRG finance minister Frantz Josef Strauss said he would like to see Franco-German relations expanded "to include a joint defense program."[16]

Actually, as accurately noted by Gerard Vaillant in his latest column in DEFENSE NATIONALE, some German statements in favor of closer cooperation

between France and Germany on conventional weapons and arms control correspond with "the pressures being increasingly brought to bear on us this past year within Western European Union and NATO bodies to have France extend its efforts in armament cooperation much beyond the objective of equipment interoperability and toward attaining the objective of equipment standardization, without most of our partners planning thereby to cease supplying themselves with aircraft and armored vehicles elsewhere than in the United States."[17]

From the standpoint of doctrine and the major principles of European defense, the recently published German defense white paper clearly looks like a manifesto of resistance to any change. Recalling that the FRG is prohibited from producing and arming itself with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the white paper firmly reasserted that "the Alliance's strategic unity in defense policy and arms control must continue to be the foundation of mutual security on both sides of the Atlantic." In fact, the German authorities emphasized that while "the security of Europe and the FRG is assured through the Alliance with North America," at the same time "Europe does constitute an important element of security for the United States." For this reason, on the strategic level, "Europeans need the protection furnished by the American nuclear deterrent, an irreplaceable factor." In connection with this reminder of American commitments, the white paper explained that "even if Western Europe were to succeed in achieving its political unity, American nuclear protection would still be indispensable." "In fact," the document added, "nothing is further from the intentions of the Federal Republic of Germany than the creation of a European nuclear force."

That's certainly clear enough. Of the four foreign policy choices open to Germany--Ostpolitik, European policy, neutralism and German reunification or special relations with the Americans within NATO--the latter is the FRG's "best choice," the choice of a European policy having been completely ruled out. It is reasonable to think, however, that the United States' mounting loss of credibility coupled with Germany's continuously increasing power will irresistibly lead the latter toward the third choice of reunification at the price of neutralization. At that time, who would prevent a very great "neutral" power from acquiring a nuclear capability in 1 or 2 months? Nobody.

American Tutelage

In a recent radio interview in the United States, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said: "It is possible that in the future our allies could assume a larger part of the burden of our common military power in their own region, while we would direct ourselves more to the build-up of global military forces." The "regional forces" of the U.S.A. and the USSR would thus be face to face in Europe. Speaking in Brussels on 1 September, Henry Kissinger was quite explicit about the "regional forces" of the U.S.A.: "It is fitting to examine the imbalance created in theater forces.... If such forces are not deployed on the European continent, we are endorsing beforehand selective blackmail directed against our allies, and we risk finding ourselves reduced to a 'nonmilitary' strategy based on the destruction of civilian populations....

The president could threaten the enemy with massive strategic retaliation. But would this be a realistic attitude?" This question is akin to Alexandre Sanguinetti's doubts about the credibility of the employment of our strategic nuclear force: "If the Soviets were to nuclearize our Cambrai [air] base, would we retaliate strategically on Minsk? I doubt it."

And this is why, confronted with the new threat of the currently deployed 80 Backfire bombers and 120 SS-20 missiles--annual rate of production: 30 for Backfires, and from 35 at the present time to 65 or 70 soon for the SS-20's--the United States will get the NATO countries to approve, without any resistance, the decision to equip them with 572 additional delivery vehicles--464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing-2 missiles--scheduled to be deployed in Europe beginning in 1983 and capable, in their opinion, of maintaining a credible deterrence. By deploying these accurate and mobile medium-range missiles, the Americans are thereby giving Westerners the capability of retaliating without being compelled to resort to a degree of noncredible violence at the very outset. Europeans will thus have the capability of conducting rational operations if deterrence fails, something Kissinger seemingly has no doubt will happen. And so Europe will virtually be transformed into a field of battle and of ruins!

And What About France"

A recent poll[18] confirmed something many persons already suspected, namely that 57 percent of all Frenchmen are not prepared to die for their country. After the doubts expressed about the chief of state's resolve to open fire with strategic nuclear weapons, this opinion poll strikes another blow at the credibility of our strategy of absolute deterrence. Our strategic force is starting to look like a dubiously effective scarecrow. We know, however, that only a deterrent force independent of the Russians and Americans can prevent them from choosing Europe as the site for settling their scientifically graduated conflicts. We know that a nuclear capability must remain the supreme instrument of "no-war" and rejection of waging a classical battle. But if Frenchmen are weary, if they are loudly asserting their refusual to make the supreme sacrifice, if more and more young officers are dreaming only of battles and are spending their time constructing theories making war possible once again, is it not, therefore, necessary for us to take cognizance of these conditions and give ourselves the doctrine[19] and means enabling us to put up a real military defense against the power of relative deterrence? Is France willing and able to adopt a military defense policy based on qualitatively and quantitatively "sufficient" tactical nuclear weapons? The partisans of a united Europe believe France cannot do this alone, that it, therefore, has to reenter NATO through the back door or become Germany's partner in a "grand plan" which Germany does not want to hear even mentioned. The French Government is waiting until the end of the current programming law. And from now until then, it is letting people talk and write. Others believe that France has the technological, industrial, and financial capacity to deploy these tactical nuclear weapons effectively. Yes, indeed, the deterrent is now being challenged.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Interview with Georges Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti," LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 20 August 1979.

2. Georges Buis, "Europe's Hard Core," LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 3 September 1979.

3. "Interview with Georges Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti," op. cit.

4. "Debate Between Michel Debre, Alexandre Sanguinetti, and Georges Buis," LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 10 September 1979.

5. Ibid.

6. Alexandre Sanguinetti, "Risking the Franco-German Europe," LE MONDE, 10 October 1979.

7. L'HUMANITE, 21 August 1979.

8. Francois de Rose, "On the Defense of Europe," LE MONDE, 26-27 September 1979.

9. "Interview With Georges Sarre," LE MATIN, 15 September 1979.

10. Paul Granet, "National Security and European Strategy," LE MONDE, 9 September 1979.

11. "Debate Between Michel Debre, Alexandre Sanguinetti, and Georges Buis," op. cit.

12. Michel Jobert, "Thank You, Henry!", LE MONDE, 6 October 1979.

13. TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN, 1 September 1979.

14. The Western European Union's Standing Armaments Committee exercises supervision and control of this provision of the treaty.

15. The Nuclear Planning Group has a certain number of permanent members--FRG, Italy, United Kingdom, United States, and Canada--and others whose membership rotates periodically. This group is the forum for discussion of plans relative to the use of nuclear weapons.

16. L'EXPRESS, 24 September 1979.

17. DEFENSE NATIONALE, October 1979.

18. PARIS MATCH, 19 October 1979.

19. When ANT [tactical nuclear weapons] were introduced in France, instead of devising an authentic test maneuver, military authorities merely incorporated their employment into the mission theretofore assigned to the 1st Army. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the function of a test is distorted if its purpose is also to "demonstrate our will to resist." Insofar as we are relying on nuclear deterrence by default, what does resisting means to someone who has admitted his is unable to mount an active conventional defense having some chance of success?

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CSO: 3100

RECENT BOOK, STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE POLICY ANALYZED

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Nov 79 pp 28-31

[Article by Pierre Dabezies: "In a Dubious Debate"]

[Text] We all know that summer is traditionally the season of festivals. This year, however, observers who specialize in defense matters have been particularly blessed! As a curtain raiser, there was the publication of a book, "Euroshima." This was followed by a few spectacular statements, and then by Carter's lofty language upon "discovering" Soviet troops in Cuba.

Should all of this agitation be viewed as beneficial or has it served to confuse people's thinking? One does not, of course, preclude the other! The most wide-ranging debates are unquestionably best when they make it possible to debunk and defuse explosive situations, and understand problems better, if not always solve them. The cause must be clear, however, and its advocates must not mask their real motives. They must not employ questionable technical arguments--arcane to ordinary mortals--meant to conceal partisan ties they do not even dare admit. They must not contradict themselves every week, using their reputation to cover new solutions they affirm to be logical, only to offer them later as more or less reductio-ad-absurdum proof of the futility of something it had been believed they had actually justified. Likewise, we sincerely hope that analysis of "deterrence" does not become--under the pretext that such analysis is the "art of the virtual" and, therefore, makes any kind of lucubration permissible--a sort of fight between ghost writers in a tunnel where anything goes!

As General De Gaulle used to quip: "Policy making is not a parlor game of crambo." We are inclined to say the same about defense matters and about problems affecting the Community's survival. Isn't there a need for some ethics in this field? In the face of all these tirades, hoaxes, dilettantism, and publicity-seeking prophecies, we have a particular right to ask to what point do critics have the right to play with those three central notions of ours, namely France, deterrence, and Germany?

"Euroshima"--a revised and corrected version of the book "Strategie France-Europe" published 2 years ago and supplemented by "La 6e Colonne" [The Sixth Column]--cannot be reproachfully labeled political cant. Couched in a somewhat summary argumentation which various specialized journalists have already belabored, the book's bias is no mystery because it is not original. According to the book, the problem is, of course, one of saving freedom at all costs from the "red hydra" which is described, as is proper, in the darkest of terms.

What freedom? All we know from this somewhat short treatise on political science is that this freedom is not independence, is not the specificity of our people, and is not France's development. On the contrary. The total threat Moscow poses to us must be countered with a total strategy. But our country is not capable of doing this. It has no choice, therefore, but to alienate itself, in a word, renounce its identity and its independence so as to preserve them more effectively. A classical example of twisted reasoning! Strategy ceases to be the daughter of politics to become its cruel stepmother. The "law" yields in the face of the "threat." Gribouille [popular type of simpleton] throws himself into the water so as not to get wet!

Yet Guy Doly, tempered by a few confederates, has made some progress since writing "Strategie France-Europe." This time, in his proposed new European Defense Community he avoids excessive reference to Germany, thereby making virtue of necessity in his approach which is "innovative" compared to the views held by those who yearn for the "old days," by the timorous and puristic who resent any sharing of our atomic forces. Yet the book's anticommunist and geopolitical over-simplifications are annoyingly reminiscent of the arguments formerly repeated ad nauseam by "psychological operations" personnel in Algiers.

To conclude, because it is well to make assurance doubly sure, it goes without saying that the more the reader is unconvinced of its "operability" the less this new EDC [European Defense Community] formula excludes Atlanticism. As for the Russians, it also goes without saying that they remain quiet in the face of the recommended change, despite the fact that they are assumed to be aggressive and conquest-minded!

Georges Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti propose an approach which differs from Doly's. It is prompted, of course, by other considerations and is of different character. Although submitted without too much personal conviction and without their own full approval, their proposal does at least have a certain logic about it, even though it is plagued with contradictions. Political considerations reassume their rightful place. The need to unite is not based on any fear of the Soviets, on a purely negative reflex. On the contrary, our two musketeers attack those abusive simplifcations which in assessing the East's forces overlook a geographical, sociological, and political context unlike any other. For the sake of the cause, these two men are able, without contradicting themselves, to claim, therefore, that the idea of a "casus belli"--in the event of the FRG's nuclearization--is a myth. In short, the basic argument of this minor "bombshell" is--at least as

far as we can judge--that if we really want to build a united Europe, we must basically form a partnership with Germany and must begin it with the defense system.

We shall make a few timid observations at this point, without mentioning those smaller European nations who may not appreciate the position to which they are being relegated, or Great Britain that is somewhat precipitately cast into outer darkness at the very moment it seems, as a matter of fact, to be interested in Trident [missiles]. Nor shall we comment on the sudden change in outlook which nobody expected from these two well-known defenders of the national "donjon." It is a well-known fact that only fools never change their mind! Let us concede therefore, that Aramis and Porthos have given up Anne of Austria for the Cardinal [Richelieu]! Let us also concede that Sanguinetti's panoramic historical surveys on the "Nation" as opposed to the "Empire," works that had made him famous, were merely jokes, as indeed some historians had previously suggested. At the very most, we will have to become used to it and no longer get excited whenever Sanguinetti invokes in support of the Franco-German nuclear force the figure of the Macedonian federator or the spectacle of the Battle of Navarino!

We shall confine our comment to the objective basic facts, and in that connection, three weaknesses must be pointed out. The first has to do with the pious wish that Germany withdraw from NATO. An illusory precondition that negates the demonstration! Not only because Bonn has absolutely no intention of withdrawing, but also because it has every reason not to do so. One such reason is that the French atomic force, tailored to its specific mission and ipso facto limited, is not prepared--even if it so desired--to rival the Soviet arsenal and conform to the Soviet strategy. Another reason is that Germany has closer ties with the United States than we do and is also more anxious--for reasons of security and the "Ost-politik"--not to provoke the Kremlin.

The second weakness has to do, this time, with the crux of the problem, namely the concept of building a Bonn-Paris nuclear defense system. Admittedly, Alexandre Sanguinetti rightly recalls that a short time ago he had emphasized how the French nuclear force served to conserve Europe. Actually he is not the only one to have said that although this force was perhaps temporarily blocking European construction, it was continuing to safeguard Europe's future until that day when it could serve as the "nucleus" of a larger force that would strengthen the political union and make us freer of NATO. The main question is whether that day has now arrived. Has it arrived because the American "umbrella" is more or less "full of holes," to use the stock expression? But that situation is precisely why we established our own nuclear arsenal some 20 years ago! No, this is by no means the case at a time when conversely there is every indication that the Franco-German balance--without which there can be no acceptable or viable Europe--would be upset in favor of Germany if we were to exchange our atomic exclusivity for a few abortively ecumenical phantasms. Without referring even to the economic aspects, one only has to look at the spectacle of the new Strasbourg Assembly: the British --the majority being Conservatives--closing ranks to defend strictly their

own interests; the Italians acting like supranationalist light draft horses; the Frenchmen, dispersed and divided as always, being attacked on such matters as defense, agriculture, and a Free Brittany; while the Germans, quite naturally, control the two major Christian Democratic and Social Democratic groups, aided and abetted by the small countries anxious to be close to the strongest country. If we abandon our atomic asset, Germany will become Europe's federator both economically and geopolitically! This certainly does not seem to be what either General Buis or Alexandre Sanguinetti want to happen. We are reminded of Lamartine addressing the Legislative Assembly of 1848, stating he "feared the Bonapartist danger more than anyone," while, nevertheless, strongly advocating election of the president of the Second Republic by universal suffrage, knowing full well where this would lead. "Alea jacta est! [The die is cast]. Something must be left up to providence," he exclaimed while resigning himself to antique fate, with the results familiar to us all.

In concluding these particular observations, we must confess our inability to understand clearly why--when there is no consensus and it is generally assumed the Soviet danger is less than depicted--circumstances should dictate our being suddenly reduced to such an extremity instead of expanding--without provocation, offense, or any display of masochism--standard military cooperation that only asks to be intensified. Prophecy? After all, this may well be a new item to be inserted in the chapter on strategy.

The aforementioned had scarcely finished their various statements when new duettists suddenly joined the fray: another Alexandre, Alexander Haig this time, plus "dear Henry" [Kissinger], as he is referred to by Jobert. But their freedom of speech and opinion is so limited that while we can speculate about the views of the others, we no longer know what to think about Haig's and Kissinger's views. In Brussels, Kissinger actually contradicted the official position he defended not so long ago, adding that if he were in the government, he obviously could not express himself in a similar vein. This creates extreme confusion, not only because we no longer know whether when secretary of state he was already saying the opposite of what he thought, but also because in referring to the "government," he was no doubt speaking of the future as much as of the past, a situation that can give his remarks a tonality that is difficult to interpret. In a nutshell, it is highly conceivable that General Haig and Henry Kissinger are each thinking of their respective careers: one wants to put a Republican back in the White House, the other to return to the Department of State, a perspective that is enough to make them both critical of the current situation and also of a Democratic administration that, in their opinion, is too lax, too favorable to detente and to a type of "trilateral" ecumenism.

The alarmism in Brussels is probably based partly on real and justified misgivings, partly on personal strategy, and at the same time, partly on an American psychosis that periodically prompts the United States to denounce Soviet advances, refer to the "missile gap," question arms control, and

"hypertrophy" the danger Cuba poses. Not to mention the fact that Kissinger may have found this to be a clever and disinterested way of inciting Europeans to request or accept new theater nuclear weapons to counterbalance the SS-20 missiles.

Then there is the crux of Kissinger's statement, namely the doubt he casts--rightly or wrongly--on American nuclear protection of Europe, and his exhortation that Europe consider making a greater commitment to its own security. Offhand there is nothing surprising in this statement, at least to Frenchmen because this estimate of the situation corresponds strictly to the estimate General De Gaulle made 20 years ago. Alas, however, far from conceding that the Gaullists had, in the final analysis, possibly displayed more lucidity and less anti-Americanism, and far from rejoicing in the fact that for once France had been able to be right in advance, French voices have been raised here and there in increasing numbers to derive, unexpectedly, from Kissinger's remarks proof of the obsolescence of our defense and of the necessity to either abandon it or share it! Perseverare diabolicum! It is certainly enough to drive one to despair!

With those words, we shall close our discussion on the confusion that has been created, without going into detail about the contradictory views expressed on our independence in general and on SALT III in particular by such socialists as Jean-Pierre Cot and Didier Motchane, or likewise about the different if not contradictory comments made by such members of the governmental majority as a certain UDF [Union for French Democracy] rapporteur, a clique in the Elysee Palace, and the minister of defense.

Light does, of course, emerge from the obscurity of a dubious debate just as synthesis emerges from pluralism and discussion. Yet how can public opinion. from whom we expect a "spirit of defense," possibly find its bearings in the midst of so many oblique approaches, technical arguments masking preconceived ideas, trial balloons, successive sincere comments, careerist turnabouts, ambivalences, pretences, and ambiguities?

In this modest analysis of ours, it is especially difficult to draw conclusions because one can become utterly bewildered upon seeing strategists, whether they be green or experienced, uninhibitedly touting miracle solutions without apparently realizing that if such solutions were so simple they would already have been found or implemented. Hence the very best we can do is offer the following few reflections.

The priority sequence of policy, strategy, and technique requires consideration and analysis in each situation because of the distortions produced at the "policy-making" level, the keystone of defense, by either the irruption of crude political maneuvering or the primacy of one of the factors that ought to normally be of secondary importance. Such consideration and analysis is one way of getting rid of or at least taking cognizance of a certain number of pretexts or discordant factors. In this connection, it is quite possible that the sophisticated modifications Americans constantly make in their policy

of deterrence, because of and with the assurance of their technological superiority, account for that current feeling of being caught on the wrong foot, as it were, by the Soviet employment doctrine which is undoubtedly simplistic but, nevertheless, more operative at a time of parity.

The "threat" must be analyzed objectively and cease being a prey to periodic cabals or deliberate and biased exaggerations. One of the primary evils in this respect are those parliamentary and electoral preoccupations of the vote-getting or increased-budget type. But there are other evils. These include: in this period of economic crisis and global restructuring, the keen desire to make Atlanticists close ranks and to gain acceptance of redeployments, under austere conditions, by invoking security reasons; Europeanizing tendencies that certain factions endeavor to impose by exaggerating the Soviet danger; making a political issue of troops in Cuba; Brezhnev's unilateral troop reduction measures "offhandedly" deemed insignificant; etc. A certain McCarthyism is not dead! And yet not only does the USSR have characteristics, complexes, and handicaps that must not be overlooked, but there is no substitute for detente, no substitute for patient efforts to achieve a certain degree of disarmament, and no substitute for a certain balance in Europe to which the principal interested parties are attached. Likewise there is no substitute for the Atlantic Alliance. These are all limitations that any "strategist" should keep in mind.

The sudden discovery, at the strategic level, of the USSR's superiority due to the first strike capability of its land-based missiles seems indeed to come under the heading of intoxication or "psychological operations" more than of reality. Depictions of that superiority are generally extremely simplistic and a serious study of the scenarios has failed to confirm these depictions. The United States continues to retain its indisputable technological lead, including its superiority in such fields as underwater detection. Consequently it is a mistake to claim that global deterrence is really threatened, or even worse, has ceased to exist. The issue of American protection of Europe and the problem of "decoupling" must be viewed within this context and these limits.

Under General De Gaulle, a coherent relationship was maintained between policy and strategy through the concordance between a concept of independence and a nuclear force that was necessarily national. That coherent relationship is now being partly challenged. An unchanged defense system cannot, in effect, be suitable if there is a profound political change, as would be the case if our heretofore limited European policy tended to become more pronounced. While we do rule out an atomic partnership which, even with the British, makes no rhyme or reason for the time being, there are still two other solutions. One of them consists in trying by successive efforts to refit the nuclear force, adapt it to the new prospects, as is currently being done by enhancing our conventional forces, participation in the land battle, etc. In such a case, because we cannot do everything, because our allies, despite Ottawa, have always been and still are hostile to our nuclear instrument, the very nature of which precludes just any kind of refit, that force will ultimately

deteriorate, lose its credibility, until some day it is abandoned. Conversely, and this is the other solution, the small percentage of funds allotted to the atomic force may permit--on the basis of plans never implemented and increased traditional cooperation with our allies--building a force that will both safeguard our specificity and augment our influence while at the same time being capable one day of offering, on a larger scale, the recourse our present arsenal is incapable of providing. In particular, we probably would have to consider building a veritable tactical nuclear instrument that is not beyond our means.

Hence there are apparently two imperative conditions. Favorable decisions must be made on equipping and financing the nuclear force while revising a certain number of the prevailing ideas on military service and conventional forces. A conceptual choice must be made and--while still thinking of the future--that choice must be adhered to. Michel Jobert is right in this regard when he stresses that if our military policy were faultless, there would be no need to issue denials and reassurances week after week. No matter what approach our president may personally be tempted to take, everything happens at times as if his staff consisted of two cliques, one national and the other more or less European and Atlanticist, with each clique "pulling tricks" in an effort to strengthen its position. Admittedly any policy is essentially a compromise. A nuclear defense policy, however, almost certainly implies restraints that exclude allowing that policy to be exposed constantly to adulteration by underlings and to Machiavellian political considerations.

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NATION'S RISKS, STAKES IN NUCLEAR WAR REVIEWED

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Nov 79 pp 14-17

[Article by Marc Geneste: "From 'Warning Shot' to Counterblows, and 'Deterrence by Defense'"]

[Text] What would it take to give the recently reorganized French Army such an impressive defensive capability that it would be able to discourage, by itself alone, any aggression by land without being obliged to rely on raising the specter of universal slaughter which, for want of anything better, has long remained the basis of deterrence? What must be done to move from the tactical warning shot, forerunner of the Apocalypse from which it derives its deterrent virtues, to a counterblow of such crushing force that nobody would dare confront it? Is it materially impossible for the nation to do this solely with its own resources, not to mention NATO's resources which, properly organized and with a sound doctrine, would be largely adequate to this task? We are going to see that this is no longer a utopian concept. France, even by itself alone, can henceforth do much better than it seemingly believes it can.

In the June 1979 issue of ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, General de Montaudoin described the French Army's "smallest large unit," namely the Armored Division 77 which has an authorized strength of 7,000 men and 500 armored vehicles, including 150 battle tanks. The active French Army has some 15 of these highly mobile units. They are designated either as "armored" or as "mechanized" depending on the relative weight of their battle tanks. Upon mobilization, the number of such units would increase to 30. What can be expected from this type of unit in a conventional warfare environment is well-known. It has been described in very detailed fashion. The unit's flexibility, mobility, spirit of initiative, etc., are unquestionably valuable characteristics that are always useful in every form of combat. But what can 30 small "GU's" [large units, i.e., of division or larger size] of this type really be expected to contribute to reinforcing deterrence and to providing a defense if that deterrence fails?

By virtue of the American example and the speed acquired since Hiroshima, military authorities in France seemingly still refuse to admit that a tactical nuclear defense has the deterrent capabilities attributed to the strategic "scarecrow." In the view of those authorities such defense is considered valuable only when associated with the escalation process. Yet, it is much more valuable than that.

It appears easier to paralyze the enemy with terror than to neutralize its physical means of successfully carrying out an aggression. It seems more realistic to intimidate the enemy by threatening to exterminate its civilian population than by threatening to destroy its armed forces. It must be acknowledged, of course, that this intellectual approach was the only feasible one in the early days of the atomic age. At that time there was no other choice but nuclear terrorism, owing to the lack of ammunition. And we can thank that terror for having helped to maintain world peace ever since Hiroshima. We shall never know, however, whether from Hiroshima to date some great power ever had the slightest reason or the slightest inclination to start World War III.

Under these conditions, the theoreticians of French deterrence advanced the well-known formula of $\frac{\text{risk}}{\text{stake}} < 1$, expressing the fact that the stake of France was not worth the risk of attacking it. Offhand this is an alluring approach. But it is becoming more and more imprudent to base our national security on such highly subjective calculations. Because we now definitely sense that the major weakness of this approach is that it consists in trying to reason like the enemy who alone knows the parameters, notably the risk factor, and also makes every effort to alter them.

Who can determine how the enemy assesses the risk of losing a few of its cities if such is the price that must be paid for victory? If that enemy considers that its losses in human life can be reduced to tolerable levels by prior evacuation of its civilians and by active and passive defense measures? Who can determine how the enemy assesses the probability of strategic retaliation to its aggression by land, when by triggering the holocaust the victim of that aggression would suffer 20 times more than it would? All the parameters of the risk factor--probability of retaliation, effectiveness of the defense, tolerable casualty rates- are known only to the aggressor. In the aggressor's mind, this factor can vary from zero to a possibly tolerable upper limit that it is striving to lower at this time. It is too tempting for the defender to overestimate the risk factor so as to persuade himself that he is deterring the enemy.

As for the stake involved, only the enemy can assess the value thereof on the basis of its own political designs. In a world war--the only scenario in which such calculations would be plausible--the capture of France would mean victory in Europe, and perhaps final victory. Such a stake is surely not a small one in the enemy's eyes!

All things considered, the defender's assessment of the risk-to-stake ratio, the basis of deterrence can be distorted by excessive optimism about the risk and excessive modesty about the stake. Hence the possible inversion of the final result in the mind of the aggressor, the only one that counts in this case.

Alice in Wonderland fabricated her world in a looking glass. Doctor Emile Coue would have endorsed that particular strategy. It was high time to recognize its limitations as General De Gaulle definitely did when he decided to equip the French armed forces with tactical nuclear weapons.

With the passing years, the former policy of "pure and rigorous" deterrence--the only possible one for France--characterized by a concept of "all or nothing" (if you touch me, I'll kill you) was gradually replaced by a more nuanced approach, a "dual-trigger" deterrence with an initial warning phase at the tactical level. As revealed in the 1972 defense white paper, the warning shot fired by the Pluton [surface-to-surface missile] on the battlefield would mark France's nuclear determination and foreshadow what would follow, namely escalation to the holocaust if the enemy failed to halt its aggression. Here again we had no other choice, because the means at our disposal ineluctably dictated our doctrine. Yet the basic principle did remain the same: strategic terror was still the sole basis of deterrence. The "warning shot" can be credited with demonstrating a fierce nuclear determination, something the NATO flexible response strategy lacks, the "change of war," the detonator imposed on all friends and enemies. This is not insignificant.

Unfortunately, this nuclear warning shot is fired of necessity after deterrence has failed, after the massive commitment of the enemy's ground forces. Any thought of "restoring deterrence" once the enemy has chosen to wage war (against the West) is offhand an apparently rather illusive hope.

Furthermore, the nuclear warning shot obviously postulates that the enemy is attacking with conventional weapons, and such an assumption is anything but certain. If the enemy attacks with nuclear weapons--in conformity with his current doctrine--the warning shot no longer makes any sense: we definitely have no choice but to fight or surrender.

Lastly, in either case, the military effects of a few tactical missiles, even though not inconsiderable, would certainly not stop a determined tank army forging ahead to victory, even if--in the absence of an appropriate doctrine of employment, currently nonexistent--we were to employ within the heart of an invaded Germany all the NATO nuclear forces. The FRG would be destroyed without any hope of halting enemy forces prepared, unlike NATO forces, to wage nuclear war. Following this devastating nuclear demonstration, we would be back facing the previous problem of "all or nothing" and reduced sooner or later to employing the Strategic Nuclear Forces, after the dramatic failure of their deterrent function. The slaughter of civilian populations would not stop the armies in the field. The enemy could even choose to take punishment and lick its wounds without retaliating so as to seize France

intact. But this would not serve to mitigate the rigors of the enemy's occupation of France.

All things considered, it is difficult to see why an aggressor would unleash a world war, after having carefully assessed the risks of such an undertaking, only to stop just short of victory if he is not forced to do so by the defeat of his armies. In other words, the failure of terror, with or without the "initial phase," would necessitate fighting a defensive battle or surrendering, with or without a holocaust which in any event would be of no use in preventing the invasion.

We could comment at length on the virtues of the "first tactical trigger, or initial phase" as a means of bolstering deterrence by terror. Some experts contend that, far from reinforcing deterrence, this acceptance of a tactical nuclear engagement does the very opposite in that it demonstrates a lack of determination to escalate to the "supreme argument." Procrastination, putting off the fatal inevitable decision, is not necessarily proof of resolution. The hard fact is that nuclear terrorism, like all forms of terrorism, must be radical and has no use for "bogus bullies" who seem reluctant to carry out their threats. This line of reasoning is sometimes carried to the point of maintaining that "accepting battle," i.e., defensive operations, would actually be detrimental to deterrence. (This may be true if the "battle" is hopeless.) The inference, therefore, is that the firing of Pluton missiles must be limited to a demonstration--a rather powerful one, however--so as not to give the enemy the impression that we "are accepting battle." It should be noted in passing that while a "rather powerful" hammering with Pluton missiles does not signify "accepting tactical battle" to the defender, it does strongly resemble such acceptance to the party receiving the hammering! Here again, the message is liable to be quite unclear to the aggressor. All things considered, the nuclear warning shot foreshadowing the Apocalypse could be of the same character as the latter--one or two strategic strikes--instead of a demonstration which, when viewed from the receiving side, could very likely be mistaken for an acceptance to fight it out. On balance, "the all or nothing" strategy did have some logic.

The only certainty is that the tactical warning shot of doubtful terroristic value does not reinforce the defense to the extent of making it an additional factor of deterrence, the latter being credible.

But let us suppose that this warning shot is gradually enhanced so that in the near future it assumes the dimensions of a formidable counterblow that can be repeated several times! Its deterrent virtues--whatever they may be--would not be lessened as a result, but its defensive capabilities would become evident. In that case, everything could change radically. The "Maginot Line" of terror having failed, the traditional argument of defense and the historic mission of the armed forces would once again be part of the deterrent equation. Then the answer could be given to the following rather puzzling question a number of Frenchmen have been asking themselves: "What if deterrence fails? What happens

if war breaks out?" As long as no serious consideration is given to the possibility that deterrence could fail, France will remain literally defenseless, and deliberately so.

What can be expected from the French Army's 30 divisions in a real defensive nuclear battle that would be forced upon us, whether we like it or not, by a determined enemy impervious to terrorist threats and preliminary "warning shots." In other words, if war were to break out, to what extent would 30 divisions be able to counter the invasion, to furnish insurance against the failure of deterrence?

Is this defensive battle really hopeless? Is it lost beforehand to such a point as to justify indefinite retention of that strategy of "desperados" we were forced to follow up to now?

It is not a matter of defeating the Red Army on the open battlefield with the means at our disposal and then advancing by ourselves alone to install ourselves in Moscow. It is rather a matter of being able to stop the Red Army no later than when it reaches France's borders so as to prevent it from installing itself in Paris, pending a possible general counteroffensive that only the Atlantic Alliance could organize from a "last redoubt" in Europe, provided the Alliance is not driven into the sea during the very first phase of the conflict. It is a matter of leaving the initiative and responsibility for the mutual slaughter of cities up to the enemy if he chooses to play that idiotic and criminal game.

Is this really impossible? The matter at least deserves examination before giving up in sheer despair as we seem to have done up to now. This evaluation is not an easy one.

The habit of thinking in conventional terms when assessing the ratio of forces is enough to give anyone a defeatist attitude. Some 30 small divisions versus 100 or more divisions appears to be impossible odds. The "big battalions" are always right. As an Englishman once said: "A good large nuclear army will always defeat a good small nuclear army."

At first glance, this reasoning appears flawless and the argument conclusive. Consequently, the only apparent recourse left is nuclear terror while praying to God that the deterrence based on that concept never fails.

Yet the analysis must be carried somewhat further so as to free oneself of such depressing myths. It does not have to be carried very far, however, to discover that the atom can be even more effective for defense than impressive for terror. One does by no means exclude the other, however. But to be able to work from basic familiar facts established by experience, we no doubt have to translate into conventional terms the new defensive potential furnished by tactical atomic weapons, find a common denominator that is easy to grasp and is indisputable.

Let us try, therefore, to picture for ourselves the destructive (defensive) potential of a single one of our "small divisions" that we shall assume is capable of employing only two nuclear weapons simultaneously (whether they are organic to the division or not). If these are "intensified-radiation" weapons, we have seen [in a previous article] that these two projectiles will instantaneously "wipe out" an area of nearly 6 square kilometers. To do as much damage with conventional artillery shells against an armored attack and over such a surface area, it would take an instantaneous hail of shells with a dispersion pattern of 1 per every 20 meters, or nearly 15,000 cannons firing simultaneously. This is equivalent to the (explosive) firepower of all the tanks and artillery of several dozen of our "small divisions" (75 to be exact, assuming that they have 200 conventional pieces, by adding the rounds fired by both artillery and tanks).

Under these conditions is it still logical to call this division "small" when by firing two nuclear weapons its forepower is increased 75-fold, or 150-fold if it can fire four weapons, or 300-fold if it can fire eight, etc.?

The matter is much more complex, so please excuse my making this comparison which does not incorporate all of the pertinent factors. Yet, this example does sufficiently illustrate the absolutely staggering character of the tactical nuclear revolution.

After this artificial but significant reduction in the same denominator, we shall examine the matter in terms of "deterrence." We shall assume that the objective of military offensive operations and traditional warfare is first to seize and hold enemy terrain with tanks and infantry. How would a potential aggressor dare risk instant massacre of his maneuvering forces by attacking a "front" each kilometer of which is defended by the firepower of several conventional divisions? Firepower does not conquer per se. It merely helps conquer. An objective is always conquered by the presence of infantrymen on that objective. Unless he were crazy, the aggressor would not take such action without being sure that such a crushing response were politically improbable or rendered physically impossible by him. Barring the existence of one of these two conditions, deterrence at this level would thus be assured. Soviet tacticians generally agree on this point. Now if the enemy ground forces are thus paralyzed, the strategic bluff, or indeed even direct strategic action, has little sense versus, the similar strategic retaliatory capabilities the aggressor would trigger against himself. You do not destroy the desired objective (while destroying yourself, at least partly) if you have no possible chance whatsoever of raising your flag on that objective and of controlling the persons and property thereon, a condition that gives political meaning to war. War means control rather than reckless destruction.

Our "small divisions" with tactical nuclear firepower are, therefore, an altogether different animal from the same units without this massive argument, and their defensive potential is a function of the ANT [tactical nuclear weapon] "quantity" factor. Nevertheless, the epic deeds of the

Israeli 7th Brigade on the Golan Heights in October 1973 show that with less than one-third the number of tanks in our new armored divisions, this "small unit" was able to hold out for 3 days without yielding an inch of ground against an enemy just as well armed and 5 to 10 times numerically superior, until the arrival of hastily mobilized "Tsahal" reinforcements. The brigade's defensive "front" extended over more than 30 kilometers and was admittedly very cleverly organized on the spurs of the Golan Heights. This almost linear barrier repelled all the attacks of two or three Syrian divisions that lost 600 tanks in the process. These operations proved that a unit of this relatively modest size--comparable in size to our present divisions--is sufficient to stop attacks of some magnitude. When bolstered by the phenomenal destructive power of tactical nuclear missiles, such a unit would easily crush and discourage any conventional attack, even at 10 to 1 numerical superiority, on a comparable front. Multiplied by 20 or more, this "front" could obviously attain highly respectable dimensions when placed along the Elbe or along the Rhine. "Small divisions" thus deployed, equipped and trained would be enough to deter a conventional attack here and there, irrespective of its magnitude. And that's not too bad at all! For to overcome such an obstacle, the aggressor would be forced to be the first one to resort to atomic weapons. Indeed that is what Sokolovski acknowledged when he wrote: "Unless the defense's nuclear batteries are first destroyed, ground operations are impossible." The aggressor would have no other choice but nuclear war, in other words, no choice but to venture at the outset into a field of activity which if not forbidden is at least very dangerous, because in the background there always looms the specter of strategic escalation which the aggressor would take the risk of initiating, this time in a way credible to him. Once again, it is the aggressor's assessment of the situation that counts.

And now let us assume that the aggressor does this and chooses the only form of warfare that can theoretically assure him of victory, i.e., open the way to invasion: the nuclear blitzkrieg, the system he advocates at this moment. In that situation, what could our 30 "small divisions" do? In other words, what could "a good small nuclear army" do against "a good large nuclear army?" When the problem is defined in these terms, there appears to be no solution to it, because the myth of the superiority of "big battalions" is too deeply rooted in people's minds. And yet the problem is no longer defined at all in such terms today. In the atomic age, the invulnerability factor takes precedence, and by far, over all other factors. In a conventional war, the force attacking on the ground was already more vulnerable than the entrenched defensive force. That is why the attacker had to have a 3 to 1 advantage--or better, a 10 to 1 advantage and be attacking from the rear--to capture a defense position. Because the defense's projectiles could not kill, at best, more than one enemy at a time--45,000 rounds for one Chinese in Korea--it could always be saturated at a price. Now, the defense's nuclear projectiles--neutrons--number some thousands of billions per square centimeter within a radius of some hundreds of meters from ground zero. Nobody can escape their effects if he is on foot, on horseback,

or in a vehicle (even an armored vehicle), unless he is shielded by 1.5 meters of earth or concrete, protection that is the exclusive privilege of defending troops, until proved otherwise. Attacking forces would no longer assault machine-gun nests, minefields, antitank guns, tanks, artillery barrages, tactical aircraft, and all the "chemical energy" weapons that the sacrifice of troops always ultimately succeeded in overcoming in Korea, at Dien Bien Phu, and elsewhere. But an "assault" against nuclear energy that is 10 times more deadly is a different story. Nuclear cannons are not the cannons of Balaklava. The heroism and sacrifice of assault troops are now of no avail against such weapons.

Traditional obstacles, already respectable and sufficient to repel infiltration and weak or moderate attacks, are now combined with a barrage of neutrons that do not miss the target. And the ratio of opposing forces traditionally calculated in terms of relative troop strength no longer strictly has any meaning.

Thus the "good small nuclear army," incapable of offensive action, can have some confidence in its defensive posture upon the approach of the "good large nuclear army." Because the "small army" is organized for this contingency, its vulnerability to the new nuclear weapons can be considerably reduced. For example, at a distance of 800 meters from ground zero of a neutron bomb, all crews of the heaviest tanks, regardless of their number, would be blasted by thousands of rads, whereas defenders in a properly designed defensive position would be safe at the same bomb's ground zero. And what then? Well then the difference between the vulnerability of attacking forces and that of defensive forces appears tremendous, and a ground offensive, hence an aggression, is now difficult if not impossible. Deterrence can now be based on something other than the threat of general suicide.

Hence, the defense needs only assure that its nuclear batteries and conventional forces cannot be neutralized by preparation fire designed to clear the way for the nuclear blitzkrieg. In other words, the defense must assure that its nuclear delivery vehicles are capable, by use of camouflage and deception, of avoiding detection, and capable also, by means of effective shielding and protection, of avoiding destruction, except, of course, by a direct nuclear hit. The same mobility, range, and clever maneuvers that enabled all the Viet artillery to survive against French counterbattery fire at Dien Bien Phu should in any case give defensive nuclear weapons sufficient chance to survive. Then the armored units of the defense's divisions would have to take similar precautions to survive the initial nuclear assault, because these units are of paramount importance in countering the threat of vertical envelopment, in closing any breaches in the defensive position, and perhaps also in undertaking occasional counterattacks. These armored units are also indispensable for conducting a possible final counteroffensive with allied forces (offensive operations still being the only means of securing victory now as in the past). All of this is admittedly not easy to do, but it is certainly not impossible.

In the inevitable initial phase of defensive operations, action of the armored units must be totally subordinated to the action of the "neutrons," and the function of these units is to permit nuclear firepower to be employed freely from one end of the front to the other. The mobility of nuclear fires is almost instantaneous and their exceptional power enables the defense to avoid being "surprised" or saturated at any point by armored concentrations, contrary to what happens in conventional warfare. The defensive doctrine need only permit this untrammeled employment of nuclear firepower without being hampered by other elements of the defensive position. This no doubt implies a partially static linear deployment, at least in the forward area, comparable to World War I defensive positions or to the Israeli 7th Brigade's deployment on the Golan Heights. In this connection, the mobile defense based on armored counterattacks, which was and remains the only posture capable of solving the defensive problem in conventional warfare, must be assigned to the mobility of nuclear firepower instead of to the mobility of the maneuvering forces who are as vulnerable to neutrons as the enemy is. In summary, the "chemical energy" actuating traditional firepower and movement now shifts to supporting that "nuclear energy" which becomes the principal means of killing the aggressor. Accordingly everything must be organized on the basis of this priority.

The mobility of the defense's number-one argument must not be sacrificed in behalf of the mobility of the maneuvering forces. A World War III defense cannot be modeled on the traditions and lessons of World War II. The overwhelming preeminence of nuclear firepower over movement would make that defense resemble more the World War I model.

As a matter of fact, there is an increasingly distinct possibility of establishing veritable Verdun-style "neutron barriers" whose security at all points would be ensured by the instant mobility of nuclear fires, and be guarded in the rear by the mobility of armored vehicles capable of responding to any possible breakthrough--even though the latter is highly unlikely--by ground forces having survived the neutrons, or by airborne troops having weathered the barrage of modern antiaircraft weapons, something equally improbable.

A potential aggressor would thus have to pass through one or more consecutive neutron barrages infinitely more deadly than the Verdun-type machine-gun and artillery barrages. Moreover, if he were to perform this feat, not without enormous losses, he would then find himself pitted against the defense's armored units.

The combined tactical lessons of World Wars I and II, as confirmed by the 7th Brigade's exploits on the Golan Heights, do definitely seem to give the thus revised defense some deterrent capabilities that dispel the threat of aggression by ground forces, thus depriving war of any sense. Furthermore, this is accomplished without assigning the mission of deterrence exclusively to the specter of a universal Apocalypse of which we would be the principal victims.

And while the recently reorganized 30 "small large units" are no doubt incapable of large-scale offensive operations--they are actually not designed for such--they can provide a defensive and deterrent shield possessing a degree of power unprecedented in the history of the French Army. Whether this shield is employed within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, of a more integrated Europe, or if the Alliance or Europe were to fail, along the very borders of our national sanctuary, the future defensive system thus taking shape makes it possible to supplement deterrence by terror with deterrence by defense.

Of course, the following requirements must be met: the new divisions must have sufficient ammunition; the tactical nuclear weapons, referred to above as an example of the capability of multiplying hundred-fold the overall "conventional" destructive potential of these divisions, must be capable of continuous fire until the possible enemy assault waves are completely destroyed, if the enemy has the strange idea of launching its troops into such a venture; and the tactical warning shot must be gradually transformable into "counterblows" that are decisive solely by themselves. There is a quantitative threshold below which tactical nuclear weapons serve as merely a negligible contribution to defense and a dubious contribution to deterrence. The peculiar characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons come into play beyond that threshold where they then play an effective part in both defense and deterrence. This threshold is the one that must now be crossed.

In the very near future, neither France, nor a fortiori Europe, will lack the nuclear material necessary for an adequate supply of ammunition. The development of these weapons has cost France very dearly, primarily because of the required production and test facilities. Yet the costs of these tactical nuclear weapons becomes considerably less than is generally believed once a sufficient number is produced. As an "asymplotic" example, in 1975 the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory calculated the cost of a single tactical missile, including a 1-KT fission warhead, to be $50,000, and the cost of all the equipment necessary--vehicles, launchers, missiles and computers--to equip NATO with 3,600 of these weapons for the defense of the West to be $360 million. Admittedly we have not reached that point. But if these figures were multiplied by four or more to take into account our lag in the nuclear weapons industrial field (our position in other fields already being competitive), they would in no way be prohibitive when compared to the figures for such conventional weaponry as modern tanks and aircraft. The persistent myth of the prohibitive cost of a quantitatively sufficient tactical nuclear arsenal must be destroyed without delay.

Hence France's technological, material and financial resources permit it to endow its new army with utterly crushing firepower by the year 2000, firepower which by itself alone is fully capable of deterring an attack by land or by sea, whatever its source.

By using, for this purpose, the facilities France has already built at great expense plus its technological advances over the past 2 decades,

the country would henceforth be able to draw considerable military and political dividends from its solitary effort, and at more reasonable expense than is generally believed. In so doing, it would establish its deterrence no longer solely on terror but also on an authentic defensive capability. Reorganization of the French Army has laid the concrete and realistic foundations for such a capability. It only remains for France to supply it with the required ammunition and establish a doctrine for the employment of that ammunition.

8041
CSO: 3100

CHOICE IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOCTRINE URGED

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Nov 79 pp 22-23

[Article by Roger Block: "A Choice Must Be Made Relative to Tactical Nuclear Weapons Doctrine"]

[Text] The leading article in the latest issue of ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI--No 42, July-August 1979--summarizes "France's defense policy." That short article can apparently be considered to reflect the very essence of France's official doctrine.

The article states that the nuclear arsenal has a "dual" role. It then describes that role as follows: "First, by their very existence in the field forces, nuclear weapons confront the enemy with the continuous threat of their employment and prevent it from taking full advantage of its superiority in conventional forces and weapons. Secondly, nuclear weapons are used to deliver the political authority's final and solemn warning notifying the aggressor that he must expect strategic weapons to be used against him if he persists in his aggression. The strategic concept is, therefore, comprehensive in that it is meant to deter all levels of aggression, rejects the all-or-nothing doctrine, and is based on the principle that a modern deterrent relies not only on a strategic arsenal but also on tactical nuclear weapons designed to enhance the value of the threat, and equally on land, sea, and air forces capable of fighting with maximum possible effectiveness and determined to do so should the need arise. This concept is also specific to France because it establishes a direct link between the threat to employ tactical nuclear weapons, or their actual employment, and the launching of strategic retaliatory strikes. It differs, therefore, from the Russian and American concepts that endeavor, on the contrary, to dissociate tactical nuclear weapons employment from strategic weapons employment."

We have quoted this passage on tactical nuclear weapons in full for two reasons:

a. First, because we are reluctant to express a definite opinion on this ambivalent employment doctrine all of whose definitional terms need to be carefully weighed in an effort to determine whether there is indeed

compatibility between the two aspects and two purposes of our tactical nuclear force. The components of that force are, in fact, considered sometimes as a sort of "trip wire" and at other times, contrariwise, as combat weapons that consequently should be sufficiently numerous to constitute a significant force.

b. In addition, while the decision to activate a "trip wire" is actually, by its very essence and its deterrent role, a political matter, the responsibility for the decision to employ a combat weapon must definitely, on the contrary, be left up to the military.

The attempt to determine whether "ambivalent" or else "ambiguous" should more appropriately describe our employment concept is an exercise in subtle distinction. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Russian and American concepts are, unlike ours, perfectly clear because they seek to dissociate tactical nuclear employment from strategic employment, a fact that definitely underscores, by contrast, the specificity of our concept. The latter is doubtlessly not a dogma. In our opinion, it is, therefore, open to discussion, if not even to change. As a matter of fact, our concept does not seem conducive to stimulating a quantitative armament effort, even if it were to consist in developing relatively simple weapons as unsophisticated as possible so as to make them more cost-effective, in other words, so as to obtain maximum effectiveness at minimum cost. But therein lies the problem: are they combat weapons or "trip wires," or a combination of both, a combination itself as specific as our concept? This is a major problem that arises even in peacetime. In case of war, however, it would be a much more acute problem, one that would no doubt assume dramatic proportions. A clear employment doctrine is of especially imperative necessity because in the event of a major crisis there would be reason to fear the possible appearance of what, a few years ago, General Usureau--then Military Governor of Paris and Commander of the 1st Military Region--called "the insubordinate army" (armee du refus). That "army's" task must not be made easier, and it would thus be disastrous if the specificity of our concept were to produce perverse effects that a different employment doctrine would perhaps have precluded.

Our best advise to any one interested in this type of defense problem is that they read the book "La 6e Colonne" [The Sixth Column] published early this year by Stock. The 380 pages of this "nonfiction novel" (as it is described on page 1) is full of such descriptions, actions, and unexpected developments that the reader cannot put the book down until he has finished it, at one sitting. The real identity of the author of "La 6e Colonne" is concealed behind the pseudonym "Francois," or to be more exact, it is now poorly concealed because on 13 March 1979, LE FIGARO revealed that "this mysterious Francois" was no other than Lieutenant Colonel Guy Doly, a highly talented officer. Among the things a person will learn upon reading this book is why and how failure to use tactical nuclear weapons at the right moment could become one of the causes of a major political and military disaster.

As chairman of the Radical-Socialist Party's foreign affairs and national defense committee, I sponsored a debate on this book. General Thiry participated in that debate and then summarized the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. If there is one evident conclusion, it is definitely that both the

book and its subject matter are enthralling. In thus "promoting" a book whose author I know only by name--he had recently graduated from Saint Cyr some 20 years ago when I myself held a very responsible position in the French Army high command--I hope the readers who may possibly take my advice will not be disappointed. In any case, they will see--dramatically depicted--how it is both essential and difficult to formulate a suitable employment doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons when, in the final analysis, the very purpose of these weapons is in question. Are they "trip wires" or else combat weapons? It is certainly tempting to accept both concepts, but, all things considered, a choice has to be made between the two. On this subject, the Americans and Russians have made the same choice. They have dissociated the tactical nuclear weapons concept from the strategic nuclear weapon concept. Hence the question for us is: "Do we want to make and can we make a different choice that would associate--but only to a certain exten --two concepts that are seemingly very difficult to synthesize coherently?"

8041
CSO: 3100

SWEDES SAY NATO TNF DECISION WON'T THREATEN NORDIC BALANCE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Nov 79 p 9

[Article by Lars Hellberg]

[Text] Stockholm, 27 Nov--AFTENPOSTEN's reporter has learned that the leaders of the Swedish Foreign Ministry do not share the Soviet view that Nordic stability is threatened unilaterally by the new nuclear-armed missiles NATO is planning to station in western Europe. Repeated efforts by the Soviet Union in recent months to draw both Finland and Sweden into the NATO debate by depicting the plans of the defense alliance as a direct threat to these neutral countries have created both uneasiness and irritation in the Swedish Foreign Ministry leadership.

The Foreign Ministry press spokesman, Erik Pierre, told AFTENPOSTEN that he could make no official comment on the present climax in the Soviet press or the authoritative Soviet writer using the alias Yuriy Kommissarov who published an article in the Finnish weekly newspaper, SUOMEN KUVALEHTI.

"What we can say is that we assume that belligerent states would respect Sweden's neutrality in the event of war," said Pierre. And he said that within the next 3 weeks Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten will be replying in parliament to an interpellation from communist leader Lars Werner. Werner has accepted the Soviet criticism without reservations and wants to know if the government intends to "protest NATO's arms build-up plans" and has called for continued negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.

Despite the absence of official reactions we can assume that the Swedes are not interested in making the internal Norwegian and Danish debates more difficult.

On the other hand they have repeatedly expressed their strong concern about military developments both to Washington and to Moscow. The fact

that atomic weapons are being placed closer and closer to Swedish boundaries has been a major concern. The most obvious example to date was the Soviet nuclear submarine presence in the Baltic Sea, the "peace sea" in Soviet terminology.

The distinction between maintaining Swedish neutrality in relation to the blocks, with the limitations this imposes in the international debate, and the traditional Swedish involvement in disarmament is an extremely fine one. The recent Soviet pressure has not made this any easier.

With regard to the NATO renewal plans as far as AFTENPOSTEN has been able to learn great emphasis is being placed on missiles that can travel a zigzag course and that are easier to program. As a result, in the opinion of Swedish experts, it should be easier to divert such missiles around Swedish territory.

Even though they are not saying so officially the Swedes are becoming increasingly disturbed by military technological developments. But at the same time the Soviet pressure on the neutral Scandinavian countries is regarded as crude intervention. The main effect is to tend to reduce Swedish Foreign Ministry leaders' desire to repudiate the plans rather than encourage them to do so. In addition a Swedish involvement in opposition to the plans would be regarded as an intervention in Norwegian and Danish security policy, indicating doubts about the balance in Scandinavia which is based on individual lands defining their own security policy course.

In this critical situation it is important for Sweden to maintain the nation's neutral status and the inviolability of Swedish territory. In this way the Soviet nuclear submarines stationed in the Baltic, a situation nothing can be done about, represent just as big a problem as the NATO renewal plans.

6578
CSO: 3108

EC, CEMA NEGOTIATIONS RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 27 Nov 79 p 15

[Article by Simon Levski]

[Text] The negotiations between the European Communities [EC] and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance [CEMA] were resumed yesterday in Moscow. The current round of these marathon negotiations, which are now in their 7th year, is taking place in the Russian capital at the request of the EC. The West European delegation is led by EC commissioner Wilhelm Haferkamp, and the CEMA delegation by Nikolay Fadeyev, secretary of the governing council of CEMA. The negotiations started in 1972, after the CEMA accepted the EC as "an economic reality." Differences of opinion between the two organizations about the relations they are to have with each other especially hamper the progress of the discussions; this issue too, is a source of differences within both organizations. When the validity of the business contracts between individual EC countries and individual CEMA countries ran out at the end of 1974, EC countries wanted to contract at the EC level only from then on. In this connection the EC was prepared to considerably liberalize East European export to West Europe. The EC wants to sign these contracts with the East European countries separately. Moscow insists, however, that they should be signed through the CEMA secretariat. Because of this mutual obstinacy East Europe missed the opportunity to take a bigger share of the EC market via the liberalization offer made by Brussels. One of the arguments by the Soviet Union against the EC standpoint is the imbalance in economic power in negotiations between the EC and individual CEMA countries. In principle that is correct, but the EC negotiates with all other countries in this way. Moscow is further afraid that the EC might try to play the individual East European countries off against each other, which would be less easy in negotiations at the CEMA level. The third factor is the most important: the Soviet Union is, in fact, not very interested in a further liberalization of trade with the smaller East European nations, because her own export structure is quite different from that of the smaller CEMA countries. More than half of the Soviet export consists of energy related raw materials and together with the other raw materials this accounts for three-quarters of the total Soviet export.

EC import duties are relatively low for these products and besides, there are no quantity limitations in this category. In the case of agricultural and industrial products the situation is different. Import duties are higher and there are limitations on the quantity that may be imported, so-called quotas. But no more than 15 percent of the Soviet export falls into this category. This percentage, however, is more than half for the smaller East European nations. They are therefore more interested in liberalization than the Soviet Union and so they follow the Russian line in the CEMA negotiations without much enthusiasm. They also fear that if their trade with the EC is to take place via Moscow, it will be more difficult and bureaucratic. The EC protests against the Soviet ideas with a formal argument: it says that the secretariat of the CEMA does not have the right or the authorization to negotiate about the foreign trade on behalf of the individual Eastern European governments. Formally this argument is correct. But there is something more behind it: the EC does not want the economic control by Moscow over the East European countries to further increase, which would certainly happen in case of centralization of relations between the East European countries and the EC in Moscow.

A further complicating factor is that not all EC countries are equally interested in trade with East Europe. On the average, 4 percent of EC exports go to East Europe. The economically strongest EC country shows the most interest: 10 percent of the West German exports go to East Europe. Some other EC countries, for whom this percentage is much lower, may fear that trade liberalization for the CEMA will further strengthen the economic power of the FRG.

9314
CSO: 3105

LO CHIEF GIVES OK TO ECO[illegible]NIC CRISIS PLAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Nov 79 p 15

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] In spite of a heralded encroachment on the sliding wage system, wage-earner organizations declare themselves satisified with the first round of negotiations with the government, while employers and the industry organizations have no comment on more specific government moves to bring down expenses and the balance of payments deficit. An apparent compromise between the prime minister and the chairman of the LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] for first presenting a proposal for decision by the Folketing and then before the summer holidays a legislative bill as well was sharply rejected by the employers in the form contemplated by the government.

"We can see now that we will not get all our wishes fulfilled, but it seems to me that we have advanced quite a ways right now," said Thomas Nielsen after the meeting yesterday on the long-term economic policy from 1 January 1980 on. The chairman of the LO, who will be in Spain for a meeting of the EFI [expansion unknown] for 10 days during the negotiations, laid stress on getting a statement presented concerning the compromise with the prime minister on the excess profits tax, on which Anker Jørgensen insisted at first that there should be a proposal for the Folketing's decision, while the chairman of the LO demanded from the outstart an actual bill. Yesterday Anker Jørgensen refused to comment on the LO chairman's interpretation of the new compromise. Concerning the attacks on the automatic cost-of-living regulation, Thomas Nielsen said:

"Of course we are watching the cost-of-living regulation, and we have said many times that it is best to think it over several times before beginning to tamper with that." Thomas Nielsen rejected a new freeze of the cost-of-living allowances and also a real suspension of the cost-of-living regulation, which he called unreasonable and unfortunate. Thomas Nielsen was willing to consider only an arrangement that would remove the oil price rises from the index number.

In connection with the government's proposals there has been talk of suspending the sliding wage system for a certain period to avoid wage escalation. On this point Georg Poulsen, chairman of the Metal Workers' Union, said after the meeting with the government yesterday, "We will work to get to share the burdens. We have never denied that it can be hard to sell to our members the idea that the sliding wage system will not get into operation, but there is nobody that says that this will never in this world be accepted. It is my definite opinion that this wage system, which may perhaps be suspended for a certain period, has so many vital characteristics that it will come back."

P. Schade-Poulsen, director of the Danish Employers' Association, said after the meeting with the government that an orientation had been presented on the economic situation and a review of some of the points in the government's opening address. He did not find, however, that the government had given specific indications of what it would do about the income policy and bringing down the balance of payments deficit. He also rejected a proposal for compulsory profit sharing, in the form that the government means to present in return for the LO's showing restraint in the matter of income.

Erik B. Rasmussen, chairman of the Council of Industry, said after the meeting with the government yesterday, "We cannot find in the government's plans any factors that will increase production or any device to get anything started that counts."

8815
CSO: 3106

WORKERS IN SEVERAL INDUSTRIES WILLING TO ACCEPT PL.

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Nov 79 p 15

[Article by Birgitte Henrichsen]

[Text] No political strikes, no big demonstrations. The situation is unusual.

Political compromises with encroachments on the wage-earners are normally followed by strikes and demonstrations. That was the rule in the 1970's. But after the wage and price ceiling was made known, not a single strike of political motivation was noted by the employers' organizations. The wage ceiling dictate is apparently accepted in Danish plants. The LO's [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] OK'ing of a crisis measure plays an important part in this.

In spite of the fact that because of the wage limit it was necessary to suspend all negotiating meetings in the iron industry, iron has not registered a single strike in protest. Iron, by the way, set a miserable record during the first 10 months of 1979, when there was a 40-percent increase in strike hours contrary to agreement as compared to the same months of 1978. A total of 50,000 workers in the industry were involved in "illegal" conflicts during that period this year as compared to 38,000 last year.

Reactions

A backward look at the politics of the last few years shows strong reactions to parliamentary decisions of the same quality as the wage and price ceiling. In 1974, after the so-called "great Day of Prayer [Danish public holiday, 4th Friday after Easter] compromise"--called the "black compromise" in labor circles--there was a long series of "spontaneous" strikes and of demonstrations before the Christiansborg Palace against the government's tax proposal.

In 1976 the compromise gave rise to big and little strikes. A total of 20,000 workers from a number of big firms, including the Odense Steel Ship Yard, B & W, Carlsberg-Tuborg, and the publishers of POLITIKEN [Liberal]

the Berlingske papers [Conservative], stopped work for 24 hours.

There were also strikes last year when the SV [Social Democratic-Liberal] government was created in August. Some 15,000 demonstrated on the Folketing's opening day, 3 November, on the palace square. The wage agreement negotiations in the spring and the subsequent compromise law also occasioned a certain amount of unrest. The Danish Employers' Association recorded about 100 strikes surrounding the wage agreement renewal in the spring.

Necessary

The comments on the peaceful situation in the job market from the employers' side are few. "Why in the world would people stop work? The wage and price ceiling, after all, is a balanced measure," says Hans Skov Christensen, director of the Danish Employers' Association, and he emphasizes that the employers had not expected any unrest due to the government's measure. "I believe the general view among the people is that it was necessary to do something," he says.

Protest

A different--or complementary--explanation may lie in the catastrophically poor showing of the DKP [Communist Party of Denmark] in the election, several job market experts have told the BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. At the moment the party is having to look after its internal situation. The VS [Leftist Socialist Party] has little influence in the plants, and the SF [Socialist People's Party] is involved at the moment in collaboration with the Social Democratic Party. Thus none of the parties that have a word they could have said has gotten a wave of protest started. The chairmen's initiative, the combination of communist trade unions, no longer has any wind in its sails, either. That combination was behind a number of the organized protests earlier, but today it is a divided organization.

The Copenhagen local of the Danish Typographic Union is among the very few that have criticized the wage limit to the government and the Folketing. The union federation also sent a deputation to the Folketing's committee on the labor market and the economy. Louis Andersen, expresses disappointment that there has not been a stronger reaction in the individual unions. "It looks like a large part of the union movement has not yet seen the handwriting on the wall," he says.

The typographers' appeal to the Folketing says, in part, "We can under no circumstances accept the imposition of a price and wage ceiling, for the simple reason that, taught by experience under earlier such legislation, we have no confidence that the price ceiling will achieve anything like the effect [illegible] the imposition of a wage ceiling has."

8815
CSO: 3106

POLITICAL LEADERS DISCUSS URANIUM MINING POSSIBILITIES

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 8 Nov 79 p 10

[Text] The Greenland contribution at the international uranium conference runs from a clear "no" to "strict conditions" for a "yes" to uranium extraction.

"We demand that all mining activity, oil prospecting, and uranium prospecting be stopped in our country, Greenland, until the Greenlandic people have established their clear right to self-determination in our own country."

With these words, formulated in Greenlandic by fisherman Jens Karlsen, of Narssaq, Jens Karlsen gave full support to the arrangers of the conference "Uranium Extraction--Still a Threat to the People of the Third and Fourth Worlds," held in Copenhagen at the end of October.

World-Wide Opposition?

"The conference has made it possible for representatives of aboriginal population groups--the Fourth World--and developing countries--the Third World--to protest to the rest of the world against uranium mining in their land areas," said Jense Karlsen. "The conference has opened up the possibility of a more united opposition to uranium all over the world."

Jens Karlsen added that it is now the intention to start an opposition movement against uranium mining in Greenland all along the coast by establishing opposition groups, which will be open to all who are opposed to the uranium project. "We will cooperate with other corresponding groups which have the same purpose."

Jens Karlsen's contribution at the uranium conference was presented as "a declaration by people who are against uranium mining in Greenland." The declaration was read in English by Karl Isaksen, (Toro), Copenhagen.

Declaration by the Sulissartut Party

At the conference Johan Fleischer, a biology student, read a declaration by the Sulissartut Party, which is also against uranium mining in Greenland

The declaration says in part that the Greenlandic people have up to now based their existence on the natural resources of the country, such as marine mammals, fish, birds, and plants. And the exploitation of these resources was always effected with a view to preserving all species. The Sulissartut Party is opposed to uranium extraction, because uranium contains elements that can destroy both plant and animal life. Radioactivity produces cancer. Many people in Japan, the United States, and Canada have died of diseases caused by radiation. In Japan because of the atomic bombs at the end of World War II; in the United States and Canada the disease has primarily hit workers in the uranium mines.

"We regard mineral raw materials as the country's economic reserves. And it is the Landsting that will make decisions about exploiting the mineral raw materials. When the Landsting does that, it must bear in mind that it must be possible for people to live in the country a thousand years from now," says the declaration, which concludes:

"We are against uranium extraction, because we are against extracting a substance that can destroy life in nature as well as human life."

Right to Subterranean Resources

Kaj Kleist, a teacher and chairman of Siumut [Forward] Party in Denmark, says, "For the first time, we are now beginning to realize the risk posed by a uranium mine close to an inhabited area, namely the town of Narssaq, and in the middle of an area where fishing and sheep-growing are principal industries. The scientists claim to be able to show that there is no danger, but at this conference we have heard reports of cancer and leukemia in the vicinity of uranium mines in the United States."

Kaj Kleist went on to say that one of the main questions in connection with the extraction of raw materials, namely the rights of ownership and usufruct to Greenland's subterranean resources, has not been adequately clarified.

Clarification Necessary

Professor Robert Petersen, of the Eskimological Institute, was asked by the central committee of Siumut to represent the party at the conference. "I accepted, even though I am not a member of that or any other party," said Robert Petersen.

"One of the things that should be clarified is the state's ownership of Greenland's subterranean resources," said Robert Petersen, who went on to say that the state is primarily an administrative organ, which in such a connection can hardly have rights of its own, but instead should protect the people's rights--i.e., the rights of all nations--under the common government [of Denmark and Greenland].

Easier To Talk About Things Today

"Today it is much easier to talk about these matters in Denmark than it was 10 years ago. It can be said openly that there can be no talk about state resources in Greenland without saying at the same time that they are Greenland's resources," Robert Petersen added.

He said that both Siumut and Atássut [Mutual Cooperation] have wanted property rights over Greenland primarily to ensure control in case of a possible extraction of raw materials. Both groups have agreed to negotiation of a "division key" according to which the income from mineral extraction shall be divided. "It is my own view that state's share will be much the same whether its ownership is recognized or not. To the Greenland public the difference will mean primarily that it will be recognized as a contributor to the common government or a recipient of contributions."

A "No" in Effect

On Siumut's position on possible uranium mining, Robert Petersen said that the party "has demanded such strong safety guarantees that it is regarded by many as a 'no' in effect to exploitation of minerals and similar alternative sources of income."

Robert Petersen concluded, "The people's reaction against uranium is often regarded as hysteria. But hysteria or no hysteria. There can be contamination of, e.g., the water off Narssaq with radioactive substances. This must not be overlooked. In an area like Greenland, which has food exports as its principle means of support, just suspicions of such a thing can hit the whole of Greenland food exports.

"There are certain damages that cannot be weighed against pecuniary compensation. One of them is the destruction of the future possibilities of the principal industry. In my opinion there must be quite different guarantees of preventing that from the ones that exist today, before uranium mining will become acceptable in Greenland."

Hertling in Head Wind

Jørgen Hertling, of Atássut, encountered a strong head wind when he stated that Atássut is in favor of exploitation of uranium in Greenland, provided there are guarantees that it will not injure the local population. The audience hissed, and a woman shouted from the back row, "We are wasting time. We are here to discuss the fight against uranium mining. It is pointless to listen to him!"

"We will set very strict conditions," Jørgen Hertling explained. "We realize that such an interference with nature cannot avoid creating a certain contamination, but we want it kept to the lowest possible level."

Basis of Home Rule

Jørgen Hertling added that Atássut's position is a reflection of the economic and employme t situation in Greenland.

"If we are to have real meaning in home rule, we are compelled to work to create an independent economic base. We haven't got that today.

"It is possible that the fishing industry can become our economic support in the future. But it is not today. And we know that economic conditions are so vulnerable in the arctic climate that we cannot depend on a single industry. We must put our stakes on several possibilities. Exploitation of raw materials, including uranium mining, must come under consideration, but, as I said, it is a precondition that it will not hurt the Greenland population."

8815
CSO: 3106

GREENLAND ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN AIMS AT OIL IMPORT CUT

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 8 Nov 79 p 10

[Text] It is of great importance to the Greenland public economy to reduce oil consumption as fast as possible. The Greenland Technical Organization has worked out an energy plan that proposes a main effort in three fields:

1. Economies in oil consumption will be attempted by, among other things, effective insulation in existing and future housing, and an attempt will be made to utilize the waste heat from electric power plants as well as possible.

2. The GTO [Greenland Technical Organization] is investigating the possibility of providing electric power plants with steam turbines. That means that they can be fired with either oil or coal, and that opens up the possibility of using Greenland coal.

3. Small water-power plants may conceivably replace or supplement electric plants in some towns within the foreseeable future.

Good Investment

It is a good investment to insulate effectively in the cold climate. In the course of 5 or 6 years all state buildings will be reinsulated by modern methods. This work was started several years ago and will cost about 60 million kroner. In return the annual saving in oil will be about 10 million kroner a year.

Greenland Coal

It is the sharply rising oil prices that evoke interest in using Greenland coal for electric power production instead of oil. At the beginning there will presumably be some consideration of using imported coal, but the GTO report talks of switching later to Greenland coal.

Small Water-Power Plants

The interest in water-power plants has begun to shift from the very large installations in connection, for example, with uranium production, iron

mining at Nuuk, aluminum factories at Kangerdlugssuaq (Sdr. Strømfjord) to smaller water-power plants to supply power to the towns. Some 30 to 35 possibilities for the installation of small water-power plants have been demonstrated.

Small water-power plants are offered on the world market today almost as "package solutions," according to the GTO report, but the report emphasizes that the Greenland towns can hardly cover their energy consumption with such small water-power plants alone. Water power will be a supplement to other forms of energy, such, e.g., as the aforementioned coal-fired power plants.

It Will Not Get Cheaper

As consumers, we should not look forward to cheaper electricity. Conversion to coal and water-power will hardly result in lower prices, but will primarily reduce the dependence on imported oil, according to the report.

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BRIEFS

PUBLIC SECTOR SPENDING IN GREENLAND DOWN--From 1968 to 1978 the GTO [Greenland Technical Organization] turnover has been almost halved to 762 million kroner. And it is especially in construction and installation activities that it has declined in the last few years. Thus the construction and installation expenditures dropped 11 percent from 1977 to 1978. On the other hand, there was a slight rise of about 2 percent in the GTO's operations account--electric power plants, heating plants, waterworks, shipyards, etc. Gunnar P. Rosendahl, director of GTO, explains that the number of GTO employees is also declining. From 1977 to 1978 the number of employees went down from about 4,000 to about 3,800. This, too, is a development that has continued for about a decade. The number of craftsmen and laborers employed by GTO has been reduced in a 10-year period from about 1,400 to about 750. The number of officials in Greenland has been stable during the 10-year period at about 650, while the number of GTO employees in Copenhagen has gone down from about 450 to about 325 in 1978. The total reduction in the number of GTO employees in 1978--200 in all--has mainly hit the local work force in Greenland. That is a new feature of the development, says Gunnar P. Rosendahl. In spite of the great drop in appropriations since 1968, until now it has been possible to increase the employment for local workers. But this trend was unfortunately broken in 1978. It should also be mentioned that the local labor force, in spite of the decline, accounts for 90 percent of the total force in the technical field, Rosendahl adds. [Text] [Godhaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 8 Nov 79 p 21] 8815

CONCERN OVER LEAK OF BUNDESTAG INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Nov 79 p 3

[Article: "Secret Transcripts Published"]

[Text] Bonn, 21 November. Publications on the secret meeting of the Bundestag committee investigating monitoring practices and operations of the intelligence service have generated some furor in Bonn. The deputy chairman of the FDP fraction, Engelhard, who is a member of the parliamentary investigating committee, said of newspaper reports on the interview of the president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Meier, that it is scandalous when information from a meeting of the Bundestag's committee classified "secret" is leaked--quite aside from the matter of the reliability of the report. This fact alone is itself enough to justify termination of the investigating committee and makes it appear very difficult to continue to take part in the meetings of this body. Besides, the possible uncovering of additional incidents of monitoring would also not change the completely negative attitude of the liberals to such a practice. In particular, the FDP will at every juncture resist views "such as those which seem to prevail in the CDU/CSU," that parallel to the G-10 law an additional law should be created which under certain circumstances would legalize monitoring in private homes.

The Union parties have rejected such attributions. Delegate Moeller told the German Press Agency (dpa) that the Union parties would certainly take no such initiative. The rumor in Bonn is that the CDU/CSU in conjunction with the minister of defense at the conclusion of the work of the committee on monitoring wants to propose a law for the counterintelligence service (MAD) according to which the work and the assignments of this intelligence service should be made more precise. The CSU delegate Althammer has, too, regretted very much that information on this meeting has become public. The serious breech of confidence is all the more regrettable as the committee chairman at the secret meeting asked whether it was desirable once again to treat those points in an open meeting which seemed appropriate for this. This suggestion was not championed by any member of the committee.

In its Tuesday edition DIE WELT reported that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in past years not only monitored the atomic scientist Klaus Traube but in five additional cases set up microphones and broadcasting devices in private homes and hotels. According to the report, this "was revealed now by the president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Richard Meier, to the Bundestag's investigating committee." At the same time the newspaper recounts in its report individual actions which Meier "announced" to the committee.

9485
CSO: 3103

COMMENTATOR VIEWS WASHINGTON'S COMEBACK AS WORLD GENDARME

DW211000 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Dec 79 p 4 DW

[Article by Dieter Schroeder: "Comeback for the World Gendarme"]

[Text] The position of world gendarme which has been vacant for years is to be filled again in the near future: The United States has already announced its comeback. This, and nothing else, is the meaning of President Carter's announcement on increasing arms expenditures by an annual 4.5 percent, after inflation, and stepping up the establishment of a rapid deployment force for missions outside the NATO area. To put proper emphasis behind his message the President has already dispatched emissaries who are supposed to negotiate on the use of bases in cases of crisis in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya and Somalia. Reportedly the action is not directed against Iran. This is only half true; naturally, Washington also anticipates from this an advantage in the war of nerves with Tehran.

Under the pressure of public and published opinion, however, Carter is already thinking beyond the hostage drama. Khomeyni has relieved the Americans of their Vietnam trauma and brought about a change in feelings. Higher defense spending is popular again; the United States does not want to be humiliated again. Thus, Carter was able to say: "We must comprehend that not each case of determined application of force is a potential Vietnam." A policy aimed at protecting the energy supply of the Western world against unrest and revolts as well as against the interference of the Soviet Union in conflicts of the Third World again meets with approval and support. All the election promises by Carter to cut arms spending are forgotten. In addition to the decision to build the mobile MX missile and some Trident submarines, he has now announced an arms program which will burden the United States with considerable expenditures that will have an inflationary effect. In their desire to be respected the Americans seem to ignore this blemish, however.

One might chide them for that and ask whether they would not be better advised to contribute instead toward an international society which can do without a world gendarme, for instance, through the renunciation of the waste of energy and raw materials by the industrial nations. Yet phrasing

this question already means relegating it to the realm of illusion. Even if all prosperous citizens in the West were to become ascetics complete with nailboards, the dependence on the energy suppliers could not be abolished. The question as to what will happen in the unstable oil countries in the Middle East cannot leave the Western world indifferent. Help from international authorities such as the United Nations cannot be expected; nor any restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. The troop movements of the Soviets in Afghanistan rather have aroused the anxiety that Moscow is planning more than just the support of a threatened vassal regime: The conquest of a base which is significant for the domination of Asia and possibly an intervention in Iran in the event the United States sees itself compelled to intervene.

The reports coming from American sources can hardly be dismissed as international propaganda. In the case of both superpowers a post-imperialist phase is notable. But this also causes the danger of an escalation of tensions and of a clash to increase. According to Carter, the rapid deployment force to begin with has been planned as a political weapon. Yet at the same time he made it clear that he would use it, too, should deterrence fail. The threat is credible only, however, if this reserve can really be sent into action. As shown by the contemplations of an intervention in Iran this still requires bases despite modern arms technology.

This is why the Middle East is moving into the field of vision for a dual reason: As a strategic crossroads which lured the British, French, Russians and Germans in the era of imperialism's bloom, and as an energy reservoir which is, for the time being, still inexhaustible. So far a large part of this reservoir has been in the sphere of Western influence, yet it threatens to slip away from the West through internal and external dangers. Objectively, the West is faced with the necessity of preventing such a development. Should the loss of this region be near at hand, the West would hardly have any other choice but to risk conflicts.

The return to a prophylactic policy of strength still constitutes the lesser evil. Yet the question remains what success such a policy can produce today. Does it help against religious madness? After the shah's overthrow Saudi Arabia at first tried to dissociate itself from the United States for fear of the anti-Western feelings. The events in Mecca, however, may well have started a rethinking process in Riyadh as well. The dynasty can hardly find any other protector than the United States. But it might demand a test of courage from Carter before complying with Washington's desire for bases. The President is still seeking a diplomatic solution; in view of the feelings in the United States, however, his patience has limits. If Riyadh complies with the American wishes, then other Arab and African states will follow, Egypt in any event.

Washington has let the Kremlin know in an open message what this will mean for detente: Henceforth there will only be "reciprocal detente."

PRESS DISCUSSES POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO BONN

DW211104 Cologne DEUTSCHLANDFUNK Network in German to East and West Germany 0605 GMT 21 Dec 79 DW

[Text] WIESBADENER KURIER notes: Just a week ago NATO made its decision in the field of medium-range nuclear arms, a decision that was linked with a diarmament offer. The meeting between Emil Wojtaszek and Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the first contact between foreign ministers of the two different alliances. That alone attributes special significance to this consultation. In the past decade much understanding has developed for the enormous security needs of many important East bloc states. On the other hand, Wojtaszek learned in Bonn that the feeling of a threat is growing in the West because the Soviets have a lead in matters of arms, and that very critical questions are being asked with regard to the aims of such partial superiority in Europe.

RHEINPFALZ of Ludwigshafen points out: The Poles most likely are not primarily for the same reasons against Western arms modernization as the Soviets who believe that their Eurostrategic superiority is endangered. The Poles probably fear that economic relations would suffer setbacks if the political climate deteriorated, and that the catastrophic situation of the Polish national economy could become even worse. For that reason Warsaw considers it impossible to further increase military expenditures, as seems to be planned by Moscow in view of the NATO plans. This is probably why Warsaw does not join the Moscow line which claims that the NATO decisions have closed the door to negotiations.

WESTFAELISCHE NACHRICHTEN of Muenster states: In these German-Polish consultations the Federal Government did not insist on special problems of bilateral relations, relations that are still far from normal but which offer no direct reason for complaints. The sharp Warsaw reactions to statements made in an interview by Bavarian Minister of Culture Maier--and the problems connected with the city partnership between Krakow and Nuremberg--were the most recent examples of the sensitivities that still burden relations between Poles and Germans. More important than this daily irritation is the fact that trade exchange continues to work despite Polish difficulties with foreign currency, that cultural relations are not stagnating and--most of all--that the resettlement of Germans from Poland is taking place correctly according to the agreements.

CSO: 3103

COMMENTATOR VIEWS NATO DECISION, WOJTASZEK VISIT

DW211120 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTHER RUNDSCHAU in German 21 Dec 79 p 3 DW

[Article by Moe, Bonn correspondent: "And Yet It Moves"]

[Text] In the months prior to the much fought about double decision of NATO and even thereafter there has been quite some croaking in Western Europe. Feeling uncertain due to the Soviet protests, some politicians who should have known better said that agreement to the modernization of American grey-zone arms would render impossible for the time being Bonn's demand for negotiations on a mutual reduction of European arms arsenals.

Helmut Schmidt and his deputy, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who is responsible for disarmament, still find it difficult to make the correctness of their NATO course understandable for everybody in the last corner of the coalition parties. It is hard to understand why the West Europeans should vote in favor of American missiles and cruise missiles if they actually want to disarm and not "close the arms gap."

But Schmidt as well as Genscher do not draw the wrong conclusion that one could defend Western Europe without the United States if a conflict situation should come up in the eighties. They do not believe either that the Soviets are nitwits who will give away some good merchandise for half its price.

It cannot be said yet whether the eighties will be the "decade of disarmament and arms control," as Hans-Dietrich Genscher would like, but his Polish colleague Emil Wojtaszek supported his conviction that on the other side of the Elbe one understands realistic give and take better than peace and friendship statements that cannot be turned into clear agreements.

The fact that Wojtaszek and Genscher agreed to have an initial meeting of experts in February in preparation for the Madrid CSCE followup conference may be considered by outsiders an unimportant matter. But it is an important signal for assessing the changes of the planned arms control negotiations. It indicates that not merely Poland, but also the USSR, remain interested in eventual disarmament so that Europe will not freeze in missiles and tanks. The United States also will be happy some day if it does not have to take care so much of its European outpost and can attend more to its domestic problems.

CSO: 3103

PRESS DISCUSSES STRAUSS OFFER TO FREE DEMOCRATS

DW171350 Cologne DEUTSCHLANDFUNK Network in German to East and West Germany 0605 GMT 15 Dec 79 DW

[Text] SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG comments on the offer made by the CSU chairman to the Free Democrats as follows: Enthusiastic Strauss fans and devoted readers of the CSU Party organ BAYERNKURIER must find it almost incredible that their idol is ready to renounce the candidacy for chancellor if the FDP in return is willing to form a coalition with the union parties. How does this square with the attacks launched by Franz Josef Strauss, which have been applauded for many years, against former candidate for chancellor Kohl and his secretary general Biedenkopf because of their lame attitude toward the FDP? Had Strauss not always said that the hopeful winking at the liberals should be dispensed with and that instead they should be fought as part of a socialist bloc or, briefly, as a socialist bloc party and that they should be ousted from the parliaments, like Kiesinger had desired at the time? Instead, Strauss will now sacrifice himself, if the Free Democrats can be baited this way? It just cannot be true. So should confusion have been created in the above-mentioned CSU friendship circles, the explanation can be given here--though without authority by Franz Josef Strauss--that the offer cannot be taken seriously. This was a quotation from SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG.

The FREIBURG BADISCHE ZEITUNG stresses: It is not for the first time that Franz Josef Strauss has toyed with the idea that he does not want to be in the way of a coalition of the CDU/CSU with the FDP, if such a coalition fails owing to him. Such ideas do not embarrass the FDP but lead it to declare that it will firmly side with the SPD, with or without Strauss. This clarification came promptly, and should this have been the tactical side intention of Strauss, then he has achieved what he wanted. Any interpretations going beyond it range between illusions and absurdity.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG writes: The trail balloon floated by Franz Josef Strauss has exploded with a loud bang. This was done by the FDP with a hot needle. It was not even prepared to seriously take notice of the offer made by the Bavarian to renounce his candidacy for chancellor in favor of

a Christian-liberal coalition. The CSU chief certainly had not expected anything else, for he knows all too well that the Free Democrats could not leave the alliance with the SPD for the mere reason that this would entail the splitting of the party, even if the new candidate were to be Ernst Albrecht. The only thing Struss was after was to rid himself of the reproach of giving his own interests priority over those of the CDU/CSU, which is a cosmetic surgery that can produce limited effects only, because it has come many months too late.

CSO: 3103

ECONOMIC INSTITUTE REVEALS PLANS OF DKP TO INFILTRATE INDUSTRY

Bonn DIE WELT in German 19 Nov 79 p 2

[Article by Heinz Vielain: "Communists in Enterprises: From "Good Colleagues" to Agitators]

[Text] Bonn. Through their "subversive activity" in industry, communists have been able to widen the base considerably for the regular production of crises. The Institute for the German Economy has made this determination in its current analysis of the situation after a 9-year observation of leftwing activities. This document also points out the dangers of increased communist infiltration of the unions.

According to presentations of the institute, adding up figures from information on communists indicates that they have in the meantime formed 1,175 enterprise groups. Their activity as a force for agitation among workers is supported by 1,129 various factory newspapers, which appear for the most part on a regular basis.

According to the institute, the production of crises is currently one of the most prominent goals of communist activity. Poorly ventilated working areas, bad lunch rooms or missing toilet paper are always welcome cause for instigating things. As soon as a basis of trust has been established, according to the analysis of the situation by the institute, the communists then turn to their next goal, namely, establishing solidarity with their party or their groups. As in the plants, the communists also finally tried in the unions to find a basis for mass support in order to be able to exert a stronger influence upon the workers.

According to the analysis of the situation by the Institute for the German Economy, it is not easy to respond to the question as to what success efforts by communists to infiltrate the unions have already had because neither the DKP nor the DGB [German Labor Union Federation] have made definitive statements. Certainly the DKP has had spectacular success with its youth organization SDAJ [Socialist German Workers Youth]. In this connection reference is made to estimations of DGB Secretary for Youth Walter Haas, according to whom 15 to 20 percent of the 1977 delegates were communists.

Regarding possible successes of the DKP in infiltrating the union, it has been established that in the DKP the proportion of convention delegates, who exercise a union function, has steadily risen in recent years. In 1978 already about 60 percent of the delegates' seats were occupied by union functionaries. Union members represented 92.8 percent of all delegates. Inferences may be drawn from this information, such as: Among the 61 members of the DKP regional leadership in Rheinland-Westfalen 57 were, for example, at the same time members of a DGB union.

9485
CSO: 3103

GENERAL OBLESER DISCUSSES FUTURE AIR FORCE PROCUREMENT

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Nov 79 pp 595-596

[Article by Lieutenant General Friedrich Obleser, air force commander: "Future Procurement of Air Force Armament — The Necessary Product at the Best Price"]

[Text] Air armament forms the material basis for the accomplishment of the Luftwaffe [air force] mission in peace and war. It is thus a yardstick for the credibility of the deterrent and the capability of the Luftwaffe to accomplish its combat mission if required. This alone is sufficient reason to intensively analyze the principles and goals of air armament and its future development from the viewpoint of the customer. Air armament also represents a significant economic factor. If air armament is understood to be the result of goal-oriented planning, then, in the final analysis, the accuracy and soundness of planning become the pivot of Luftwaffe future procurement.

Operational Missions and Planning Assessment

The first planning step consists of a planning period-related check of basic operational missions [and of] their effect and significance as measured against the quality and quantity of the opposing potential. In further steps operational missions are broken down qualitatively and quantitatively into individual missions so that these can be covered with available weapon systems. Covering these individual missions with the weapon systems available in the planning period eventually results in mission accomplishment gaps for which planning solutions must be found. To this end new air warfare equipment options are fitted to the gaps discovered with the qualitative and quantitative requirements for new air warfare equipment being thus established. Thus this assessment proceeds from missions to targets that have to be combatted and from these targets to the required air warfare equipment. It follows the sequence "target — weapon — operational means — support element" and thus touches solely on the correlation between missions and threat.

This planning assessment is mission-related and threat-oriented. It fulfills the required system-free overview in that it encompasses the entire operational spectrum and keeps ready assessment points and basic values for actual weapon system planning for the planning period.

At the same time this planning assessment breaks with traditional sequential thinking in which old weapon systems are replaced only with similar but more modern systems without specifically asking if this is the optimum solution. In actual weapon system planning it will be the task of a further step to translate the qualitative and quantitative results of this planning into requirements and to describe solution alternatives with which the militlary mission can be expediently accomplished.

Today more than ever this planning step occurs under concrete restraints and in an arena characterized by

- an increasing discrepancy between cost development and budget reality,
- an increase in missions with almost unchanged personnel strength and
- more complex interstate armaments ties.

For this reason it will be increasingly necessary to develop and apply new concept and work procedures which are suitable to achieve, by the development of as comprehensive alternatives as possible, the militarily "necessary product at the best price."

How is this formula to be understood and where can solution assessments be recognized?

Among the conditions named the term of the militarily "necessary product at the best price" is a synonym for the "optimally achievable" solution. The "optimally achievable" is the alternative which, within a realistically estimated framework of available means and compatible with the organizational and personnel structure of the Luftwaffe, makes realizable, given appropriate higher quality, sufficient quantities to be able to counter the threat in the future as well.

Realistic Cost Basis

Orienting Luftwaffe planning toward the "necessary product" did not by itself denote a basic change in planning principle. New accents were established only after the forced coupling of the militarily necessary requirement with a realistic cost basis. A look at the early years of the new Luftwaffe may make this shift in accents clearer.

The principle of weapon system planning was — also, to be sure, under other peripheral conditions — maximum system performance. The effort to always react to the threat with qualitatively superior systems also allowed very expensive performance peaks to be achieved. But also the then valid NATO strategy of massive retaliation placed less demanding requirements on the conventional capabilities of the first and, in part, also on the second weapon system generation.

With the transition to the strategy of flexible response, the Luftwaffe received the additional mission to also accomplish its defense mission with conventional means — preferably day and night under all weather contions — while retaining available capabilities. Translating this mission into appropriate weapon systems unavoidably led to a drastic and expensive increase in performance requirements on the new weapon system generation.

This change took place a t a time during which the investment wishes of the armed forces were viewed in increasingly harder competition with other desired expenditures by the state. This frequently resulted in a conflict of goals that was resolved only in limited areas where the economic interests of the state and the armament wishes of the armed forces were identical.

Such an identity of interests lasted so long as there continued a buildup of national industrial capacity aimed at making the armed forces more independent of foreign weapons deliveries and gaining access to the modern technology standard.

As soon as this phase of the buildup of national resources was completed, Luftwaffe armament had to be separated from the very demanding goal of performance maximizing to meet military weapon system requirements and be restricted to realizing the militarily necessary. In a deliberate case of terminological emphasis "design to requirements" was replaced by "design to needs." But a turning point in cost development was still not achieved.

The upward trend of cost development remained steady and continues to be in clear contradiction to budget development. The continuity of a measured and balanced air armament will in the future be decisively determined by the criterion which will bring cost development under control, establish cost security over the life cycle of weapon systems and increase the cost consciousness of all participants.

Analysis of the cost structure of modern flying weapon systems shows that the relation of development, procurement and operating costs move over an order of magnitude of 1:3:5 to 1:5:10. The conclusion is that the most important cost magnitudes — composed of a 10-year development period and a 20-year use phase — are the operating costs. Seventy percent of operating costs are caused by personnel costs.

Given these viewpoints, reduction of operating costs by a radical decrease in personnel intensity in the use phase of a weapon system receives primary significance. This simultaneously poses the prerequisite that reduction of personnel cost — synonomous with a corresponding decrease of life cycle cost — must become one of the most important design parameters of a weapon system as early as the development phase.

These planning procedures are often tagged "design to life cycle cost" or, even shorter, "design to cost." What do they mean?

'Design to Cost'

"Design to cost" was developed by American industry and adapted for the armed forces. Its goal is to establish, in the planning stage, the total costs of a weapon system in all phases of its life cycle from development to retirement and to be able to control cost development at the earliest possible point in time. This goal arose from the experience that the combat aircraft cost increase trend in the various stages of the development phase frequently could be influenced only by reductions in numbers to a no longer acceptable level. The consequence of this reduction in numbers was that supplementary developments and procurements became necessary in order to support operational mission accomplishment.

Important principles of the "design to cost" concept are
- a careful balance between tactical/technical requirements and all elements of life cycle costs
- the definition of tactical/technical minimum requirements for absolutely necessary operational performance capability and
- establishing a realistic budget upper limit.

Acceptable alternative solutions must lie in the spectrum between the budget upper limit and the lower limit of tactical/technical minimum requirements. If the performance lower limit is not reached, the value of a new development must be doubted. If the plan cost framework is exceeded, the cost effectiveness of such an alternative solution must be questioned. Costs thus become, along with traditional planning factors, a design-determining basic parameter in actual weapon system planning.

Tactical/technical requirements must thus be arranged in spectra and grouped into clear technological partial steps in order to be able to determine the cost-intensive parameters of these requirements. Here an example:

The requirement for a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 can be met with a simple air intake but a top speed of Mach 2.0 requires a more complex intake with considerably higher development, procurement and operation cost. This gives rise to the question if the operational value of a top speed higher by Mach 0.4 justifies the additional costs in weapon system life cycle.

Future investment strategy is also largely determined by applying the principle of the "design to cost" concept. It is a question of investing primarily in those areas where the greatest return for an investment is to be expected. Analysis done to date indicates investment concentration priorities for future flying weapon systems will follow in the sequence of "armament — avionics — airframe — powerplant."

In summary it can be established that the growing discrepancy between cost increase and budget reality is increasingly limiting the planning, and thereby the negotiating, freedom of the Luftwaffe. The exhaustion of varied technological possibilities has contributed to reaching clear qualitative improvements in weapon system performances and has hitherto made it possible to also credibly counter an increased threat. But in the final analysis no success has been achieved in so mastering total costs in the cycle of development, procurement and operation of a weapon system that the cost increases can be held in prescribed plan cost frameworks without considerable quantitative losses in substance.

Although a part of the losses in substance could hitherto be accepted, the results of threat- and mission-oriented planning in quantitative and qualitative analysis nevertheless clearly show that further losses in substance — particularly quantitative ones — can hardly be accepted.

The Luftwaffe has taken these realities into account by "realistic planning" and concentration on the "necessary product at the best price." This path must now be logically continued. But this is also a challenge to industry to find solutions to more effectively combat cost increases. The test will have been passed if the gap between realistic funding expectation on the one hand and price increases for necessary weapon systems on the other can be closed.

The test in this case could be the Tactical Combat Aircraft for the '90's (TKF 90) which has been qualitatively and quantitatively defined from the viewpoint of a threat- and mission-oriented planning and identified as a "necessary product." The formulation of TKF 90 requirements in spectra and the limiting of performance values to the corresponding total costs in the aircraft life cycle give the necessary freedom of movement for the most favorable price within reality-justified bases of the plan cost framework.

The translation of Luftwaffe planning into qualitatively high-value products in numbers appropriate to the purpose and at affordable costs is both a challenge and a chance for future procurement of air armament and the Luftwaffe.

8373
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TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH ALPHA JET, TORNADO COMBAT PLANES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 12 Nov 79 pp 42-45

[Article: "I Think I'm Standing Still"]

[Text] The Luftwaffe [air force] is still having problems with the Alpha Jet and Tornado combat aircraft. The highly praised superbirds are not only limping but will also cost more than planned.

Luftwaffe commander Friedrich Obleser was optimistic: "Keep a close eye on this baby," he warned in March after his first flight in the Alpha Jet at Leipheim Air Base with test pilot Peter Klonk. "It has good qualities."

Last Wednesday, eight months later, Obleser had to admit to the Defense Committee of the Bundestag [lower house of parliament] that the highly praised German-French superbird was still worrying him. "But the difficulties," said the general soothingly, "are being exaggerated."

The reason for Obleser's interrogation was the Leipheim test pilot reports being kept secret by the Luftwaffe. After 1,300 flying hours they certified the new combat aircraft's outstanding maneuverability and stability but gave the engines a grade of "unsatisfactory." The verdict of a major: "A turtle dove with midget powerplant. Has only limited capability as a combat aircraft."

In extreme situations such as in a dive the French Larzac-04 engines are still subject to dangerous shock stalls. The engines can be brought from idle to full revolutions only with difficulty. Acceleration also continues to be less than desirable. But precisely this is important to survival in war.

After all, the Alpha Jet, which is to replace the Bundeswehr's [federal armed forces] obsolete Fiat G-91 machines by 1982, is to support the army on the battlefield — with bomb and cannon attacks against armor and supply columns and with attacks against maneuverable enemy helicopters. This mission requires a surprise maneuver at variable speed and, above all, a rapid retreat after firing weapons.

But the Alpha Jet — costs for the 175 Luftwaffe machines: DM 3.5 billion — has frequently proved to be a lame bird i the speed tests. During acceleration there have frequently been, as with many autos, at certain rpm ranges holes in which the machine does not react for fractions of a second. One pilot: "Then I think I'm standing still." At such moments the Alpha Jet would be a sure kill for air defense.

Obleser believes, however, that these defects can be soon corrected by changes in the engine. But his pilots are pessimistic because for months technicians of the French firm Snecma-Turbomeca have been predicting a quick improvement — but so far without success.

The supply of spare parts is also presenting a problem a few months before reequipment is to begin. The Luftwaffe's test program cannot be conducted on schedule because industry is in arrears with the delivery of promised replacement engines and test equipment. Weapons and low-level flight training which was to begin in May of next year at Beja in Portugal is being further delayed. Obleser to the Defense Committee: "We will be able to make a decision only in January."

The Bundeswehr also has problems with the second European joint aircraft, the German-British-Italian MRCA Tornado multirole combat aircraft. The Tornado program — total cost for 322 Bundeswehr machines: DM 19.9 billion — is also not running as troublefree as the military and technicians have hitherto tried to convince the deputies.

Costly changes are necessary, for example, on the Rolls-Royce engine because it still uses too much fuel and produces too little power. Other defects: the onboard cannon vibrates so heavily that electronic devices either give false readings or malfunction; the radar altimeter does not function precisely; and, finally, the bomb shackles have to be rebuilt because the American bombs do not fit exactly into the mounts.

Eliminating these errors will, according to a defense ministry report to the Budget Committee, cost at least DM 328 million. The German share of Tornado development costs will thus climb to DM 4.4 billion.

Even more. As a result of the defects the deliveries to the squadrons originally planned for the end of 1978 will be further delayed — the new date is now the beginning of 1982 — and the operational F-104 Starfighters scheduled for retirement will have to be modernized. The costs for this program are not yet known.

But the deputies are no longer satisfied with the standard defense ministry answer that the new aircraft will accomplish the required missions "with few exceptions." They are demanding precise data.

The Luftwaffe commander already knows what to expect in coming weeks. "The Tornado," he admitted last Wednesday, "is actually worrying me more than the Alpha Jet."

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BRIEFS

GDR N-SAFETY TALKS--Berlin, 21 November (Reuter). The federal government wants to talk to the GDR also about the "safety standards of nuclear plants." Berlin Federal Senator Heimann reported this. Although the nuclear plants operating or being constructed in the GDR do not have the "specific safety concept" of those in the FRG, Heimann noted that this of itself does not permit a "founded statement relative to apparently less safety." [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Nov 79 p 1] 9485

CSO: 3103

RUDOLF BAHRO HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE IN HELSINKI

LD101941 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1530 GMT 10 Dec 79 LD

[Excerpts] Rudolf Bahro, one of the best known East European dissidents of recent years, is currently visiting Helsinki. Bahro, who was released from a GDR prison in October and came to the West, gave assurance at a press conference this afternoon that his criticism of the present socialist system has considerable support, for instance among the scientists in Eastern Europe. Now Bahro aims, however, at working for changing the Western capitalist system, because that, in the first place, will decide the development of the world. Yrjoe Lautela reports:

Despite his experiences, Bahro says that his criticism has extensive support at least among social scientists in the GDR and other socialist countries. In his view ideological development is increasingly strongly going against party machinery. All those who think, Bahro says, think against the machinery.

Following his arrival in the West he intends now to concentrate on influencing conditions in the capitalist countries, chiefly in the FRG. Bahro stressed at the press conference the crisis of the living environment, created by the Western industrial system. Bahro said: I am in any case sure of the fact, that, taking into account the crisis of the environment, which is a direct result of the development of the capitalist forces of production, we cannot continue as at present, especially in the most developed countries.

The criticism of the inefficiency of the Eastern system is wrong if the yardstick for it is the pattern of Western efficiency, Bahro said. Thus, in his view, the change must take place particularly in the West, which is the flywheel of development; otherwise the West cannot be a model for the socialist and developing countries.

Bahro has a clearly positive attitude toward the so-called green movement, which in the FRG is confusing the traditional three-party election pattern. Bahro stressed, however, that the mass of people interested in environment questions is much bigger than the new party which will

probably be officially established next month. Bahro referred to the fact that at the Social Democratic Party congress last week more than 40 percent of the delegates voted against nuclear power. Bahro admitted the possibility that the new party may help Franz-Josef Strauss, the candidate for federal chancellorship, known as an extreme right-wing representative of the Christian Democrats, to power in the Bundestag elections next autumn. On a longer-term basis, however, it is most important, in Bahro's view, to achieve an extensive understanding among those interested in the protection of the environment and the left-wing forces in the Federal Republic.

CSO: 3107

POLITICIANS BEGIN MANEUVERING FOR PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 16 Nov 79 pp 48-49

[Article by Mikko Pohtola: "Information from the Top: New Men, New Appraisals"]

[Text] The latest presidential Gallup poll has forced policymakers to re-evaluate many of their habitual opinions.

Aarne Saarinen is trying to unify his party. The internal conflict has become strained to its limit.

Then too, a lot of names are being changed in a lot of important posts. The KEPU (Center Party) is debating the chairmanship issue and the Conservative Party is looking for a party secretary.

The elements for a dispute over the radio law committee, which is to be formed, are well-known: The chairman's seat is up for grabs.

Support for Mauno Koivisto among the Social Democrats themselves is now so strong that he cannot be relegated to the sidelines during the choice of a party presidential candidate. The international merit Kalevi Sorsa has won for himself is not enough to refute the fact that Koivisto is the only party candiate who has any real chance of winning.

As long as cooperation in government affairs between the majority factions of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] continues, it is foolish to suppose that during the presidential elections the "reformists" [Finnish Communist Party majority] would jump onto the Social Democrat bandwagon by throwing their support to some bourgeois candidate. There is good reason for adding the "reformist" vote to Koivisto's share of the total.

The widespread notion that "the president is chosen in Moscow" has outlived its time. There is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union will not behave properly with regard to the Finnish presidential election.

As far as the presidential race is concerned, a gaping void dominates the middle class. The only one of the candidates mentioned in public discussion does not even have any significant support in his own party, much less outside it.

Old Set-Up

Thus the presidential game is being played around one man. In this respect the situation is reminiscent of the 1956 election which preceded it, when the campaign was between those who were for Urho Kekkonen and those who were against Urho Kekkonen. At that time Kekkonen's opponents as a last resort sought refuge in President J.K. Paasikivi in order to keep Kekkonen from being elected. They persuaded the old man — he was then 86 years old — to accept at the last moment, between the first and the second ballots, when he allowed his name to be used. But it was too late.

But now they have in good time begun to talk in political circles about the possibility that President Kekkonen might be persuaded to continue in office even after 1984. In this way they would buy themselves more time to weaken Koivisto's position. However, there are for the present no signs that Kekkonen would agree to this.

New Names

In the transition to the 1980's, new names will inevitably appear. In KEPU circles these are Keijo Korhonen and Kauko Sipponen. The former, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs political assistant secretary of state, is a strong contender to carry on Urho Kekkonen's foreign policy and the latter is a governor and former head of the President's Office.

Heikki Haavisto, one of these timely names, is the chairman of the MTK [Agricultural Producers Association]. Delivering a speech at a farmers' celebration of All Saints' Day in Paimio at the beginning of this month, Haavisto really demonstrated his support for Johannes Virolainen in the KEPU chairmanship race when he said that from the farmers' standpoint it is important for "a person who represents farmers to continue to head the party." But Haavisto's speech gave rise to the assumption that he himself might be prepared to accept the KEPU chairmanship if the visible candidates were to expend their energies in fighting among themselves. If Haavisto really is ready to step into the political arena, the experts feel he can to a greater extent attract to his party middle class districts too, which are looking for an alternative and a counterweight to Koivisto.

SKP Situation

The result of the latest Metalworkers Union election has provided SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Chairman Aarne Saarinen with more weight in his new attempt to unify his party under majority faction terms. The Communists did suffer a defeat but it was especially the "Stalinists" who lost ground. As the majority faction sees it, the party's internal disputes are the reason for the weakening of its support.

Saarinen's ultimatum-like appeal to the minority faction means an extreme sharpening of the internal conflict. Experts on the international communist movement feel that behind this there lurks a change in the way the Soviet Communist Party has been reacting to the Finnish situation. The replacement of the Soviet ambassador to Helsinki is an indication of this change. Ambassador Stepanov, who was sent home early last summer, was known to be a protector of the "Stalinists." The new ambassador, Sobolev, is a proper career diplomat who does not stick his nose into Finnish party affairs.

However, any dramatic change in the SKP's internal situation is regarded as improbable. There is no reason to expect the "Stalinists" to leave the party. On the other hand, it is taken for granted that their organizational strength will continue to grow weaker.

Conservative Party Party Secretary Issue

At the end of last week Conservative Party district chairmen gathered about Ilkka Suominen preparing the party secretary issue for the party delegation meeting to be held on 25 November. He is to take over Veikko Tavastila's seat.

Suominen had earlier "thrown" the name of his own candidate, current organization head Jussi Isotalo, into the ring. The Jyvaskyla district, however, decided to run its own candidate for the post, Rantaloma general manager Juhani Kivela.

As is known, in the reigning atmosphere of reconciliation, both candidates were renounced at the recently held meeting. As a compromise, the name of the party's present information chief, Aarno Kaila, an experienced organization man, was mentioned.

It is felt that the situation that has arisen reflects dissatisfaction by some of the Conservative Party's constituencies with the bureaucratic way in which questions relating to party appointments are now and also have in the past been handled.

Radio Law Committee

At the present time a special radio law committee is being formed to urgently consider questions pertaining to MTV [expansion unknown] news and particularly the new radio law. Communications Minister Laarto has been thinking in terms of a committee balance of power of five to five with a rightist chairman. Johannes Virolainen favors a slightly bigger committee. Its balance of power would be seven to six in favor of the nonsocialists.

It is generally taken for granted that the committee chairmanship belongs to the KEPU. However, there may be a dispute again over who the chairman will be, as has been the case during the past few days. The elements for a dispute have already existed for some time now. When Atte Pakkanen was

pried loose from his position as chairman of the board of YLE [Finnish Broadcasting Corporation], he was, as is known, promised the chairmanship of the Radio Committee for reasons then valid. The idea of a committee, which was to have made decisions on MTV newscasts and define the relative position of cable television, was quietly buried. Pakkanen is still a candidate to head the committee now to be set up. Presidential Office head Juhani Perttunen is also trying to get the post.

It is now felt that an attempt will be made within the party — perhaps to cool down the passions engendered by the race for the chairmanship — to reach a compromise as a result of which Gov Kauko Sipponen might be appointed chairman of the Radio Law Committee.

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ARMED FORCES CHIEF COMMENTS ON SECURITY PROBLEMS

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 16 Nov 79 pp 36-41

[Article by Juhani Aromaki: "Disarmament, Peace Policy and New Fighter Planes, Big Guns, Missiles, Troop Concentrations. Gen Lauri Sutela Answers the Question: What Is Finnish Credibility Really Like?"]

[Text] It is claimed that, in proposing world disarmament while at the same time equipping its army through the expenditure of record sums of money, Finland is behaving in a self-contradictory way.

Armed Forces Chief Lauri Sutela answered this charge in a special interview granted SUOMEN KUVA EHTI in which he also took a stand on criticism of Finnish arms purchases.

A respected representative declaims before hunger strikers on the steps of Parliament and delivers a knockout to Army arms procurements, democratic women deliver an extremely radical public statement, a left-wing Communist newspaper daily makes a lot of noise about the issue and the ordinary man in the street wonders about the vague information and intimations.

What is it all about?

The Armed Forces have become the target of criticism from different quarters. The main thrust of this criticism is aimed at next year's defense budget proposal and through it at the 2.3 billion marks the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee at the time recommended be used for military equipment procurements for 1977-1981.

The general staff proposed an appropriation of 4.5 billion marks to the committee, with which the Army felt it could correct all of the Armed Forces' worst deficiencies. The recommended sum was, therefore, half as much as the generals had hoped for.

Will Finland now procure more weapons or replace the old ones?

"The whole time the issue has been whether to replace the old weapons. There has been no need for adding to our armaments, since following the

wars there were quite enough weapons, in terms of numerical strength, left over in our stocks," the chief replied.

"Of course, at some time they will have to be renewed. We have mainly been able to renew equipment which is at the absolute end of its usable life (for example, airplanes that can no longer remain aloft) or was built for wars that took place during entirely different historical periods (for example, third-line rifles and Boer War cannons).

"The missile is probably our only truly new weapon since the wars. Our assortment includes anti-tank, anti-naval and aircraft and now, finally, also anti-aircraft missiles," Armed Forces Chief Sutela said.

When speaking of the big powers' armament race and Finland's defense budget, in the chief's opinion, there is just no basis of comparison between them.

Finland Still at a "Minilevel"

"Insofar as Armed Forces leaders are subjected to accusations that Finland's arms procurement and its efforts to restrict the arms race are in contradiction with one another, the critics have gone completely out of their minds," the chief parried.

"In Finland there is no question of any armament spiral, rather of the indispensable renewal of obsolete weaponry. Our level of armament, which throughout the entire post-World War II period has been a European 'minilevel,' can in no way be compared with a situation in which one discusses reduction of the big powers' nuclear weapons systems or other significant steps taken toward disarmament at that level," the chief noted.

General Sutela admits that ground forces appropriations have risen during the past few years, although not quite as much as the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee proposed when it was left to its deliberations in 1976.

"In accordance with recommendations made more rapidly than on the average — and the existing more urgent needs behind them — equipment procurement appropriations have particularly risen in next year's budget proposal.

"The increase is chiefly due to additional purchases from the Soviet Union (anti-aircraft missiles and MIG-21-bis fighters) and payments for Hawk procurements. In these respects, things are in good shape."

According to the chief, however, the Armed Forces will not be able to manage next year without a supplementary budget. This is due to the fact that the purchase value of the so-called operations and maintenance appropriations is about 100 million marks, or a fourth less than the committee recommendation.

"This extremely restricts Armed Forces daily expenditures. For example, we have to cut corners much too much in transportation and the training of recruits, in target practice and training materials."

Missiles to Hyryla

The object of General Sutela's visit was the Helsinki anti-aircraft regiment in Hyryla. New Soviet regional anti-aircraft missiles are to be located there shortly. These missiles will probably be the first the Soviet Union has sold to the West. This time too, the deal will be subject to specific stipulations. Finland has entered into this sort of confidential deal before and everything went smoothly.

What is so exceptional about this arms deal with our neighbor is the fact that these technically demanding missiles will not now either bring a single Soviet trainer to Finland. Instead, a rather large team of Finnish experts: officers, operations officers, technical engineers and technicians, is at the present time in the Soviet Union learning how to use these weapons.

Col Hannu Pohjanpalo is in command, since the chief is busy familiarizing himself with the sites before the missiles arrive. Hyryla is almost ready to receive the weapons but the garrison still requires more barracks and will have to increase the watch in the area.

The Armed Forces are switching to their new weapons system with missiles. Up to now planes flying at altitudes of over 3 km have been out of range of our anti-aircraft batteries — if we discount fighter anti-aircraft. In other words, those altitudes have constituted an open area. Now, the military says, this major deficiency will in time be corrected.

The chief then asked the men at Hyryla about the state of their health, their readiness and the tests they were making for the new missiles, after which there was a short training session.

Then there was a coffee break in the soldiers' home.

"Finland Is Part of the North"

Before answering the question as to what kind of armed forces Finland needs, the chief said he felt that in some quarters the same defect, which generally eases conversation among Finns, was interfering with discussion of defense policy: staring at one's own navel, self-concentration.

"Issues are isolated from their contexts, divided into their components and dealt with separately, in the process of which their perspective and significance are distorted. Then too, we forget that we are part of the North, part of Europe and of other, bigger regions as well," the chief said.

According to him, all defense policy appraisals and decisions must be made in terms of our environment and our security policy goal. He misses such appraisals of and stances on overall prospects in the course of public defense policy discussions.

"Too often in our discussions we forget the meaning of the will to defend ourselves. In the final analysis, the Armed Forces' ability to act and the entire nation's presence in an international situation heightened to the point of war depend on its ability to hold out."

In the 1970's parliamentary defense committees deliberated a great deal about Armed Forces duties and performance demands. What is new in all this is the fact that politicians have engaged in extensive and constant discussion with the military.

"First of all, we must have the means for keeping watch over our territory and defending it against intrusion. Even in peacetime, this presupposes air and naval forces capable of acting and the ability to develop readiness in all branches of defense should the situation tense up.

"Secondly, we must be able to prevent a potential invader from attacking any objectives he has set himself. This presupposes ground forces in large numbers, armed to deal with the situation, also because of the relatively large surface area of our territory."

"Our Territory Must Remain in Our Hands"

"Therefore, Finland must have its own credible defense capability. Then it will also have the effect of preventing in advance the danger of involvement in a war and then, too, it will in the best possible way reinforce the implications of our foreign policy activities," General Sutela said.

He also stressed the fact that, through its ability to act, the Armed Forces would become a natural part of the balance of military power in the North. From the point of view of the military, the obligations of a basic Finnish security policy decision are also based on this:

"A small country's best means of attempting to stay out of open conflicts is to see to it that it preserves good relations with its neighbors and with the outside world in general.

"For Finland this has meant the choice of a policy of active, peace-seeking neutrality. Thus foreign policy measures are of primary importance in our security policy.

"However, our position as an independent state obviously places on Finland the obligation of defending its government and its citizens should the need arise, despite everything. As a matter of fact, we must also reckon with the same obligation when we enter into a YYA [?mutual aid and cooperation] agreement.

"We must, therefore, see to it that our territory remains in our own hands so that it is not used to wage war against other states. In this way properly proportioned defense measures will also provide Finnish foreign policy with the support it needs," the chief said.

Nowadays it is impossible for any state to persuade others of the effectiveness of its defense capability if it cannot actually back up its words. Ordinary citizens are unaware of the fact that there is occasionally lively activity in Finnish border areas too. Credibility also implies constant vigilance.

How do outsiders keep tabs on our capability?

"It is easy to get enough correct information on a democratic country's armed forces. Among other sources, one can keep watch over the development of our budget. The budget record tells anyone a lot, not only about equipment, but also about training exercises...

"Then there are up-to-date technical devices for getting information. These are obviously effective too."

Half of Funds for Weapons Cut

The general staff requested 4.5 billion 1976 marks for military equipment procurements for 1977-1981 of the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee. The politicians, however, rejected half of that.

"Our bigger proposal was based on the fact that within a reasonable amount of time we could have eliminated the worst equipment deficiencies, particularly in our air defense, but also in our ground forces. The proposal also provided for the acquisition of a third defense fighter squadron."

The plan was to station this third squadron with the Satakunta Flight Detachment. The loss of the squadron caused the Army its own concern because the Baltic area too requires constant surveillance. As the situation demands, Finnish soldiers have to be sent there if there is an alert.

Taking care of this has required and will for some time to come continue to require special arrangements. Planes are sent to the spot from Rissala or Lapland and they are responsible for keeping watch over the Southwest Finland area.

How will the Armed Forces be strengthened by the arrival of the MIG-21-bis and Hawk planes?

"The new MIG-21-bis planes are all-weather fighters, like the Drakens, whose acquisition from the flight detachment referred to means the restoration of activity to a level present-day fighter operations everywhere presuppose.

"As far as the Hawks are concerned, they will replace our outdated Fouga equipment and thus meet the requirements set for Air Force training jets. With their aid, flight training can be continued in the Air Force. Actually, therefore, it is a matter of continuing to fly," the chief maintained.

It it had materialized, the generals' 4.5-billion-mark proposal would have increased the defense expenditures share of the GNP to about 1.8-1.9 percent, or to the level it had reached in the mid-1960's. The generals say that this would have been among the lowest of its kind in Europe.

"Among the nations of Europe, only Austria is behind us in its expenditures for defense, but then, as we know, it has no need for maintaining a navy."

According to general staff calculations, Finland's defense expenditures are in practice among the lowest in Europe, or 450 marks a year per capita. It is estimated that the Swedes expend sums amounting to 3.6 times that, the Swiss 2.7 times and the Danes 2.8 times as much.

Northern Finland's New Troops

In accordance with the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee recommendation, a light infantry brigade was formed in Sodankyla on 1 October 1979. Finland's decision is part of a greater international political design.

"For reasons independent of Finland, the military importance of the Arctic and the surrounding waters has increased over the years. All this is due to technical developments.

"Before, the Arctic regions were inaccessible, but they are no longer so. Naval development has been linked with the development of nuclear strategy. Now that submarines can be armed with missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, the importance of the Arctic regions has increased.

"Its economic significance is also important. New sources of energy, chiefly oil and natural gas, have been and will in future be found there. Fishing, too, has its own importance there.

"The light infantry brigade is a sign to the world that Finland is concerned with the inviolability of its own territory right up to its farthermost northern reaches," the chief said.

"Of course, as such the Northern Finland garrisons are insufficient to guarantee the defense of Lapland. They do, however, form the framework for that defense which can, as need be, be reinforced by moving more troops into the area.

"Lapland is a region where no one can be allowed to chase anyone around, and we should demonstrate the fact in peacetime. Keeping the region under our own control is merely the security policy of an independent state, which our YYA agreement commits us to.

"Finnish Lapland is today no more a 'void' than our neighbors' northern regions are. I am thinking now primarily of our western neighbors," Armed Forces Chief Sutela said.

He sees preservation of a credible and preventative defense capability in the 1980's and 1990's too as especially meaning renewal of our ground forces equipment.

"Considering our military position, terrain and rather large reserves, I believe that we can continue to equip our field army with mainly simple equipment.

"Primarily we have to renew our anti-aircraft and anti-tank armaments and improve our mobility in terms of both night and winter operations capability. The accelerated development of military techniques will, however, probably require us to equip some of our ground forces troops with clearly better equipment than they now have."

Soviet Announcement

When you discuss this with the Finnish military, it is repeatedly emphasized that Finland cannot reach decisions on these matters by staring at its own navel; rather it must take into account the existing surrounding facts.

When the chief explains the military point of view on disarmament, this comes out again:

"When the big powers arm, their attention is directed toward both strategic and conventional weapons systems. In the domain of strategic weapons, agreement on checking the arms race has to some extent been reached.

"Negotiations aimed at restricting conventional weapons, on the other hand, have not for the present produced any results at all. Against this background, there is good reason to regard the Soviet Union's announcement concerning a reduction in the number of its troops in the GDR as an important step in the right direction," the chief said.

"Security policy starting points are always defense capability or renunciation of same. In this domain Finnish measures always have effects that extend beyond our own country and its security requirements. Because of this all our measures are aimed at maintaining the regional status quo.

"The Armed Forces must in part be capable of backing up our foreign policy operations potential. Thus we must possess the necessary readiness and capability to maintain credibility in our security policy in accordance with the obligations we have set ourselves in terms of our national independence and the agreements we have entered into."

Finland Arms Itself As Usual, at the Last Moment

Total Defense Ministry expenditures will next year rise to fully 24 percent more than last year's, or 2.574 billion marks.

The military regard this higher percentage as misleading since the 1979 budget did not, for example, include the additional Soviet purchase budgeted in the supplementary expenditures appraisal for that year.

If we deduct the earlier decided on supplementary purchase and the additions to the trainer fighter procurement program from the 1980 budget proposal, expenditures will rise 10 percent, whereas the entire budget will grow by 12 percent.

According to the budget proposal, the 2.545 billion marks for military ground forces expenditures account for 5.2 percent of the government's total expenditures.

What will the Army do with these billions?

Less than half, 900 million marks, will be used to pay the salaries of about 20,000 military and civilian personnel.

Less than 300 million marks come under compulsory military service costs, stemming from maintenance expenditures of about 10 million days of room and board.

Special training expenditures account for 20 million and construction work and real estate 300 million.

The remainder, about 1.1 billion marks, on the one hand, comes under the heading of Armed Forces daily operation and, on the other, about 800 million marks, goes into equipment procurement and maintenance.

Among other items, in addition to these missiles and aircraft, the Armed Forces now makes use of about 150 boats, 4,000 vehicles, hundreds of radar devices, over 10,000 communications devices and various kinds of combat and engineers equipment.

In Finland Armed Forces development plans are usually left to the last moment. Now, for example, faced with a complete overhaul, the Air Force's basic equipment inventory is all at once becoming obsolete.

To beef up our air defense, a renewal of low-level-surveillance radar equipment and communications systems will be carried out during the mid-1980's.

Saab Safir equipment will be replaced with Vinka equipment which the Army expects to receive late from VALMETI [expansion unknown] early next year. Thirty units will be delivered.

Fifty English Hawk trainer fighters have been ordered. The first four Hawks, made in England, will be arriving during the second half of 1980.

The remaining Hawks will be assembled in Finland at the VALMETI factory.

Several Soviet MIG-21-bis planes have already been received. The number has not been made public but it is estimated that from 20 to 30 of them will be delivered sometime next year.

Short-range missiles have also been received from the Soviet Union and regional defense missiles will be delivered, which will open a new era in Finnish air defense. The system will be completely modernized.

A prototype of its 130-mm gun has been ordered from TAMPELLA [expansion unknown] for use as coastal artillery. A regular order for the guns will perhaps be issued next year sometime.

Coastal defense will be beefed up by completely renewing surveillance, communications, computation and fire control systems, among others, in the 1980's.

The Navy is to receive a minelayer training ship next summer. This winter surveillance combat command electronics systems will be installed on the ship.

Guardboat 80's will replace motor gunboats and also gunboats. Wartsila is building the protoypes. A protoype for a fast guardboat, which would also be suitable for use in the labyrinthine waters of the archipelago, is also now under construction.

The ground forces have not really gotten anything. The Lapland light infantry troops will receive mobile equipment and special equipment suited to winter and cold conditions.

In addition, of course, there are tanks, anti-aircraft guns and an abundance of home-made but effective mines in Lapland.

The time will soon come for replacement of our Ilyushin equipment. These already worn-out planes have been used for towing targets and for high-altitude aerial photography as a basis for all of Finland's mapping operations.

11,466
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FOREIGN MINISTER AFTER SAUDI ARABIA TRIP SEES MORE TRADE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 15 Nov 79 p 16

[Text] Relations between Saudi Arabia and Finland are going through an active phase. Top Saudi leaders are very favorably inclined toward Finland and cooperation between our two countries.

"Saudi Arabia is a very important partner in cooperation for Finland," said Foreign Affairs Minister Paavo Vayrynen Wednesday while reporting on the results of his visit to Saudi Arabia.

The visit of the Finnish delegation headed by Vayrynen came to an end late Tuesday evening. The delegation was composed of representatives of the Finnish economy as well as Foreign Ministry officials.

Vayrynen felt that the visit was successful and was of the opinion that it had created a new basis for the conduct of practical matters in the future. According to the foreign affairs minister, Finland has an opportunity to considerably increase its share in the extensive Saudi investment programs, among others, dealing with the expansion of the construction and industrial bases in the region.

Finland has run into stronger competition on the Saudi market than before in its customary construction activities. Vayrynen mentioned South Korea as an example of a tough competitor. However, the minister said that Finland leads the pack in special construction.

According to Vayrynen, Saudi Arabia encourages free competition and hopes to bring in new enterprises. Nevertheless, those firms that have already been operating in the country have the advantage if communications and relations with local leaders are in good shape.

In the Court of Khaled

In connection with his visit, Vayrynen met with Saudi King Khaled, Crown Prince Fahd and 10 members of the government.

"The reception was quite magnificent. The programs were highly organized," Vayrynen elucidated on his trip.

"Finland has a 3-year oil agreement with Saudi Arabia, during the last 2 years of which about 2 million tons of oil are to be shipped to Finland," Vayrynen said.

Explanation of Oil Needs

"The new agreement will begin to take on its final shape when the present one comes to an end," the foreign minister said. "We wish to explain the development of our oil needs. It is obvious that we will gladly distribute these shipments among several countries to reduce the risks of a crisis."

According to Vayrynen, Saudi Arabia hopes to be able to export other items, aside from oil, to Finland. According to Vayrynen, Finland's trade balance deficit with Saudi Arabia will be balanced out to the extent of about 100 million marks a year by imperceptible items like advisory activities.

According to the foreign minister, it is hard to set a timetable for the balancing of the trade balance. Trade is a multilateral affair and Finland's way of going about it differs from that of some other countries in the Near East.

Disciplining Inflation

"Combatting inflation has become a central objective of the Saudi second 5-year plan which is to come to an end in May 1980. The rate of inflation was cut back several years ago from a few dozen to 10 percent," Vayrynen said.

Checking inflation and constricting the budget deficit considerably reduced Saudi funding in many programs.

According to Vayrynen, ambitious development programs are part of the new 5-year plan. In October Saudi Assistant Trade Minister Yousef al-Hamdani said that the second 5-year plan concentrated on the creation of an infrastructure whereas the new plan aims at the development of industry and farming.

Electrification Well-Suited

Among other things, opportunities to participate in the big Saudi rural electrification program are, according to Vayrynen, well-suited to Finland's principled support of developing countries.

Vayrynen mentioned Foreign Trade Minister Esko Rekola's delegation's visit to the Far East as an example of our aiming at markets in the developing countries, which, according to the foreign minister, offer big growth potential.

The economic representatives who participated in the visit supported Vayrynen's interpretation of Finland's favorable opportunities on the Saudi market.

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SAUDI OIL MINISTER SEES INCREASED OIL SALES TO NESTE POSSIBLE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 16 Nov 79 p 18

[Article by Jarkko Sauli]

[Excerpt] Jidda—Finland's chances of getting crude oil from Saudi Arabia on the basis of longer-term agreements later in the 1980's too seem to be good. On Thursday in Jidda, Saudi Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani expressed the hope to the STT [Finnish News Bureau] that the present 3-year delivery agreement could be renewed when it expires at the end of 1981.

"We generally sell oil to governments that have friendly relations with us and at the time we also take into account political factors," Yamani emphasized.

"With countries like Finland, Saudi Arabia can enter into agreements whose duration can always be extended for 3 years. Finland was granted such a contract extension last summer."

Yamani added that he hoped that Finnish-Saudi relations would continue to develop favorably in all sectors, both politically and economically.

"We hope that it will be possible to renew your agreement after 1981," he said.

Two Million Tons a Year

According to the agreement reached with Neste last summer, Finland received an additional allotment of a million tons of oil this year and, simultaneously, the shipment of 2 million tons in both 1980 and 1981 was agreed on.

As to possible technical cooperation in the oil sector between Finland and Saudi Arabia, Yamani said that Saudi Arabia always welcomes cooperation between foreign and national oil companies if an appropriate domain of joint activity can be found.

Last summer the Saudi oil minister visited Finland as a guest at the invitation of Trade and Industry Minister Ulf Sundqvist. Yamani's most recent contact with Finland was last Monday when he invited visiting Foreign Affairs Minister Paavo Vayrynen to lunch at his home in Saudi Arabia.

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BRIEFS

SORSA ON POLITICAL PROSPECTS—According to SDP [Social Democratic Party] Chairman Kalevi Sorsa, in the 1980's the main fight between political parties will be between the Conservative Party and the SDP. In an interview granted KAUPPALEHTI, Sorsa said that the coming decade would present a big challenge to the other parties too. Sorsa said that the problem for the Social Democrats as well as for the other parties would be the growth of so-called single-issue movements and through them political alienation. Sorsa also predicted there would be internal splitting within the parties: The SDP left wing is undergoing an internal communist dispute and the weight of SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] socialist votes has clearly strengthened their urge to become indpendent. "On the other hand, on the right an ideological gap has already taken shape. In other words, we have no liberal party. The KEPU [Center Party] has not rid itself of the image of the agricultural party that gave birth to it nor of the notion that it is by nature a leading party," Sorsa said. [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 16 Nov 79 p 9] 11466

CIVIL DEFENSE CUTBACK SEEN—Tampere (STT)—The Finnish Civil Service Personnel Union is afraid that the Defense Ministry is planning to weaken the Civil Service. The ministry has set up a seven-man work group to consider changes in the Sivil Service System. The work group includes five Defense Ministry representatives. The union is of the opinion that Civil Service development is a function of the Labor Ministry, not the Defense Ministry. In the opinion of the union, the social status of Civil Service personnel is clearly inferior to that of military recruits. The VR [State Railways], buses, swimming pools and motion picture theaters grant discounts only to recruits. The union would like to do away with the now existing penalization [of Civil Service personnel]. The number of Civil Service jobs should be increased and service working conditions improved. The union intends to propose to the Fundamental Rights Committee, which is now in session, that the Civil Service be acknowledged as a fundamental right of all citizens alongside that of military service. The Finnish Civil Service Personnel Union meeting was held at the end of the week in Tampere. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Nov 79 p 9] 11466

CSO: 3107

IMPLICATIONS OF NATO 'EUROMISSILES' DEPLOYMENT DECISION

Exclusive U.S. Control

LD181007 Paris LE FIGARO in French 13 Dec 79 pp 1, 4 LD

[Article by Paul-Marie de la Gorce]

[Text] The Brussels NATO meeting decision to deploy American "Euromissiles" in Europe is a strange one. In particular, these missiles are to be used for the defense of European countries, which should therefore have been the first to ask for them. In practice, however, this is not what has happened at all. Let us not talk about Denmark and Norway, which have used their marginal geographical situation as an excuse for keeping out of it; nor about the Netherlands, where the government had to accept unconditionally parliament's rejection; nor Belgium, whose foreign minister has adopted an attitude contrary to that of the Socialist Party of which he is a member. But even Germany itself has long advanced pretext after pretext to delay the deployment of Pershing-II and cruise missiles on its territory.

And this is not all. Once they are deployed--around 1983--the new "Euromissiles" will be under the American Government's exclusive control. This is not just what the American Government wanted; on the contrary, it is NATO European countries themselves which expressly requested that there be no "dual" American and European "key" to either Pershing or cruise missiles, as is the case for some of the 7,000 tactical nuclear arms deployed in Europe.

What is the reason for this apparently paradoxical situation? The fact is that the governments of NATO European countries were not enthusiastic in their approval of nuclear arms capable of hitting Soviet territory. Chancellor Schmidt, for instance, was obviously afraid that this would lead to increased tension in Europe which would stop any progress in detente and, especially, prevent any continuation of the Ostpolitik and any steady development of relations between the two German states. In the end, however, obsession with the idea of a threat from the East and the feeling that the USSR has achieved a significant lead triumphed over reservations and secured the Europeans' agreement.

However, what counted most was American determination which, as is now generally known, was mainly due to American reaction to a strategic innovation represented by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.

But much more is involved in all this. Because of an accelerated deterioration in the positions hitherto held by the United States both in Africa and the oil-rich Middle East, following the loss of the position it enjoyed in Iran in the past, Washington decided that the consolidation of the "European theater" is a matter of major importance.

First, in relation to the Soviet Union, which has thus been warned that America is prepared to embark on a new arms race. But also in relation to the Europeans themselves. A brake has been applied to the development of specific discussions between individual NATO countries--especially Germany--and the Soviet Union under the sign of detente. Believing, rightly or wrongly, that it has been involved in a number of very difficult confrontations to which the USSR has not always been extraneous, the United States wants to see the bloc which it leads become firmer and more disciplined.

Furthermore, it is clear that since the United States will exert exclusive control over Euromissiles, any dealings concerning nuclear arms in West Europe will have to be referred to it. The Soviet Union is being urged to stop trying to take advantage of the situation of any individual NATO country. This means that insofar as much major negotiations as SALT III talks are concerned--talks aimed at reducing the number of "theater" nuclear arms, that is, tactical or medium-range nuclear arms such as Euromissiles--the United States expects to be able to not only talk from a stronger position but also to be Moscow's only interlocutor.

As a result, NATO European countries appear to have been the subject matter of American policy, whereas they should in principle be the first countries involved and the first countries to take a decision. There is a logical connection between a strategy which makes Europe's defense dependent on American protection and a policy which leaves it to the United States to lead the Western community. It can be seen as unavoidable. You can reject it and opt for something different, as France has done. But you cannot ignore it.

Implications for France

LD191501 Paris LE MATIN in French 11 Dec 79 p 2 LD

[Editorial: "France, NATO and Detente"]

[Text] The negotiations which have just started within the NATO framework relate to modernization of the Atlantic alliance's nuclear forces in Europe. To be more precise, it is a question of deploying new long-range missiles in the FRG, Belgium and Italy. This is the first time since its creation

in 1949 that NATO has had to decide on such important measures, which concern the question of rebalancing its forces in relation to those of the Warsaw Pact. Obviously, such a question was bound to give rise to different, even sharply opposing attitudes among the political parties of the countries concerned. This has happened in Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark.

In France, the PCF leadership has expressed "its firm opposition to these plans," asserting that "nothing good can come of them for either France, or Europe or peace." Such a Manichaean attitude was to be expected with the PCF choosing at the same time to place the debate within the sphere of general disarmament. It has thus adopted Moscow's viewpoint, according to which the NATO plans will lead to a revival of the arms race.

Things are not so simple. It is not a question of Soviet socialists who disarm, on the one hand, and American imperialists who accelerate the production of arms and want to use the old continent as a launching pad, on the other. Public opinion has not been fooled and realizes perfectly well that the peaceful intentions proclaimed by both sides conceal a dangerous reality--far from being stabilized, and far from submitting to any control which everybody officially desires, the arsenal of both conventional and nuclear arms is continuously being increased in both East and West.

In view of this situation, what is France's attitude? Our country has withdrawn from the Atlantic alliance's military organization. This means that, unlike Italian and British forces and so forth, French forces are not deployed by and do not take orders from NATO commanders. In other words, France has set itself up as an independent nuclear power. A sin of pride in relation to the two superpowers which nonetheless has enabled France to try to make its voice heard. Hence the proposals once made by the head of state for a world conference--an idea that soon aborted--and his recent proposal for a European conference on military detente and disarmament. An initiative which this time could prove successful.

What is the reason for this desire to transcend the framework of existing agreements such as the NATO agreements? Valery Giscard d'Estaing has repeatedly demonstrated a desire to extend the "notion of detente" and progress from the military to the ideological sphere. In fact, how can any real detente in the military sphere be imagined if any struggle can be justified on ideological grounds? This can indeed be observed in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Vietnam and could well be observed in Iran in the future. The Elysee's analysis is good inasmuch as it is sensible and quite consistent. However, it ignores interventions in Africa. Both Soviet pressure and French military presence on that continent are realities. This is why the head of state's proposals would be much more credible if his African policy were not at variance with his search for a "philosophy of detente."

CSO: 3100

CONSERVATIVE PAPER COMMENTS ON PROSPECTS FOR NEW GOVERNMENT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 6 Dec 79 p 20

[Unattributed Editorial: "The Road to a New Leftist Government"]

[Text] "We Progressives have expressed our willingness to serve in a coalition, and I will stand by that, for the time being," said Steingrimur Hermannsson, Chairman of the Progressive Party, in a conversation with TIMANN yesterday on the outcome of the elections. In this way, the chairman reiterated vows, made by him before the election, that he desired that a leftist government be formed anew. Now, at the conclusion of the elections, negotiations to achieve this will begin under the leadership of Steingrimur Hermannsson. MORGUNBLADID asked him if perhaps government formation might be prolongued into the new year, and Steingrimur Hermannsson answered: "That would be terrible . . . The government must be formed before Christmas. The budget, and everything else, has not been attended to. Delay would irritate everyone."

With this, some of the difficulty has been brought out, which lies in store for Icelandic politics in the future. Under the leadership of the Progressive Party, the leftist parties will sit on the judgment seat, and examine the premises for the continuation of their cooperation, which shattered, due to fundamental differences of opinion, 2 months ago. And a man, who intends to keep to his word, plans to finish up before Christmas. But are there any prospects that the three parties in question here, the People's Alliance, the People's Party, and the Progressive Party will draw together, and find a factual basis so that "all loose ends can be tied up," as partisans of the parties say.

Declarations of the three parties have, on the one hand, been characterized by avowals of love, with regard to leftist cooperation, with the Progressives, and Communists, and, on the other hand, by faintheartedness and contradiction in the position of the People's Party. ALTHUGUNBLADID said, quite correctly, in an editorial yesterday: "The experience of the last coalition shows that the People's Alliance was, to an unchanged degree, a party incapable of governing. The election outcome has not changed this fact whatever. And Ludvik Josepsson said in MORGUNBLADID, concerning the

Progressive Party in the last government: "If one of the three parties changed its mind, back and forth, and sat on the fence, and seemed wavering, it was the Progressive Party. Thus, I think that even if it is stronger now, chances for cooperation have been altered not at all, rather, to the contrary."

There is tension between the leftist parties. Each has experienced the treachery of the others, although, in words, the possibility of government cooperation is raised. There is much more affinity between the policies of the Progressive Party, and the People's Party, than between the Progressive Party, and the Communists. It was the Progressive Party, and the People's Party, that forced out the Communists with the economic laws of last April. When Ludvik Josepsson speaks of a leftist program, he is sending a message to the Progressive Party, that it should change its policies.

Steingrimur Hermannsson has backed himself into a corner, with his declarations before, and after the elections. He has created a situation for himself whereby, after preliminary skirmishes, the People's Alliance wants blood, and is forcing him to either offer his plan for a leftist government, or leave off with the gradiose words. But the leadership of the Progressive Party is divided. Olafur Johannesson would await events, and see how things turn out. He would not be sad, at all, if Steingrimur Hermannsson placed the party on thin ice. Then Olafur Johannesson could take advantage of the vacuum, as he would like.

In the first rounds the Progressive Party, and the Communists, will deal with one another. They will let the People's Party be schizophrenic, as long as it suits them. When they have come to an agreement, hard conditions will be set for the People's Party, through the power of the labor unions, and the People's Party will be happy to find shelter.

The picture, which we have drawn here, is not a pretty one, and perhaps events will not develop as is forseen here. But, if we take a look around, now, at the conclusions of the elections, it is clear, that with all the potshots, the leftist parties are attempting to gain cabinet seats.

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CSO: 3111

PROGRESSIVES' CHAIRMAN DISCUSSES NEW LEFTIST GOVERNMENT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 6 Dec 79 pp 20-21

[Article by Bjorn Johannsson: "'More Afraid of Malace Than Difference of Opinion,' Says Steingrimur Hermannsson, Chairman of the Progressive Party"]

/Text/ "In my mind, it is a major question, just how deep the malace between the People's Party, and the People's Alliance runs. Personally, I am much more afraid of the malace, than I am of difference of opinion," said Steingrimur Hermannsson, when MORGUNBLADID talked with him yesterday, after the president of Iceland asked him to begin talks between parties, for the formation of a majority government, and Steingrimur Hermannsson told MORGUNBLADID that he would begin to write letters, to the chairmen of the People's Party, and the People's Alliance, and ask their participation in such talks.

MORGUNBLADID, first of all, questioned Steingrimur Hermannsson in connection with the remarks of Jon Baldvis Hannibalsson, in a lead article in ALTHUDUBLAD, where he said that he felt it was difficult to forsee what part the People's Party would have in the government formation efforts of the Progressives. "It is clear to me," said Steingrimr Hermannsson, "that Jon Baldvin was one of the most influential people, behind the scenes, in the People's Party government collapse. That should be made clear to all. But his strange position is amazing to me."

"I shall, to be sure, say nothing, on how the members of the People's Party are taking stock of the outcome of the elections. For myself, I can only see their losses in terms of the dissatisfaction of the electorate with the role of the People's Party in the government collapse. Whether they will take stock of the situation, and conclude, that the dissatisfaction arose from that, but their party bears no responsibility, I cannot say. I conclude, from the dialog in the last government, that we, and the People's Party, are very close to one another, and, according to what I have seen, or heard, from People's Party members since, there is nothing new to cause our dialog to suffer shipwreck. I think that it would be extremely difficult to explain why they would not be participating in discussions on a

new leftist government. I think that they will first made certain proposals, and see how events develop."

What about the People's Alliance? Ludvik Josepsson seemed, not at all, enchanted, before the elections, with the economic policies of you Progressives.

"Indeed, Ludvik Josepsson said that there was no difficulty to struggle against in economics. He also said, before last year's elections, that there would be no difficulty about agriculture. People have only to eat more meat. I think that Ludvik Josepsson fails to understand that there can never be a purchasing power increase, or any productivity gain, if inflation swallows up all the attempts of the people to better their situations and businesses."

"I have often thought that Ludvik Josepsson is unaware of the various side effects of inflation. I think, moreover, that some of the young men in the People's Alliance are more understanding in this respect."

Do you have any new tricks up your sleeve that could, in your view, make the Progressive Party, the People's Party, and the People's Alliance more likely to work together, after the elections, than before?

"I cannot say that I do. It is clear to me that there are certain difficulties in cooperation, and power will have to be shared better than last time. In my mind, it is a major question, just now deep the malace between the People's Party, and the People's Alliance runs. Personally, I am much more afraid of malace than I am of difference of opinion."

Members of the People's Alliance said, before the government fell, that they would take up defense decisions in connection with a review of cooperation declarations of the government. Do you expect that defense matters will be more difficult a problem than they were, in terms of the configuration of the last leftist government?

"I think that economic matters will have to have absolute priority. Whether or not defense matters will be in a different situation, in the new government configuration, as compared to the old, I cannot say."

"Myself, I am of the belief that we must take a more active part in decisions concerning what defense measures are necessary for Iceland. We must not just accept the present arrangement as final. We must evaluate the matter, and talk with our allies, concerning how we can take a more active role in our own defense. I say, with complete candor, that it is painful for me, to see an army in Iceland. But I lay the emphasis on good cooperation with our allies, and I am far from wishing Iceland defenseless, so that we would increase the risk for our homeland."

"I lay emphasis on having the Security Committee of the ruling parties continue to function, and that we can settle the matter, for ourselves, on the basis of this committee, and appraise things in connection with it."

You are working for the formation of a majority government. What do you think of thoughts advanced on minority government?

"I am very hesitant about that. It will have to be totally clear, that the possibilities for a majority government have been exhausted, before we begin to talk seriously about minority government."

"To tell the truth, I have had no desire to think about the possibility. I forsee nothing else than that such a government would continually be under fire, and that is no way to overcome the difficulties that we wrestle with now."

But you have discussed the possibility of a national unity government?

"Yes, I have proposed it. But, on the other hand, I cannot see, with things as they are now, that this would be a practical possibility. It seems to me that there is so much bad blood, between the Independence Party, and the other parties. On the other hand, I do not wish to rule out the possibility that all else will be pushed aside, and a national unity government formed for a set time, until inflation is brought down. But I think, without doubt, that a leftist government is a better option than a national unity government."

What about the pronouncements that these elections will be the last, with an unchanged constitution?

"We Progressives think it natural that the number of Althing seats be increased for those living in densely populated areas. But we lay, on the other hand, emphasis on bearing in mind the enormous difference between the densely and thinly populated areas. We might, for example, not disregard the arguments of the people in the thinly populated areas, that they are involved with the greater part of national production."

"We are willing to discuss changes, but we are not willing to discuss a one man, one vote system. We might, for example, increase the balance by moving a compensatory seat south. But I am vehemently opposed to talk about still further increasing the Althing membership."

What kind of a feeling is it now, to stand with a request for government formation in your hands?

"Events have moved far more swiftly, in recent months, than I thought, a time back."

"I am far from having to form a government as a matter of urgency. I would not like to form a government, which will fall. For this reason, I want to lay emphasis on the fact that things will be done as well as possible."

"It is uppermost, in my mind, now, what an awful burden it is, to stand with such a request in my hands. I have no feeling of victory."

11,433
CSO: 3111

PCI'S LEDDA COMMENTARY ON U.S.-IRANIAN CRISIS

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 23 Nov 79 p 6

[Article by Romano Ledda: "But Is It Really a 'Challenge' to a Great Power?"]

[Text] I confess that I do not believe for one moment that the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran and the detention in it of tens of hostages are part of a logical process that advances the cause of the Iranian revolution. That the anti-American sentiment of the Iranian masses runs deep is certainly not new or unjustified: the memory of the coup against Mossadegh and of the constant U.S. support of the Shah's savage tyranny is still too fresh not to arouse deep passions, and the price, paid in human lives, suffering, and persecutions is still too high for hate to quickly be dispelled. Thus, the wave of anger can be understood. But that has little or nothing to do with the grave precedent set with the violation of a principle and of a norm that is neither Islamic nor Christian, revolutionary nor conservative, but simply a regulation that allows for relations among states with reciprocal guarantees. In those events I always see something below the surface: the telltale sign of the degradation that has influenced even the most elementary norms which up to now have guaranteed international relations. And I ask if it is really by chance that all this happens to take place in a region of the globe where this "right" in the past decades has been most tenuous: from the tyranny of the Pahlavi to the scattering of the Palestinian people, from the repression of the Kurds to hijacking, from the daily Israeli bombings in Lebanon to no less than four wars fought over a period of 20 years.

However, even had there not been the matter of the hostages, other factors would have contributed to create the picture offered us by the Iranian events in these weeks, almost like an anticipation and materialization of tendencies and counter-tendencies, problems with their differing solutions which will probably dominate the final segment of this century.

A few days ago, both stupefied and offended, James Reston was wondering about the impotence of a great power in similar circumstances, and some days later was asking where the United States' "allies" were in this contest with Iran. Both questions, one could say, have but one answer. If Iran dares "challenge" a great power such as the United States, it is not the

result of a sudden folly on the part of Khomeini or of a plot engineered by the USSR. It is simply the reflection of a hegemony crisis which assails great powers and which has already been active in the redistribution of world power. In this sense, the word "challenge" no longer corresponds to the truth. Beyond the element of negative and absurd provocation involved in the hostage matter, Iran, whatever the course taken by its revolution, is itself one of the many expressions of new national and state entities which no longer intend to recognize supremacies or, conversely, a position of inferiority and shall want to negotiate as an equal with great powers. And the point is that they can do it, thanks not to the force of their arms, but to the use of their riches, which, until recently, had been denied them.

With respect to the allies, the United States has made numerous appeals to the West not to acquire oil earmarked for their use; but apparently concrete solidarity is lacking; cordial but cool agreements, if not confusion or open resistance, result. The famous Energy Agency, which Kissinger wanted in order to muzzle industrialized countries' energy policies, once again revealed itself as full of "technical" good will, as pointed out ironically in a large British daily, but coming up short when it comes to "good political willingness." (On the other hand, however, England was of on its very own attempting to seek out good deals.) Therefore there exists here, too, a hegemony crisis brought about by a divergence of interests and objectives (by far transcending the matter of hostages) whose presence has been apparent for a long time and which has exploded in a clamorous way at a crucial moment. Also noticeable is the fact that we are facing a taking of refuge in national egoisms, which occurs so often when the balance sheet has to be drawn on the material nature of things (oil resupply, markets not to be lost, bids to be had, etc.) and this not only is true, but it can be compared to playing tit for tat as when raising the subject of Nixon's privileged information disclosures during the first great oil crisis or the merciless oil policy carried out by Carter on Rotterdam's spot market; intra-Western contradictions and conflicts grow sharper.

There are, however, other signals that come out of the Iranian situation. The economic and diplomatic conflict between Washington and Tehran has totally confused the world metals market, and the banking-monetary warfare has "brought about the deepest sense of consternation in finance," complicating an already precarious and volatile situation, while Indian arm-wrestling over oil opens lugubrious horizons on the prices of petroleum and runs the risk of provoking uncontrollable chain reactions. Everything thus is linked, confirming an ever increasing interdependence between political, economic, commercial and monetary conflicts. But perhaps above all this is showing us an international order which is no longer capable, without great and long-term changes, of sustaining periods of tension and crisis in a relationship between two or more countries. We are therefore present at a crossroads of complication, diversification and simultaneously at that intertwining of international relations which presently has neither the means nor the tools to prevent and contain the outbursts of crises situations. We have reached the point where we ask if a gesture such as that of the Iranian students may or may not have global consequences, unleashing an ever-expanding spiral of conflicts until their apex is reached.

But there is even more to this. Whether we like the Ayatollah Khomeyni or not, the developments of the Iranian drama bring back to us the whole unresolved matter of the Middle East. One should go back and read today what was written at the time of the Camp David accords, when even this paper was criticized when it commented on how frail, inconclusive and in the long run destabilizing a policy of "peace" was, one which was based on the divisions within the Arabic world, on the exclusion of the Palestinians, on keeping the door shut to the USSR, in order to offer only an American guarantee for the stability and security of the region. Brzezinski himself, who thought up the presence of an arch of instability beginning in the Middle East, has had some second thoughts on his "bye bye PLO" [thesis] at the time of the Israeli-Egyptian accords. [It is these accords] that now set the pace, allowing the spoiling of a situation which envisions no solution but which certainly encourages integralisms, disruptive movements and which create vacuums which could be filled by untold forces.

Finally, in its latest issue, a great Paris weekly's front page had the inscription: "The Real Oil War Has Begun." Perhaps this is a slight exaggeration of facts, but not so regarding signals. The story of the "substitution of the oil routes," of "their control," of the "defense" of the West's vital interests is assuming a more and more disturbing tone. Kissinger now is not the only one to say that a war would be natural, nor Aron alone in saying that Europe cannot allow a "second Iran." Even men like George Gall state in unmistakable terms that the moment has arrived for an American force to take on a surveillance function in the Persian Gulf. "It is the French government and the American administration that have prepared rapidly deployable task forces. These are grave signs of "frayed nerves" tied to developments in the energy problem, which is taking roads not foreseen earlier and which have changed the essential structure of the world oil market compared to those same crises of 1973 and of this year. [This comes about], be it because of inflation, the dollar crisis, small and large multinational speculation or the foreseen production slowdown. LE MONDE is right: (consuming nations have lost control of their petroleum resources and the hopes couched in that indispensable dialog with the Gulf producing nations today appear eroded.") But then what? The answers are two. Either draw up a scenario--insane and impossible--of a military intervention which would be tantamount to placing a torch in a gun powder depot. Or, one could set off on the most realistic road of recognizing how much has changed in the world, in the obsolete character of old domination or instability control mechanisms originating from an archaic international source, in order to work in a new way, with new ideas, first among which should be the tight dovetailing of peace, stability, balanced development, rational use of resources, and a more equal world economic order.

9202
CSO: 3104

PSI'S CRAXI INTERVIEWED ON EUROSOCIALISM

Rome IL SETTIMANALE in Italian 21 Nov 79 p 19

[Interview with Bettino Craxi, Italian Socialist Party leader: "Marx Does Not Enter Into It"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The Lisbon meeting of the Socialist International's executive committee was devoted mostly to Latin American problems, but it also considered those of socialism in Europe and Portugal. The approaching elections and the coincidence of the Madeira and Lisbon meetings indicate that a difficult and delicate hand is being played. IL SETTIMANALE interviewed Bettino Craxi, who took part in the meeting of the International and was accompanied by Carlo Ripa di Meana.

[Question] What does European socialism expect from Portuguese socialists?

[Answer] Above all, we want Soares to keep his forces intact in Portugal. This will be a difficult goal to achieve, because socialists are divided and the country is almost ungovernable.

[Question] What will the coalition policies be?

[Answer] I think Portuguese socialists should try to keep the central position that they have occupied in recent years and thus prevent the formation of a center-right majority.

[Question] But there is Cunhal on the left; what are their relations with the communists?

[Answer] They are among the worst in Europe. This has so far led Portuguese socialists and communists to share only negative positions. Portuguese socialism is a democratic reform socialism, but the Communist Party is the most closed and sectarian in Europe.

[Question] Does the Socialist International propose to develop a unified strategy for European socialism? In other words, is there such a thing as Eurosocialism?

[Answer] Our problems have remained difficult because of the two kinds of countries that exist in Europe: those that have communists and those that do not. Where there are no communists, the socialists have different problems. What has sometimes been called Eurosocialism is a process of reassessing the various traditions of European socialism: the workers', the social democratic and the South European. This is a continuing process, but it remembers that every party is a national one.

[Question] In some countries, socialism seems to be advancing rapidly. Is this the case of Spain?

[Answer] The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] is trying to win an absolute majority. Meanwhile it is in the democratic opposition and is keeping a certain flexibility with respect to Suarez's government. Relations with the communists are not good in Spain, either.

[Question] Has Gonzalez retaken full control of the party?

[Answer] I thought he had never lost it.

[Question] Another red-letter day for the socialists in Europe is coming up in 1980: the German elections. In recent years Italian socialists have intensified their contacts with the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]

[Answer] We are close to the German socialists in relations, collaboration, and exchange of political experience. Every so often somebody says they give us financial help, but it isn't true.

The German elections are very important. Strauss is a dangerous unknown. He is a hard-line conservative, and I think it is unlikely that he will win. Schmidt is solid; he has a good image and a modern, progressive party behind him.

[Question] Along with a pro-Soviet wing that even Secretary Egon Bahr seems to belong to.

[Answer] Not pro-Soviet. It is only convinced that the "Ostpolitik" is irreplaceable, even though the East has always been stingy when it comes to reciprocating.

[Question] But the East is communism, and you have said some very hard things about the "Asiatic" vocation of the communists.

[Answer] Hard? Maybe so, but Karl Marx would have said the same.

8782
CSO: 3104

SURINAM'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS LOOK BLEAK

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 29 Nov 79 p 3

[Article by J.F. van den Broek]

[Text] Utrecht, November--This year 12,000 Surinamese came, and are still coming to the Netherlands. This conservative estimate was made by Minister Gardeniers of CRM [Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work] on 25 November at the fourth anniversary of independence celebrated in Utrecht by a considerable number of the Surinamese population. By now about one-third of this population has cast its vote of distrust against the future of its own country be leaving.

"The people who are coming here are Surinamese, no Surinamese Dutch or Dutch Surinamese. They flee their own country because the situation there is becoming increasingly hopeless. The emigration will continue even if an attempt is made in the future to enforce entrance restrictions. If one wants to flee one always finds a way, just look at the Vietnamese boat people. The Surinamese should get the status of refugees," says Ronald May of the Solidarity Movement Surinam (SBS). He calls himself a "welfare hustler" even though he also hopes to finish his anthropology studies some day.

Ideal

He feels that each refugee lives with the dream of eventually returning to his homeland and that goes for many Surinamese as well. The Back to Surinam Foundation is there to help with this; in 5 years time it has sent 1,500 Surinamese on their way. Henk Herrenberg, Surinamese member of parliament, has recently asked Prime Minister Arron for an active stimulation policy, but it is a cry in the wilderness, May says.

The Surinamese identifies more with his origin while in the increasingly less hospitable Netherlands, than he did in his own country. "He is also more involved in the problems of Surinam and he has the fullest right to

do so," according to May. "From a comfortable chair in the Netherlands it seems easy indeed to shout that things go badly in Surinam and should be done differently. But a club such as the Solidarity Movement Surinam also wants to show the Netherlands its own responsibility."

Somber Story

That was done in the "Throw a Chair" brochure about development aid to Surinam. It is a somber story. "At independence the Netherlands made a unique gesture," it says. "A progressive government gave very much development aid on the basis of a plan surrounded by tough conditions."

"At least, that is what it seemed to be. But in reality nothing has changed compared to the past. Large infrastructural projects are carried out by foreign contractors under supervision by Dutch engineering firms, for the profit of Suralco, Biliton, HVA and Bruynzeel. Social Welfare remains equally poor, unemployment is growing and the housing shortage is not diminishing."

"The Surinamese are leaving because from these plans you cannot eat. But Minister De Koning maintains that there is a development program which centers on the weakest and poorest groups."

Prestige Battle

The stumbling block is the gigantic Surinam project that through the years has grown into a prestige battle between Dutch and Surinamese development experts, with the stake of a hefty portion of the 2.7 billion guilder development pot. With increasing antipathy the Dutch are working on the railroad, the bauxite export harbor Apoera, and before long the hydroelectric Kabalebo project. Not until next year--strategically after the accelerated elections of March--will the mining concerns Biliton, Suralco and Grassalco make it known whether or not they see "bread" in the bauxite extraction in the Bakhuis Mountains and that opinion alone will determine the future of the project.

Just before the independence of Surinam, ex-Premier Den Uyl hesitantly went along with the dream of engineer Frank Essed, and, to the fury of the Surinamese government ex-minister Pronk now feels that, via the railroad plan, the Netherlands have been blackmailed into the entire project. But the expensive plan is now leading its own life and goes on accompanied by the inevitable stories of corruption and waste.

Matrix

The Dutch members of the Development Cooperation Netherlands-Surinam Committee (CONS) are willing to untie the knots, but West Surinam is not present at this week's meeting in The Hague, they are waiting for Surinamese answers to a long list of technical, financial and economic questions. Because of late arrival of the papers they had wanted to delay the meeting but Surinam was against that.

So now there are--somewhat apathetic--discussions about 'matrix': the division of the remaining 700 million guilders development funds that have not yet been spent or allocated to other projects.

"There are still social education projects, plans for housing and such" according to a spokesman of the ministry. The reproach of the Netherlands is undeserved. We have kept to the terms of the development plan, in which half is spent in the productive sector, a quarter in the infrastructure and a quarter in the social education projects."

That is now denied by organizations like Solidarity Movement Surinam. "The Dutch aid so far has benefited big business, preferably large foreign concerns and not the people. The West Surinam plan is a repeat of the catastrophic Brocoponda project and the original inhabitants, the Indians, are the victims. The capital-intensive mining only causes more inflation to the ordinary Surinamese and it would be surprising if 7,000 new jobs were created in all of West Surinam.

"The same goes for agriculture. There is aid to large farms that are not labor-intensive, small farmers are competed out of business because they get no new land and no water--or, suddenly too much. Small labor-intensive projects hardly receive any attention and the buildup of an economy has not been started.

Familiar Wishes

The long list of wishes sounds familiar: agriculture that makes Surinam self-sufficient and less dependent on expensive imports that enrich middle business. Coupled to that they want their own food industry. Also, better social services--the promised and planned health insurance still does not exist--and good education, a balanced budget and an end to the severe housing shortage--estimated at 30,000 to 35,000 houses for the coming 10 years. "What we have to do is to help organizations close to the base of the Surinamese population" a brochure from the SBS says. "The aid should be sensibly used, otherwise we run the risk that Surinam will get stuck with unusable Dutch products, high maintenance cost, and a poor distribution."

The SBS is thinking of including labor unions, women's organizations, regional committees, the so far virtually ignored leftist political parties and such. They feel they are now at the mercy of favoritism, established political parties and the Surinamese development experts who are themselves often involved with business.

"Otherwise there will be even bigger chaos and total moral decay is close" Surinamers here say. "Now even the better educated are beginning to leave and those empty spaces can no longer be filled by Guyanese immigrant workers, of which there are now over 10,000, Surinam is becoming a depopulated country. The Netherlands should think about that."

9314
CSO: 3105

SURINAMESE IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS TO BE DISCUSSED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 26 Nov 79 p 2

[Text] Paramaribo, 26 November--A Surinamese parliamentary delegation is to visit the Netherlands shortly to get acquainted with the position of our countrymen. They are to contact especially centers for drug addiction and welfare organizations.

Surinamese parliament member H. Herrenberg (VDP) [United Democratic Party] stated this in his speech to parliament. Herrenberg called it logical that the attitude of the Surinamese government toward her countrymen in the Netherlands will determine the attitude of the Netherlands towards these citizens. Herrenberg blames his government for considering these Surinamese in the Netherlands either Dutchmen or idlers who want to enjoy the Dutch social and economic advantages. "This attitude hurts our citizens and promotes discrimination against them."

Herrenberg wants measures to stem the emigration stream: "Pretty soon Surinam will not have people left to build up the country, which is five times as large as the Netherlands."

The head of parliament, Wijntuin, said to be glad this issue has been brought up: "The problem can now be studied, as well as the way information is given, both by Surinam and the Netherlands."

Policy CRM [Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work]

Yesterday, at a meeting in Utrecht celebrating the Surinam Independence Day --the so-called Brasa Day ("embracing day")--Minister Gardeniers (CRM) expressed her horror of the discriminatory statements recently made at a meeting of the National Youth Front in Soest. She said that the government is alert to the tendency of growing racial discrimination.

She said further that the government will improve the policy structure for cultural minorities next year. She asked that Surinamese welfare organizations cooperate with this new policy. To the Surinamese women she said that

it is largely up to them how the Surinamese youth will develop in the Netherlands. "The terrible example of youth who use hard drugs should speak to you. In a small circle you can do more than a number of government measures can."

The number of Surinamese citizens who have registered in the Netherlands this year will be about 12,000 by the end of 1979.

9314
CSO: 3105

NO AMMUNITION TO BE STORED IN OVERIJSSEL DEPOTS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Nov 79 p 3

[Report: "Military Depots in Overijssel Not Intended for Ammunition"]

[Text] Zwolle, 28 November--Secretary of State for Defense Van Eekelen informed the provincial legislature of Overijssel yesterday about the decision in principle of the government to establish an American storage depot in Overijssel.

The state secretary stated emphatically that the establishment of an American depot, which would provide jobs for 550 persons, will not involve the storage of ammunition but rather the stationing in sheds of conventional equipment such as tanks and army trucks.

In anticipation of the visit of Van Eekelen, the municipal boards of Enschede, Almelo and Hengelo, all in Twente, had already reacted with displeasure to the plans of the government. On the one hand because there had been no prior consultation between The Hague and the municipal boards, and on the other because the storage of ammunition in or near densely populated areas is considered dangerous.

Van Eekelen apologized for the fact that the political decision was first made in The Hague and that the lower-ranking authorities were informed only subsequently. As regards the protests, Van Eekelen voiced the opinion that they were premature.

The possible establishment of American depots in Twente will involve two storage areas, each of about 35 hectares. In view of the encampment of the American division in West Germany, for which division the equipment is intended, the depots have to be located near the eastern border of the Netherlands. Other areas considered for such depots are accordingly South Limburg and Southeast Drente.

In a reaction to the explanation of Van Eekelen, PvdA [Labor Party] Deputy Dijkema stated that the provincial legislature would deliberate about the

government proposal during the coming weeks. "That places such as Almelo, Enschede and Hengelo are unwilling or unable to cooperate does not necessarily mean that we will reject the proposal. From a planning point of view there are more possibilities in Twente."

For the rest, Van Eekelen said that if Twente would offer no possibility for the establishment of the depots, there are still other areas in the eastern part of the Netherlands which may come up for consideration. He was obviously referring to the Achterhoek [in Gelderland].

Although Almelo has not yet been asked whether space would be available for a depot, the mayor and aldermen and the council already last week took a stand against the establishment of such a depot within the city limits.

There was sharp opposition particularly from the side of the PAK--the combined fraction of leftist parties and the D'66 within the council. The fact that there is no more land available in Almelo for new establishments also played a role.

Furthermore, the fact that a military depot offers too few jobs in comparison to the area of the terrain required is also considered a reason for opposing the wish of the cabinet.

At Hengelo all of the council fractions stated last week that they had no need for an army depot in the industrial area. For that matter, Hengelo had already been sounded out at the beginning of 1979 by the Overijssel development society, on behalf of the defense department, regarding such a project. Even at that time the mayor and aldermen took a negative attitude toward this request.

5742
CSO: 3105

SECOND CHAMBER DISCUSSES TESTING OF B-52 BOMBERS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Nov 79 p 2

[Report: "Big Fractions in Chamber Discuss Testing of B-52s"]

[Text] The Hague, 28 November--Defense specialists of the big fractions in the Second Chamber want to discuss with the government, early in December, the reports about possible testing in Europe of American B-52 bombers during times of increased tension.

These defense experts knew about these American plans, which were reported in the newspapers yesterday, although they did not bring them up for discussion in the debate about the defense budget on 7 and 8 November 1979.

In response to a query, a spokesman of the American embassy declared once more categorically yesterday that it is not intended to station these big bombers in Europe.

On 4 December the permanent defense commission of the Second Chamber is to have a final oral consultation with Minister Scholten; the government has to take a standpoint in Brussels by mid-December in regard to the possible modernization of nuclear arms in Europe. At that consultation Frinking of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and Brinkhorst of the D'66 [Democrats '66] want further information about the American plans.

Former minister Stemerdink of the PvdA [Labor Party] is planning to present a total picture of the Soviet and Western nuclear arms systems, in the course of parliamentary debate about nuclear modernization in December. He is of the opinion that this will show, among other things, that the placing of new cruise missiles (also in the Netherlands) is not necessary. Stemerdink hopes that the United States Senate will shortly ratify without change the SALT-II agreement in regard to the curtailment of strategic nuclear arms, and that it will want to extend the duration of the protocol which prohibits until 1981 the installation of sea-based or land-based cruise missiles with a reach of more than 600 kilometers.

Stemerdink expects, however, that the Senate will not do this, and this means that the cruise missiles planned within the framework of nuclear modernization might be introduced into Europe after 1981. The [projected] SALT-II treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States expressly leaves open the possibility of having available cruise missiles underneath aircraft, although there is a limit on their number.

Stemerdink believes that the United States is definitely planning to plug a nuclear "hole" in the European theater with modernized B-52's capable of launching cruise missiles, for example into the second half of the eighties, [with] the intended Pershing-II missiles and land-based cruise missiles stationed in Europe. Also for this reason he considers the modernization program, on which NATO will probably decide in December, unnecessary and undesirable.

5742
CSO: 3105

ARTICLE EXAMINES IMPLICATIONS SURROUNDING EEC MEMBERSHIP

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 22 Oct 79 pp 17, 18

[Article by Joao Pedro Pontes, assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of Economics : "Common Market and the New Model of Dependency"]

[Text] Liberal ideologs and orthodox Marxist analysts have viewed Portugal's membership in the EEC in a one-sided way. Seen by some as a factor for an immediate and automatic increase in well-being and, at long range, a factor in the efficiency and scope of the Portuguese productive apparatus, membership is seen by others as a factor for the inevitable disintegration of the latter, owing to Portugal's competitive weakness in international trade. Membership is always seen, however, as a rigid and well-defined choice (a kind of "model for development") and not as a context which could be developed in several possible ways. We feel, then, that from the standpoint of the process of development, Portugal's membership is "defined more by what it leaves out"--an orientation toward autarky, a reduction of the role of foreign trade in the national income, a break with the world market--than by what it positively implies. Membership could give rise to various patterns of development. Although they share the common denominator that they are based on "capitalist paths of development," excluding autarky and planning, these patterns differ substantially among themselves. The pursuit of one or another path will depend on the shape the membership negotiations take and on the political and institutional factors that reflect the power relations at the highest domestic and foreign levels.

The first context where different patterns of development may be found is the food and agriculture sector, which, in the framework of trade between Portugal and the EEC, has an exceptional status. In effect, as A. Silva Ferreira notes in an article published in the magazine ECONOMIA (Jan 79, "An Evaluation of Trade Exchange Between Portugal and the EEC"), contrary to what occurs in overall trade, and with particular respect to intermediate goods and equipment, the EEC is not our major supplier of agroalimentary products. Its proportion of Portuguese [food] imports declined from 13.1 percent in 1965 to 11.1 percent in 1976. Moreover, although the balance of trade between the two zones strongly favors the EEC in intermediate goods and equipment (steel products, chemicals, industrial machinery, electrical equipment and

automotive products), the balance with respect to food products favored Portugal until 1973, and in 1977 was just about even.

$$\text{Index } \frac{X - M}{X + M} = 0.06$$

(X = Exports; M = Imports)

U.S. Role

This situation reflects the fact that Portugal's food dependency--seen in the continuing reduction of our self-sufficiency in grain production throughout the 1960's--is more the result of our relationship with the American state and the "food assistance" mechanisms employed by the latter, particularly those pursuant to the celebrated Public Law 480, than a move toward European states within the EFTA and EEC accords. In effect, the deterioration of domestic grain production stemmed from the sale of American surplusses at low prices ("dumping"), while the Americans' control of the funds from the domestic sale of the grains enabled them to finance the introduction and development of a new livestock production technology--intensive production, separate from agriculture and based on corn and soy feeds--calling for heavy consumption of grains and proteo-oleaginous products, which resulted in the accelerated growth of imports.

Although they are dependent on the United States for their supply of proteo-oleaginous products, particularly soybeans, the EEC countries established a combination of protective measures within the Common Market Agricultural Policy [CAP] to offset U.S. grain domination, including the so-called "prelevements," duties on certain imports to make up the difference between lower world prices and the internal EEC prices, which are higher because of the CAP guarantee mechanisms. Hence, by reason of the interimperialist contradictions in the area of food and agriculture, Portugal's membership in the EEC would mean an end to U.S. grain "dumping" and a considerable rise in agricultural prices, since the guaranteed community prices are considerably higher than current domestic prices. The domestic/CAP price ratio if 0.77 for wheat, 0.72 for barley and 0.91 for corn. Moreover, membership will mean the elimination of the subsidies that reduce the price of grains used in intensive livestock production. As noted by Balassa ("Portugal in Face of the Common Market," Second International Conference on the Portuguese Economy): "The elimination of the subsidy for grains used in livestock production could be considered urgent. In more general terms, in the preparations for Portugal's admission to the EEC, agricultural prices in Portugal would have to approach the relative Common Market prices. This would require an increase in the price of grains other than corn, relative to livestock products."

The decreased profit from intensive livestock production, by reason of the increased cost of production (grains) in relation to the price of the product (meat) would, by the capitalist economy's rule of cost minimization, mean revising production methods, with less intensive use of grain and increased recourse to pasturage.

Alternatives

Under the circumstances, we can define the alternatives that EEC membership poses for the agriculture-food sector: either a "diversion of traffic" in the sense that Viner gave to the term, i.e., by reason of regional integration, the transfer from a cheaper foreign source of supply (in this case, the United States) to a source of supply which is more expensive but is within the membership zone (France, the major EEC exporter), contrary to the principle of "comparative costs"; or an appreciable increase in food self-sufficiency, in view of the rise in prices and farm income, and the combination of troublesome conditions involved in intensive livestock farming. In either case, there would be an increase in the price of consumer goods, with an effect on the distribution of the national income between wages and profits. However, the way in which the increase in the price of consumer goods will be reflected in real wages, that is, in the quantities of these goods available to each worker, depends far more on political-institutional factors (particularly the aggressiveness of the labor movement), the type of industrial specialization adopted for the Portuguese economy and the intensity of the international transfer of values (Unequal Exchange) than on the Ricardian question of the effects of the rise in the relative prices of agricultural products.

In the analysis of the problems posed by admission, at the industrial level, the emphasis has been placed on the small and medium industries' poor competitiveness abroad and the risk that they will "go under" with freer trade. Well, contrary to what occurs within our borders, the ability of a sector to compete abroad depends not only on the comparative efficiency of domestic production conditions and average international conditions ("national value" and "international value," in the Marxist sense), but on the rate of exchange. The problem that membership poses for the Portuguese production apparatus is not lack of competitiveness--the recent surge in exports of textiles, clothing and shoes to the Common Market is an illustration--but in the "price paid" for that competitiveness in terms of the unequal exchange that stems from the increased difference between Portuguese wages and EEC wages, associated with the obligation to devalue the escudo. That is to say, the problems posed by membership are not found at the level of the "market in products," but at the level which, empirically, could be called the "market of factors."

Liberal View

It is, in effect, at this last level that the liberal economists view the shape of Portugal's industrial specialization within the context of EEC membership. As Balassa states (ibid.): "At the same time, Portugal has great possibilities for expanding sales of manufactured products on the Common Market." On one hand, Portuguese exports of manufactured products to the EEC are minimal--only 0.3 percent of imports of manufactured products from the Common Market countries. On the other hand, Portugal has a considerable "wage advantage" over these countries. According to World

Bank figures, in the textile industry, for which there are comparable data, the average cost of an hour of work in 1976/1977 was $1.45 in Portugal, as against $6.90 in the FRG and $5.15 in Italy. Portuguese wages were much lower than those in competing countries, such as Ireland ($2.88) and Greece ($2.23). With the devaluation of the escudo since 1976/1977, the dollar equivalent of wages has risen less in Portugal than in other European countries. Portugal's wage advantage is reflected in the level of its industrial trade with the Common Market countries. According to Doenges and Schatz (1978): "Portugal's relative advantage over the EEC, 'revealed' in trade statistics, lay in labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, clothing and shoes." In a continuing reference to the neoclassical theory of international trade, the liberal specialists in integration start from the principle that in weighing the factors that characterize the Portuguese economy, labor is relatively abundant and capital is scarce. According to the Hecksher-Ohlin theory, the international maximization of production and well-being presupposes that each country specialize in the goods for which the production process emphasizes its relatively abundant factor. Hence, our country would do best to specialize in labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, clothing and shoes.

In the first place, we must understand the meaning of the statement that labor is relatively abundant in Portugal. The idea of the allotment of factors is not used here in the sense of the "volume of employment" ratio, since the "stock" of capital is not directly measurable in physical terms, because it is not homogeneous,* but in the sense of the relative prices of the factors--"relative abundance of the labor factor" meaning that the wage/profit ratio is smaller in Portugal than in the EEC. Well, because capital, by reason of its internationalization, can be moved all over the world, the cited inequality results entirely from the low level of wages in our country. As A. Emmanuel demonstrated (cf "Unequal Exchange"), the nonequivalence of international trade relations, in short, their "imperialist" nature, derives from the difference in the national rates of exploitation, evident in the contrast between the wage levels of industrialized nations and of dependent nations.

According to the liberal economists on this point, then, one would think that the preference for labor-intensive sectors in the scheme of industrial specialization naturally follows from our country's low wage level. The opposite is true, however. It is not the distribution of income in Portugal that determines the composition of industrial exports, but the latter that determines the former. As Richard Eckaus notes ("Strategies of Development and the International Division of Work," second International Conference on the Portuguese Economy), among the underdeveloped countries exporting manufactured products, Portugal's structure of industrial exports is represented largely by the group "textiles, clothing and shoes" (44 percent in 1976), comparable to lower-wage zones like Korea, Hong Kong and

*The problem of the "measurement of capital" is the weakest point in the neoclassical construct.

Taiwan, and very different from the type of export specialization of countries with higher wages, like Spain, where the group "textiles, clothes and shoes" fell to 19 percent of manufactured exports in 1976. Given the impossibility of gaining advantages in productivity, and the restriction that invested capital must earn a "fair" return (i.e., the average general rate of profit), the necessity of competing on the world market against marginal producers of these goods is the real reason for the devaluation of the labor force in our country, where real wages fell 7.7 percent in 1976, 10.5 percent in 1977 and 5.2 percent in 1978, by virtue of the combination of the devaluation of the escudo and inflation. The nature and the goals of the devaluation of the escudo are seen in a better light if we keep in mind that the trend toward a new foreign trade balance equilibrium, observed since the second quarter of 1978, is based on a surge in the exportation of textiles, clothes and shoes.

"Automobile Question"

In the context in which autarky is excluded, the only way to avoid unequal exchange is to shun competition with the newer exporters of manufactured products, seeking a different scheme of international specialization, producing manufactured items for export more like those of the developed capitalist countries. Referring to Poland, A. Emmanuel notes ("Unequal Exchange," p. 349): "It might be thought foolish for Poland to drop the production and export of cotton, in which it has done well, in order to produce an automobile on which it expends 1,000 man-hours, when the same automobile is produced in Turin with only 500 man-hours. However, an automobile man-hour is worth four or five times as much on the international market as a textile man-hour (because automobiles are produced mainly in countries with a high wage scale and cotton textiles are produced in countries where wages are low). Hence, it would be perfectly feasible for Poland to produce its own automobiles instead of acquiring them in exchange for cotton textiles, despite the considerable difference in productivity."

Simply, whereas in the model for industrial growth based on "textiles, clothing and shoes,"* the initiative lies with what we will conveniently call "small northern capitalism," an industrial growth model based on the electromechanical industry, starting with the automotive sector, implies the leadership of the multinationals (in this case Renault and, possibley, Ford). This is because the complex technology and mass production which uniformly characterize the automobile industry cannot be supported by the domestic market. Hence, the sector can only be installed by firms with an international production and marketing network. Moreover, the internationalized development of the automobile sector is not only valuable in itself, but also to the extent that it brings firms in the electromechanical sector into a production cycle within the framework of a process which Joao Cravinho has called "subcontract exportation."

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* In short, this is the so-called Xavier Pinto model defended in the Congress of Economic Activities.

Hence, in Portugal's case, the traditional Leninist concept, tending to identify imperialism with the export of capital, must be replaced by the concept of "mercantile imperialism," associated with trade relations between countries with different wage scales. The recent debate on the organic law for the automotive sector revealed the line of demarcation between dependency and the defense of the nation's interests, separating those who would import merchandise, i.e., "reconvert" present assembly lines into import agencies for finished automobiles, under the elimination of duties scheduled for 1980 in the 1972 trade agreement with the EEC, and those who seek to bring the multinationals in and to develop a parts industry under subcontract to the latter, maintaining the customs barriers until 1985 and using the system of licensed imports as an instrument for an industrialization policy. In the context defined by the law, the attribution of market quotas for each firm would depend on the size of the manufacturer's investment in Portugal.

Mobility of Labor Force

Finally, a decisive factor in the process of development following EEC admission is the period and the modes in which the clause concerning the free circulation of the labor force within the Common Market, contained in the Treaty of Rome, would be applied. With the abolition of institutional restrictions on emigration, given the already-existing ties between the Portuguese labor market and the EEC's labor markets, the application of said clause would reinforce the international mobility of the labor force, tending to bring Portuguese wage levels closer to community levels. Although sociological factors and the current unemployment in Common Market countries mean this mobility would be less than perfect, it is inconsistent with an industrial growth model based on textiles, clothing and shoes, in competition with countries with lower wages.

For the sake of simplification, we can group the indicated development options for each of the contexts (agriculture, industry and emigration) into two extreme scenarios. In the first scenario, CAP implementation means a simple "diversion of traffic" from the United States to the EEC exporters of food products, with a drop in the real earnings of the workers, making consumer goods more expensive. Industrial growth, dominated by "small northern capitalism," would be based on a "Third World" specialization in such sectors as textiles, with a continuing trend toward the degradation of the terms of exchange and the level of wages. The membership negotiations would lead to the virtual suspension of the clause pertaining to the free circulation of the labor force, maintaining the wage-scale difference necessary for unequal exchange. In the second scenario, the implementation of CAP would be reflected mainly in the greater degree of food self-sufficiency. Industrial growth, dominated by the multinationals in the automotive industry and electromechanical enterprises, would tend to provide the Portuguese economy with a specialization, and wage levels closer to community levels. The application of the clause providing for free circulation of the labor force would tend to bring wage levels closer together and to reduce the unequal exchange. These options for long-range development correspond to short-range economic policy options: to maintain the present stabilization policy based

on deflation and the devaluation of the escudo, in the case of the first scenario; or to consider that "we have been too long" on this road, and to propose a turnabout, in the case of the second scenario. These were the options in confrontation in the Second International Conference on the Portuguese Economy. Since the possibility of autarky is ruled out, what remains to us, as the lesser of the evils, is to await the arrival of the multinationals.

6362
CSO: 3101

COLUMNIST CRITICIZES NATO FOR NOT PROVIDING MILITARY AID

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Oct 79 p 3

[Article by J. Baptista Comprido: "Loyalties and Commitments"]

[Text] We have been members of NATO for 30 years, as long as the Atlantic Alliance has been in existence. It could perhaps be said that for 3 decades we have systematically reiterated our loyalty, to the allied chiefs of state when they have visited us here at home, or when we have gone to the political and military capitals of the organization.

No one doubts, surely, that the declarations of loyalty are sincere, although one might wonder at the insistence on their repetition. In any event, the goals are the same today as they were yesterday, the effects are very similar, although the circumstances are very different.

Thus the same loyalties mean the same commitments. Hence, our active membership in NATO has not reflected the increasing value and importance of our geography and our strategic potential within the general framework of the alliance.

Perhaps this is also why our armed forces are today becoming more disenchanted than ever.

The essentially maritime character of the Atlantic Alliance obviously weighed in the decision to put strategy before politics where Portugal's admission to NATO was concerned, and that emphasis must have been very strong, inasmuch as the alliance spoke out for political democracy, and our country could only offer the solidarity of its geography, rooted in Europe and extending into the Atlantic.

Despite Portugal's less than perfect qualifications, it was granted certain opportunities for military rearmament, relatively limited and justifiably directed toward the maritime component. The opportunities consisted in the acquisition of used equipment or the modernization or reconversion of existing equipment (paradoxically dictated more by the plans than by what Portugal would have desired), against delayed but guaranteed payment. The only thing that could be expected from these commitments, apparently, were dividends of political solidarity.

Although the Portuguese component was treated strategically as an island (Spain was a non-NATO "sea"), and was included in the Atlantic command, the diplomacy of our military was skillful enough to see that our land force acquired fair participatory status in the defense of Europe and came to receive assistance and materiel.

It was natural. The army had a hard time accepting that in any alliance, political or (even more logically) military, it would have to assume a subordinate position. And, here, the oaths of fidelity meant an obligation to honor commitments. Actually, military technology still used concepts and applications surviving from the last war, which did not pose any insoluble problems in learning new tactics, nor did it demand sophisticated training or drill, nor entail high maintenance and operational expenses.

The final choice of overseas theatres, the strategic reorientation toward the south, implying a radical reorganization of the military apparatus, the geographical boundaries of the treaty itself and its restrictive interpretation of political solidarity all led to the end of the land program and the reduction of Portugal's active participation, but with no break in the commitments assumed.

It should be noted, in the interest of truth, that the allied military solidarity was practically nonexistent with respect to the colonies, and the political solidarity, which was weak to begin with, became insignificant with time, even turning into active hostility, which diplomats on both sides demurely glossed over in public.

This rapid and limited foray into history of political and military relations between Portugal and NATO will perhaps clear the mind and make it possible to understand much of the disillusionment that still bothers us today when we consider that our political solidarity with the alliance and our generosity with our geophysical space on behalf of the organization should be adequate justification where our military wants are concerned.

It would not seem helpful to deny that the "improvement" of the former regime, ensuring stability and strategic confidence, succeeded in maintaining the allied interest and made the regime politically tolerable, the more so because it was never a financial burden, even if it was not particularly generous.

Well, events in Portugal after 25 April, led by the military themselves, could not help but be followed with particular attention and (it must be said) with cold logic and marked impartiality by our partners in the alliance, as a group.

The year 1975, especially, caused public apprehension, although only the most elementary measures were taken to fully guarantee the minimum security indispensable to the organization and the alliance.

For this reason, 25 November and subsequent events were greeted with relief and satisfaction by all the allies. The alliance believed in the sincerity of the loyalty, once again reiterated (and now perhaps justified), and in the intention and propriety of reorganizing and converting the armed forces into a useful instrument of broad cooperation.

The plans and programs presented, naturally both courageous and ambitious, and the sincerity with which they were undertaken, even though they implied qualitative national priorities that may not have been consistent with the operational requirements of the organization, were certainly accepted and even appreciated.

However, the elegance of the gesture and the generosity of the promises could only have been found deficiently grounded by anyone in the least familiar with the standards and pragmatic criteria that a collective organization must adopt in reasoning out decisions, involving not only the establishment of goals and the use of resources but the guarantees and risks in their implementation.

They are problems for which time generally provides realistic solutions.

And time has shown, as it has in other regions within the organization itself, that political instability, generating discontinuity in government and all the unavoidable economic and social ramifications, and obviously weakening the image of the regime itself, makes decisionmaking difficult and presents problems for the implementation of those decisions.

Nor is there any advantage in fleeing from the supposition that the spirit of the transition period we are undergoing could be carried out strictly to the letter, and hence the armed forces could be in a phase of resuming their genuine military vocation, without further idiocies which have no lawful place in a political democracy and violate the principle of the natural hierarchy.

The economic factor, perhaps even more important than the political factor, has always been, from the first days of the alliance, the major yardstick for the defense effort. The economy and defense have always been considered the basic elements in a system whose equilibrium cannot be disturbed because of the negative results that would inevitably be provoked in the other vectors of defense itself.

Moreover, in the last 2 years there has been a visible qualitative leap in the military application of technology. There are no longer minor branches. All of them use sophisticated weapons, and all of these, even if they are conventional, require a certain degree of technical training to operate and a high level of technology to maintain and conserve. The corresponding costs can hardly be supported on weak or badly managed budgets.

We need not go into other factors, different in nature but of equal or greater importance, to demonstrate that the present situation is quite different from former situations.

Hence, it might not be presumptuous to say that although the declarations of loyalty have perhaps never been as sincere as they are today, the commitments have never been so expensive to meet.

It would be interesting to analyze the curve of the rate of aid and military assistance from NATO in parallel with the development of the political situation in our country. A synchronous evaluation of the two phenomena might add much to our understanding and provide new food for thought.

It is certain, and even vital to the nation's interests, that the armed forces must be rethought, from top to bottom, as always; from its politics to its strategy, as is logical; and from inside to outside, as the procedure.

When that occurs, then it is not hard to foresee that loyalties and commitments could even trade places.

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CSO: 3101

ECONOMY MINISTER FORESEES 1 TO 2 PERCENT GROWTH IN 1980

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 23 Nov 79 p 44

[Text] The minister of economy, Jose Luis Leal, stated on Wednesday that within the context of international uncertainty and the gradually increasing flexibility of the national economy, the growth foreseen for 1980 will range between 1 and 2 percent. In the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, he said, the growth will be close to zero and inflation will increase.

The minister of economy ascribed the question of the employment level to the "responsible behavior" of the social affairs officials through which the "strain may be eased by joint progress that may make it easier to bring unemployed workers and young people aspiring to hold their first job into the productive process."

In the course of his speech during the Third Annual Colloquy which, under the epigraph "Where Does the Spanish Economy Stand and Where Is It Heading," the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks organizes, Jose Luis Leal asserted that in 1980 foreseeable long-term capital receipts make it possible to predict a mdoerate deficit in the current account, "one that we are ready to face up to."

After reviewing the political successes achieved during the present fiscal year and stressing the importance of the trade unions and employer organizations being able to spare the government "unpopular decisions" and discuss issues which properly concern them, he dwelt on the need for the "public sector to use the resources allocated to it with greater effectiveness." Especially when we are going through a stage in "which it becomes difficult to meet the over-all demand for greater well-being that broad sectors of society demand."

Jose Luis Leal underscored the need during 1980 to observe strict discipline in the economic process--"what we do not know is the limits of the economy's liberalization"--and indicated a foreseeable supplementary investment of 70 billion pesetas.

In his address, the director of the Department of Research, Advice and Programming of the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks, Manuel Lagares, weighed the positive and negative aspects of Spain's present economic situation. Among the former he emphasized in particular the high level of recognition and acceptance by all the social affairs officials with respect to the existence of a serious crisis.

With the respect to the negative factors in the economic situation, he pointed to the reality of a cyclical situation caused by a lessened demand, a low level of employment and a high level of inflation; an international context caused by the strain of energy costs; a considerable loss of dynamism in economic growth and an economic infrastructure functioning within a rigid framework of relations.

Mariano Rubio, deputy governor of the Bank of Spain, noted the "temptations" which during the next fiscal year will besiege financial policy: To follow an expansive monetary policy for the purpose of combating economic weakness and unemployment; to maintain that unemployment is reduced with a deficit in the public sector; to reject self-financing as a significant source of funds for an enterprise and to increase controls.

In the course of the colloquy, Mariano Rubio commented that it may be predicted that "for 1980 the types of interest will be restricted" and that the growth rate of liquid assets will fluctuate between 18 percent and 19 percent.

Miguel Marin, Under Secretary of the Budget and Public Expenditures of the Ministry of Finance, underscored that the most significant aspect of the budget's negative balance with respect to the subject of expenditures is in large measure attributable to the state's assumption of the financial imbalances Social Security and the management sector are undergoing.

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INFLATION RATE FLOATS ALONG AT 13.6 PERCENT

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 24 Nov 79 p 33

[Text] During this past October the consumer price index rose by 1.1 percent according to the provisional data made available by the National Institute of Statistics, pending a review by the provincial price commissions.

This increase indicates that in the first 10 months of the year the increase in consumer prices hovers around 13.6 percent. Once the provisional data of preceding months are reviewed a change of some tenths is possible.

The October increase is slightly lower than that of the same month last year when an 0.9 percent increase was recorded. The yearly rate of price increases for the 12 months ending this October, was 16.6 percent, a percentage which may be surpassed when the year ends taking into account the fact that the final two months, especially December, usually have a tendency to rise.

The basic component of the price increase recorded in October is the stability of prices in the food, beverages and tobacco category that represents 40 percent of the index and which in October recorded a positive shift of four-tenths of 1 percent. The stability of food prices has moderated the increase in the price index throughout the year.

The annual inflation rate of the Spanish economy at this time stands at a level close to half that of the OECD and of the European Community. In both organizations in September the average inflation rate rose above the 10 percent quotation with clear tendencies towards a rise. This drawing closer to the developed countries' inflation rates is a positive fact for the Spanish economy although some experts fear an accelerated inflation rate in the future.

8094
CSO: 3110

EXPORTS SHOW A DECLINE DURING SEPTEMBER

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 20 Nov 79 p 53

[Text] In September a considerable drop in Spain's rate of exports was recorded while a large import figure was maintained. The most significant fact about the latter was the cost of the petroleum acquired that month which already reached the price of 10,500 pesetas per ton. Twenty-six percent of the total value of imports represent the crude oil category according to the figures of the Directorate General of Customs.

This price for every ton of imported petroleum stands in contrast to that of the selling price to the public of the refined products which, in the case of heavy by-products--fuel oil--hovers between 7,800 and 9,000 pesetas. This fact emphasizes an actual subsidy of 1,000 to 2,200 pesetas per ton of fuel made available for consumption. The rest of the by-products at this time are at higher selling prices than the cost of the raw material, crude oil, although the difference between the two values has been reduced.

Alongside this fact, which brings out the magnitude of the petroleum crisis and which is based on import prices that must be termed low where those one should expect next year, September's foreign trade data seem to indicate a change in the situation of our trade relations.

The over-all figure for the imports of the month we are referring to amounted to 138,853,000,000 pesetas with an increase on the order of 28 percent as compared with the same month last year. Exports, however, which in the past 10 months had been maintained at over 90 billion pesetas remained at 77,345,000,000. This figure is 15.7 percent higher than that of the same month the previous year in monetary terms which indicates in real terms that we have maintained the value of our exports.

The cumulative figures for the first 10 months of the year, despite the October crisis, are remaining at a very satisfactory level which has never previously been attained by Spain's foreign trade. The value of imports over those 10 months rose to 1,190,215,000,000 pesetas and that of exports amounted to 870,332,000,000. The cover of the latter as compared with the former attained the record quotation of 73.1 percent.

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FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES CONTINUE TO INCREASE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 20 Nov 79 p 53

[Text] Spain's gold reserves and foreign currency in October also saw an increase of $62.8 million according to information from the Bank of Spain. This increase was the lowest of the year although it occurred in a month traditionally experiencing a small increase in foreign currency because of the nonexistent impact of tourism. The actual amount of reserves came to $13,223,800,000, a figure which is one of the highest of the oil-importing developed countries. In the first 10 months of the year, throughout which reserves rose, the increase amounted to 3,208 billion dollars, representing a historic record.

Official estimates indicate a reasonable expectation that next year may produce a loss of reserves as a result of the impact of the cost of petroleum imports which will necessitate a sizable transfer of resources abroad. This drop will make greater flexibility in internal credit possible in that the foreign sector will absorb less resources. It is feared, however, that the effect of a retrenchment in the foreign sector will be neutralized by the larger public deficit as a result of which internal private credit will once again be the one to pay for the policy of controlling liquid assets.

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BRIEFS

WAGES KEEP UP WITH INFLATION--The high rate of price increases during these last few years has made it so that it is now traditional that the minimum wage established in the month of April must once more be adjusted in the month of October. This time it has risen from 640 pesetas to 692, which means an increase of 8.1 percent. If one takes into account that during the 6 months ending in August--the latest data available--the consumer goods price index rose 8.04 percent, one arrives at the conclusion that the minimum wage adjustment between April and October does no more than to cover the loss caused by the cost of living increase. In brief, it has been a question of restoring the buying power eroded by the loss of value of the currency. On the other hand, between October 1978 and October 1979 the minimum wage increased 92 pesetas in absolute terms and 15.3 percent in relative terms. The price index rose from August 1978 to August 1979 by 14.7 percent, that is, slightly less than the minimum wage. In view of these figures, it can be stated that wage earners are in practically the same economic situation as they were a year ago. So, a comparison of the minimum wage established on 1 October to that established 6 months ago and that of a year ago shows that there has been practically no change in real terms. However, in order to confirm this conclusion more definitely it will be necessary to wait for the publication of the September price index so that the periods compared for both indicators should coincide. [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 20-26 Oct 79 p 5] 9204

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES GIVEN--Neither inflation nor unemployment is evenly distributed over the national terriroty. The latest employment statistics show that the rate of unemployment recorded ranges from somewhat less than 2 percent to somewhat more than 18 percent. All of the Andalusian provinces--with the exception of Almeria--and the two provinces of Extremadura, have a rate of unemployment of over 10 percent. Among them Seville, with a record figure of 18.3 percent, and Malaga, with almost 17 percent, stand out because of their high rate of unemployment. Both provinces have more than double the national rate of unemployment; the most recent statistics do not show a noticeable improvement of the situation. Following these two are the remaining Andalusian provinces--from Huelga, with 14.3 percent to Granada with slightly over 11 percent--and Extremadura, with Caceres and Badajoz, which respectively have a rate of unemployment slightly over and under 12 percent. The province of Ciudad Real also has a rate of over 10 percent.

Provinces with rates of unemployment which exceed the national average include several provinces of the Mediterranean coast, at the head of which is Barcelona with 9.4 percent, the Bay of Biscay coast--Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya, which have nearly 9 percent--and two small islands in the northern plateau--Burgos and Valladolid--and one in the Atlantic: Las Palmas. The remaining Spanish provinces have unemployment rates under the national average. Some of the provinces with the highest unemployment rate also have the highest inflation. [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 20-26 Oct 79 p 4] 9204

INDUSTRY DEPRESSED--The latest survey of economic conditions--for the month of August--carried out by the Ministry of Industry could lead one to believe that the activity of the sector might develop favorable during the last quarter of the year. However, neither domestic demand, which is going through a period of marked weakness, nor foreign demand, for a sector which is increasingly running into difficulties, permit much hope for a change for the better in the short run. In fact, the level of orders placed is 46 points below normal, which is one of the worst levels of the last 12 months. This situation is even worse in subsectors such as that of capital goods whose indicator is -63, without any prospect of improvement in the immediate future, and of semiprocessed goods, which is -50. Only the subsector engaged in the manufacture of consumer goods has risen 7 points, being 35 points below normal. [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 27 Oct-2 Nov 79 p 7] 9204

RECORD TRADE DEFICIT--During the month of July, there was a trade deficit of 56,141,000,000 pesetas which is the highest figure in the last 2 years. Imports rose to 159.25 billion pesetas which, in addition to being a real record, were about 25 percent more than those of 12 months ago. Of the total value of the imported products, 28.6 percent--that is, 45,537,000,000 pesetas--was for crude oil which is the highest monthly figure ever. Exports--with a a value of 103,109,000,000 pesetas--remain unchanged, near what appears to be their upper limit, and although the total exceeds by almost 22 percent the amount for July 1978, it is about equal to that maintained during this entire year. The coverage of imports by exports, which last June was 84.6 percent, in July fell to 64.7 percent, which is one of the lowest percentages in the last 2 years. [Text] [Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 27 Oct-2 Nov 79 p 7] 9204

CSO: 3110

ATTACK ON GOESGEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION DISCUSSED

Police Investigate Terrorist Attack

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 6 Nov 79 p 9

[Article by Jacques-Simon Egly]

[Text] "If the Federal Security Police had not suffered the popular failure that we know and if it were not currently engaged, in no way would it be involved in an investigation like the one now mobilizing the Federal Public Ministry." In any case, that is the opinion of the spokesman for the Federal Department of Justice and Police. He was questioned yesterday about the steps chosen to investigate Saturday's explosion at the Goesgen nuclear power station. He recalled that police duties are handled by the cantons, unless assistance is requested. Offenses involving espionage, the counterfeiting of currency and the illegal use of explosives, alone, fall within the jurisdiction of the Confederation which carries on the prosecution and investigation. In this instance, investigation by the criminal police is being pursued in collaboration with the Solothurn cantonal police and the scientific service of the Federal Ministry located in Zurich.

Made up of both the services entrusted with counter-espionage and with the illegal use of explosives and counterfeiting, the police corps under the jurisdiction of the Confederation attorney general numbers some 30 people. For the time being, the investigation is attempting to prove the authenticity of the letter claiming authorship of the deed by the "007 Do-It-Yourself Group." One way of autenticating the letter would be to establish it was written and mailed before the explosion. At this point, it seems Bern has no knowledge about the identity of any of the members of the "007 Do-It-Yourself Group."

The Nuclear Sector Attract Terrorists

It is rather curious to think that the name of the group claiming authorship for the Goesgen attempt is known, that it is already being credited with a previous deed, and maybe others, while none of the leaders of this "007 Do-It-Yourself Group" have yet been identified. Do-it-yourself refers to a small book, the saboteur's perfect guide, published , then ultimately prohibited in West Germany. As for 007, it refers to the fast-paced humor of Jame Bond's movie audience. In this Switzerland where the names of citizens who have committed small pecadilloes are sometimes kept on file by the police, where Cincera's methods provoked an outcry, we would rather like for the police (cantonal and federal) to have records enabling them to arrest those terrorists before they escalate their violence.

If, until now, their attacks against nuclear power stations have only produced material damages, desire or an error in execution could, someday, lead them to commit a most calamitous action.

Ecological circles which are an integral part of our democracy are obviously the first to wish for the arrest of the authors of those attacks. The fact that the terrorists attack nuclear power stations--for them the symbol of a society they reject--could lead to the dangling uneasy suspicion they are acting as a sort of muscle guard for anti-nuclear sympathizers. Consequently, ill-informed citizens could mistake them for those who oppose nuclear forces democratically. This confusion must be absolutely rejected.

Yet, we believe that those who participate in energy discussions should reflect on such attacks. It is normal, democratic and even necessary to have different opinions on a suitable energy policy, the use of various types of energy, or ways to save by reducing waste. However, on the basis of these discussions, especially on nuclear matters, a sort of overall moral condemnation of our society should not be inferred. Before the Reformers' Wall in Geneva last Sunday--the day after the Goesgen attack--, I could not help thinking about that while listening to the moderator of the Pastors' Association address a crowd of Protestants. In his sermon, he was cheerfully mixing specific and general criticism: jumping from the nuclear sector in Switzerland, to underdevelopment in Third World countries, to the withering of spirituality, it all ran together. To conform to fashion, it would be easy to speak of the overall concept of the committed sermon.

To be sure, all the elements of our existence are linked together; to be sure, our way of life is both cause and effect of the energy consumption, but, as soon as we try to find balances, defining problems and possibilities, contradictions and complementarity must consequently--and particularly--be taken in consideration: in short, events must be characterized in context and not confused in a common reproof or glorification. Finally, this ordering is nothing more than the requirements of a democratic life. Overall confusion has always generated totalitarianism.

By definition, terrorists are people who neither equalize nor shade arguments. Their dissent is inclusive, their attitude rigid, which enables them to perform their destructive acts.

Terrorists are interested in becoming involved in the nuclear sector because it is highly emothional and engenders clear-cut choices. However, dissension is luckily too strong between those people and ecological circles which are an integral part of our democracy. The Goesgen terrorists are deluding themselves and are not deceiving anyone.

Yet, all those who discuss energy--ecologists and others--should be even more determined to prove that debating nuclear matters is to exchange serious information, thought-deserving arguments and listen to each other to find balanced solutions.

As for the Goesgen power station, despite incurred external damages, its rapid return to operations proved that it is well guarded and its security measures real.

Damages Estimated

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 6 Nov 79 p 9

[Text] The amount of damages sustained by the meteorological tower and the 400,000-volt transformer located on the outskirt of the Goesgen nuclear power station following the attempt perpetrated by the "007 Do-It-Yourself Group" on Saturday night is currently estimated at 1.5 million francs.

Station Director Hermann Wisler stated that the damages to the transformer amount to approximately 1 million francs, a great many insulators and cables ensuring the feeding and distribution of the electric power having been damaged. As for the meteorological tower, the amount of sustained damages may be estimated at close to 500,000 francs; it will have to be reerected, repaired and its measuring devices used for the study of climatic variations around the station will have to be replaced. The two installations are insured and an investigation is underway to determine more exactly the scope of the damages.

The meteorological tower belongs to the Goesgen-Daeniken Nuclear Power Station Company while the transformer is the property of the Aare-Tessin Electric Company (ATEL). It should be noted that ATEL holds 35 percent of the capital of the Goesgen-Daenicken Nuclear Power Station Company.

As of Saturday morning, surveillance was reinforced in the station's vicinity. Moreover, on Sunday, many onlookers who had flocked to Goesgen were unable to satisfy their curiosity, the Solothurn police having barred access to the site of the attempt. Finally, let us recall that it was announced last week that commercial exploitation of the Goesgen station in mid-November was about to be approved.

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